INDO-PAK WAR 1965 September 2015 Operations in the Chhamb and Sialkot Sectors n By Lt Gen Satish Nambiar AKISTANI INFILTRATION operations action to effect the Poonch-Uri link up, into J & K in August 1965 were code- notwithstanding the failure of Gibraltar, and named Operation Gibraltar. If these the fact that the Pakistan Army had suffered had made good progress, Pakistan’s significant losses in the Tithwal, Uri and Kargil plan was to launch Operation Grand sectors, Field Marshal Ayub Khan decided to PSlam towards capturing the Indian state. It was launch Operation Grand Slam anyway. planned as a swift and surgical armour-led On September 1, 1965, well before the thrust into the Chhamb bulge for the capture crack of dawn, the hamlets around the Indian of the vital town of Akhnoor. Maj Gen Akhtar border town of Chhamb awoke to the rumbling Hussain Malik, General Officer Commanding of Patton tanks and a thundering artillery Pakistan’s 12 Infantry Division, the architect of barrage from 105 and 155mm guns. Pakistan both Operations Gibraltar and Grand Slam, had had launched the operation with almost cleverly woven in an artillery plan to provide three brigades supported by two regiments Nonetheless, overwhelming support to the Southern thrust of armour and an entire artillery brigade lines of the offensive. The prelude to this plan consisting of a large number of field and despite the was to cause heavy attrition to the lone artillery medium artillery guns, gun locating regiments heavy fire, regiment that supported India’s Akhnoor- and an air defence regiment. From accounts based 191 (Independent) Infantry Brigade, available, it appears that by about 1100 hours, units of the which was supported by a single squadron of faced with the ominous prospect of being 191 Infantry light AMX -13 tanks of 20 Lancers. overrun by the enemy, Brig Manmohan Singh In the event, as the unsuspecting batteries asked for air support to check the enemy’s Brigade of the Indian Army’s 14 Field Regiment advance. Why it took almost five hours after did well. As celebrated Independence Day on August the commencement of the Pakistani offensive 15, they were struck at multiple locations by to do so remains a mystery; the fact that it all three the well directed and concentrated fire from took another six hours for the first IAF aircraft battalions of Akhtar Malik’s artillery brigade; as a result of to arrive on the scene is another. which the regiment was crippled with the Nonetheless, despite the heavy fire, units the Brigade loss of about half of its guns and considerable of the 191 Infantry Brigade did well. As all and the lone ammunition stockpiles. Worse still, Brigade three battalions of the Brigade and the lone Commander Brig Masters was killed in the squadron of AMX tanks withdrew, first to squadron of bombardment. Jaurian by early morning on September 2, and AMX tanks Though the Western Army Commander Lt then to Akhnoor by the same evening, they Gen Harbaksh Singh (who had the reputation caused significant attrition to the advancing withdrew, first of being a no-nonsense and aggressive Pakistani forces. Inexplicably, as it seemed at to Jaurian by commander), speedily replaced the loss with the time, though Pakistani forces had crossed a battery of medium guns, and moved Brig the Munnawar Wali Tawi during the night early morning Manmohan Singh post haste from the Miran of September 1/2, they delayed resuming on September Sahib-based 162 Infantry Brigade to assume advance till September 3. command of 191 (Independent) Infantry This provided space to the Indian forces to 2, and then Brigade, damage had been done. The Akhnoor reorganise. Headquarters 10 Infantry Division to Akhnoor sector was in considerable disarray. With (that had arrived) was made responsible surprise on its side and superior use of artillery, for the sector with two additional infantry by the same Pakistan had scored a significant preliminary brigades (28 and 41) under command. While evening success even before the battle had begun. 191 Infantry Brigade was tasked to organise While the Indian military was initiating defences at Akhnoor, 41 Infantry Brigade, 54 IndiaSTRATEGIC September 2015 was tasked to take up defences around Akhnoor on September 6, they had run out 1965 War Major Jaurian. This it successfully did till it withdrew of steam, and were decisively beaten back. By engagements with infiltrators in Aug, large on night September 4/5 apparently due to late evening September 6, seeing the writing number of raiders killed, overwhelming Pakistani pressure. But it had on the wall, Pakistanis started moving much of others exfiltrated back to achieved its purpose by allowing 28 Infantry their armour and artillery out of the Chhamb POK Brigade to be inducted into a delaying position sector to deal with an Indian riposte that was at the Fatwal Ridge, thus further ensuring under way in the Lahore and Sialkot