If you have issues viewing or accessing this file contact us at NCJRS.gov. r . ~IJI- ~ -.,. .. .. .. .. National Drug Control Strategy 128897 U.S. Department of Justice National Institute of Justice This document has been reproduced exactly .as recei~e? from the person or organization originating it. Points of vledw or oP;n~0:C~~~~~I~ I thl d cument are those of the authors an d 0 no :apre~en~ the official position or policies of the National Institute of Justice. Permission to reproduce this cCliyrighted material has been gr19~gric Domain/National Drug Control Strategy/The lVhite House to the National Criminal Justice Reference Service (NCJRS). Further reproduction outside of the NCJRS system requires permis­ sion of the copyright owner. February 1991 The White House TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES: I am pleased to transmit today for the consideration of the Congress and the American people the 1991 National Drug Control Strategy, in accordance with section 1005 of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 (Public Law 100-690; 21 U.S.C. 1504). This is the third National Drug Control Strategy, and it should be viewed as a companion to the previous two submitted in September 1989 and January 1990. This Strategy lays out a comprehensive plan for Federal drug control activities for fiscal year 1992. The principal goal remains unchanged: to reduce the level of illegal drug use in America. This goal cannot be achieved by the Federal Government acting alone, and so this Strategy calls upon all segments of our society to continue to do their part. In crafting this Strategy, we have sought the counsel not only of Federal officials and Members of the Congress, but also State and local officials; experts in the fields of drug prevention, treatment, and enforcement; and public-spirited citizens. I am pleased to be able to report that there are indications that we are embarked on the right path: although much remains to be done and serious problems still confront us, numerous indicators show that we are beginning to see significant declines in drug use throughout the Nation. continued congressional suppo,rt is essential to ensure progress. THE WHITE HOUSE ---------- Contents Introduction ........................................................................... 1 National Priorities The Criminal Justice System ............................................... 23 Drug Treatment ................................................................... 45 Education, Community Action, and the Workplace .............. 59 International Initiatives ....................................................... 77 Border Interdiction and Security ......................................... 93 A Research Agenda............................................................ 105 Intelligence and Information Management ......................... 115 Appendices A. High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas ........................... 127 (,; B. Federal Resource Priorities and Requirements............. 133 C. Drug Policy Management Agenda................................. 143 D. Recomlmended State Legislation................................... 153 E. Acknov.rledgments ........................................................ 159 ~\ f I I Introduction PreSident Bush presented his first National Drug Control Strategy to the Congress - and to the American people - on September 5, 1989, a time of unprecedented concern over epidemic levels of drug use and frightening amounts of drug-related crime. There had been highly publicized Presidential initiatives against drugs in the past: periodic law enfOrCe111ent crackdowns over the years, major Federal public aware­ ness and treatment campaigns, and more recently, attempts to police and seal our national borders against drug smugglers. But the President's National Drug Control Strategy marked a clear and bold departure from previous attempts to grapple with the problem, attempts that empha­ sized one tactic or another. For the first time, the Federal government had developed and publicly articulated a complete, sophisticated, and finely differentiated understanding of drugs as a public policy issue. The Strategy clearly acknowledged the visible effects of widespread drug use: rising rates of violent crime, serious damage to the Nation's health and economy, and strains on vital relationships with international allies, for example. And the Strategy's proposed program - now largely ratified and funded by Congress, and in place, up and running - included major new initia­ tives in these and other areas. But at tl"le same time, the President's Strategy advanced a vigorous argument against continuation of the largely reactive, uncoord~nated, and piecemeal efforts of past anti-drug campaigns. There would be no faddish search for a single, overriding answer to drug addicqon and its attendant miseries. And there would be no pendulum swings among policy alternatives, first one extreme, then the other. Instead, the National Drug Control Strategy sought to come to terms with the drug problem not as a collection of random and frighten­ ing symptoms, but in its essence: drug use itself. The President's first Strategy in September 1989 described drug use as a broad epidemiol- National Drug Control Strategy 1 Introduction ogical phenomenon, progressing in individuals and passing through sectors of the population at different rates, in different degrees, with different effects. The Strategy also described drug use as the result of a market, in which the variable "supply" of drug sellers and the variable "demand" of drug buyers meet in a combustible mix. Arrayed against these complicated, interrelated cycles must be a series of complicated, interrelated responses, each designed to complement the other, each designed to achieve maximum disruption of the drug ma.--:-ket and the epidemic it feeds. This third National Drug Control Strategy reaffirms the main argu­ ments about the drug problem advanced in the first two Strategies, and, like those documents, argues that to fight drugs successfully we must - as a Nation - exert pressure on all parts of this problem simultane­ ously. We must have meaningful efforts to prevent people from using drugs in the first place, and we must provide effective treatment for those who need it and can benefit from it. On the presumption that law enforcement not only punishes but also instructs, we must hold users accountable for their actions and thereby deter others from using drugs. We must prosecute dealers and traffickers. We must punish those convicted of drug crimes. We must disrupt the flow of drugs, drug money, and related chemicals. We must engage other nations in efforts to reduce the growth, production, and distribution of drugs. We must support basic and applied research in behavior, medicine, and technol­ ogy. And we must improve our intelligence capabiliti~s in order to attack drug trafficking organizations better. No single tactic, by itself, is sufficient. All of these must be employed. Under this Administration, Federal funding to fight drugs has grown 64 percent to $10.5 billion in Fiscal Year 1991. The President is requesting a total of $11.7 billion for Fiscal Year 1992, an increase of 11 percent above the Fiscal Year 1991 level, and 82 percent since this Administration took office. Appendix B presents a broad overview of Federal budget levels and funding priorities. A companion volume to this Strategy, the National Drug Control Strategy Budget Summary, presents detailed resource information for each drug control program agency. There are some who believe that the Federal effort should be evenly divided among what are loosely called "supply reduction" and "demand reduction" activities. This notion ignores the fact that the mission of the Federal government includes activities that only the Federal government can undertake, such as efforts in countries where drugs are grown and produced, as well as broader initiatives to engage the international community to take strong measures against money laundering. It ignores the fact that much of our interdiction effort occurs offshore, on the high seas, or in international airspace, and requires the use of expensive assets, including ships, aircraft, and sophisticated air-, sea-, 2 National Drug Control Strategy Introduction and land-based radar systems. It also ignores the fact that law enforce­ ment, sometimes conceived of as only a "supply reduction" activity, has il a deterrent -- i.e., "demand reduction -- effect, an effect widely acknowl­ edged. Indeed, some would even argue that deterrence is law enforce­ ment's main effect, or main justification. In any case, simple distinc­ tions between "supply redudion" and "demand reduction" are artificial and at times even meaningless. That said, this Strategy continues the general pattern of distribu­ tion of Federal funds presented in the first two Strategies. Federal Departments and agencies maintain exclusive responsibility for drug­ related diplomatic and border security programs; major responsibility for large-scale climinal investigations, and long-term scientific research; and they provide information and partial funding support to local law enforcement, treatment, and prevention programs. (A significant por­ tion of the funds in Fiscal Year 1992, it should be noted, are targeted for Congressionally-mandated pay reform for law enforcement personne1.) Neither the original National Drug Control Strategy nor its January 1990 companion proceeds from the assumption that the Federal government's programs and money