sectors, adequate time for the preparation of defences leaving just about enough forces to blunt any at Akhnoor. Indian counter-attack. While the Pakistani offensive did catch the The Indian forces in the sector, having Indian military by surprise, it seemed there stalled the Pakistani offensive and recovered was also some disarray within the Pakistani balance, then launched operations to evict the senior leadership over the depth to which Pakistanis but with limited success, before the the offensive was sustainable. The delay in ceasefire came into effect. exploiting the surprise gained on the launch The Indian Army launched simultaneous of operations, and crossing of the Munnawar thrusts in the Lahore and Sialkot sectors, as Wali Tawi, was possibly occasioned by the also further south in the deserts. Operations change in command on the Pakistani side in the Lahore sector commenced before first with Akhtar Hussain Malik being replaced by light on September 6, but operations in the Lt Gen Yahya Khan on September 2. By the Sialkot sector to be undertaken by 1 Corps time the Pakistanis resumed the offensive under Lt Gen PO Dunn were staggered to and reached the forward defences around enable its formations to get into position in IndiaSTRATEGIC 55 INDO-PAK WAR 1965 September 2015 AIR + LAND + NAVAL + SECURITY + MEDICAL + UNMANNED kilometers of Pakistani territory. Sialkot, though only about 14 km from the nearest point on the border, was always going to be an REGISTER objective too far for India’s “Strike” Corps, considering the strength of NOW the opposing forces. FOR EARLY 26 Infantry Division and 6 BIRD DISCOUNT Mountain Division that crossed the International Border just Access the global before midnight September 7 in areas Bajragarhi/Unchewains and Charwa/Maharajke respectively, made slow progress in establishing market at the world footholds across on the Pakistani side for the next two days. Even so, 1 Armoured Division was launched leading defence to exploit the space provided and breakthrough towards Phillaura and Chawinda as initial objectives. & security event On September 11, 1 Armoured Division achieved initial success at Phillaura and managed to destroy Two Pakistani officers, the Jammu-Samba area, and were launched a large number of Patton tanks in what were Captain Ghulam Hussain and Capt Mohammad just before midnight September 7. bruising tank battles of fire and attrition, but Sajjad, were captured Though impressive in terms of the number progress on ground was slow. Having secured of formations under command, the “Strike” Phillaura, 1 Corps made the same mistake that Corps was in fact an ad-hoc arrangement put the Pakistanis made at the Munnawar Wali Tawi together hurriedly for the operation. The Corps in the Chhamb Sector; the forces paused to Headquarters itself had commenced raising regroup before attempting to take Chawinda. only in May 1965; 6 Mountain Division was a As it turned out, 14 Infantry Division ran into It is a two-brigade formation raised in March 1963 tough opposition and by the time, the Corps measure for operational tasks on the UP-Tibet border, gathered itself for assaults on Chawinda and and was neither equipped nor trained for Zafarwal, the battle in the Sialkot sector turned of the operations in the plains; 14 Infantry Division into a corps versus corps battle with near parity commitment was under raising and had done no training in all respects. The much heralded strike corps as a formation; 1 Armoured Division (less 3 offensive had fizzled out. Holding battles were and Cavalry that had been left behind in Asal Uttar, fought in adjoining sectors with very little dedication most fortuitously as things turned out), and prospects of any significant territorial gain, and the Jammu-based 26 Infantry Division were Chawinda was a do-or-die\situation for Pakistan. of the junior the only cohesive formations, though they The battle raged for over six days with division leaders, that had never trained together. 1 Corps, therefore, sized forces jostling for control of a few villages, had neither trained for, nor even war-gamed crossroads and other tactically vital ground. 1,500 companies representing the whole Networking opportunities with 32,000 the officer to the operational contingencies together. This In the final analysis, the Pakistani forces supply chain, from Primes to SMEs representatives from government, military, industry and academia from was done by the intrepid Western Army were subjected to a battering that went a long 6 sector specific areas including rank and file all over the world Commander Harbaksh Singh shortly after way in restoring the pride, confidence and self- an Air Zone casualty ratio the arrival of the formations in the area of esteem of the Indian armed forces that had Largest display of the latest defence High-level seminars delivering the operations and a couple of days before they taken a beating in 1962.