Islamist Terrorism in Northwestern Africa A ‘Thorn in the Neck’ of the United States? Emily Hunt Policy Focus #65 | February 2007 All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any infor- mation storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. © 2007 by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy Published in 2007 in the United States of America by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1828 L Street NW, Suite 1050, Washington, DC 20036. Design by Daniel Kohan, Sensical Design and Communication Front cover: A Nigerian girl walks past a wall displaying graffiti and political posters on the eve of presidential elections, April 18, 2003. Copyright AP Wide World Photos/Schalk van Zuydam. About the Author Emily Hunt is a former Soref fellow at The Washington Institute, where she studied North African terrorist net- works. Prior to joining the Institute, she worked as a terrorism consultant for the London security firm Aegis Defence Services. Ms. Hunt is currently a research fellow with the International Assessment and Strategy Center. She holds a master’s degree in war studies from King’s College, London, and a bachelor’s degree from the Univer- sity of St Andrews, Scotland. n n n The opinions expressed in this Policy Focus are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, its Board of Trustees, or its Board of Advisors. Table of Contents Acknowledgments. v Introduction . vii Operating.Environment . 1 GSPC.in.Context. 5 GSPC’S.Growing.International.Network. .7 TSCTP:.Program.Overview. 12 Empowering.the.State.Department. 13 Honing.the.U S .Military’s.Performance. 16 Conclusion. .20 Acknowledgments I AM GR ATEFUl to the many people who made the research for this paper possible, particularly the officials at the U.S. State Department and European Command who facilitated my on-site research in the region as well as the many African soldiers, civilians, and government employees who agreed to be interviewed. Many thanks are also due to Josh Prober, May Habib, and David Jacobson for their valuable research support. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy v Introduction AYM A N A L-Z AWA HIR I ,. al-Qaeda’s. second. in. involvement.of.northwestern.Africans.in.important. command,.announced.a.new.alliance.with.the.Alge- acts.of.international.terrorism,.including.the.Septem- ria-based.Salafist.Group.for.Preaching.and.Combat. ber.11,.2001,.attacks.and.the.2004.Madrid.train.bomb- (GSPC).in.August.2006. The.announcement.was.cor- ings .Following.the.formal.alliance.between.the.GSPC. roborated.by.a.statement.posted.on.the.GSPC.web- and.al-Qaeda,.the.activities.of.Algerian.militants.must. site.soon.after. This.radical.Algerian.network.is.little. be.evaluated.in.the.context.of.international.Islamist. known.in.the.United.States.but.is.one.of.the.top.ter- militancy .The.GSPC’s.expanding.operations.through- rorist.threats.in.the.northwestern.corridor.of.Africa. out.Sahelian.Africa,.funneling.of.African.volunteers. that.runs.from.Morocco.to.Chad,.is.active.in.continen- to.fight.in.the.Iraq.insurgency,.connections.in.Europe,. tal.Europe,.and.may.even.have.connections.to.aspiring. and.increasingly.sophisticated.internet.propaganda. militants.in.North.America 1.Zawahiri’s.statement.was. strategy.are.of.particular.concern . little.more.than.de.facto recognition.of.a.longstanding. The.intersection.of.local.conflicts.with.al-Qae- relationship.between.al-Qaeda.and.Algerian.Islamist. da’s.global.ideology.and.technological.expertise.has. militants,.but.his.announcement.publicized.a.nascent. prompted.U S. officials.to.focus.on.North.Africa.both. counterterrorism.challenge.in.northwestern.Africa . as.a.potential.target.of.attacks.and.as.a.safe.haven.or. Arab.North.African.countries.were.key.recruit- recruitment.ground.for.terrorists.intent.on.attack- ment.grounds.for.the.1979–1989.jihad.against.the. ing.elsewhere. The.primary.vehicle.of.U S. counter- Soviets.in.Afghanistan. Hundreds.of.North.Africans. terrorism.policy.in.northwestern.Africa.is.the.Trans. who.had.participated.in.the.Afghan.conflict,.known. Sahara.Counterterrorism.Partnership.(TSCTP),.a. throughout.the.Middle.East.as.“Afghan.Arabs,”.began. State.Department–led.effort.to.integrate.and.pur- to.return.to.their.countries.of.origin.by.the.end.of. sue.multiagency.objectives.in.the.region.by.work- the.1980s. Their.arrival.infused.burgeoning.local. ing.with.and.empowering.local.partners. TSCTP. Islamist.groups,.such.as.the.Algerian.Armed.Islamic. encompasses.nine.countries—Algeria,.Chad,.Mali,. Group.(GIA).and.the.Nigerian.Taliban,.with.an. Mauritania,.Morocco,.Niger,.Nigeria,.Senegal,.and. uncompromising.radical.outlook,.coupled.with.a.set. Tunisia—a.wide.swath.of.territory.with.a.diverse. of.external.connections.and.expertise. The.political. set.of.inhabitants. The.partnership.is.envisioned.as. conditions.underlying.the.rise.of.Islamist.militancy.in. a.long-term.initiative.focused.on.assisting.local.gov- northwestern.Africa.festered.throughout.the.1990s,. ernment,.military,.and.police.officials.in.their.efforts. blocking.a.decisive.resolution.of.local.conflicts. Radi- to.constrict.the.tactical.and.ultimately.the.strategic. cal.networks.have.since.metastasized.and.embedded. operating.environment.of.terrorists.in.northwestern. themselves.deeper.in.society. Simultaneously,.the. Africa. TSCTP.is.an.ambitious.program.in.its.initial. original.leadership.of.al-Qaeda.has.pursued.a.strategy. stages,.and.U S. government.officials.are.in.the.pro- of.harnessing.local.groups.with.local.grievances.to.the. cess.of.adjusting.to.the.program’s.immediate.needs. wider.global.jihad.against.the.West . and.requirements,.such.as.improving.language.ability. This.strategy’s.success.has.been.demonstrated.by. and.increasing.regional.specialization.among.analysts . a.series.of.attacks.in.northwestern.Africa.and.the. In.addition.to.these.“growing.pains,”.the.participating. 1 . “A.Terrorist’s.Testimony,”.testimony.of.Ahmed.Ressam.at.the.New.York.trial.of.co-conspirator.Mokhtar.Haouari.in.the.millennium.plot.to.bomb.Los. Angeles.International.Airport.in.December.1999. Available.online.at.Frontline: Trial of a Terrorist.(www pbs org). In.November.2005,.Canadian.police. dismantled.an.alleged.Algerian.terrorist.cell. The.leader.was.Brahim.Bouchaib,.an.Algerian.who.had.trained.in.explosives.in.al-Qaeda’s.Khaldun.camp . Canadian.authorities.claimed.he.was.a.member.of.GSPC.but.did.not.publicize.the.exact.connection. Bouchaib.entered.Canada.through.the.United. States;.he.was.returned.to.U S .border.officials.who.plan.to.deport.him.to.Algeria . The Washington Institute for Near East Policy vii Emily Hunt Islamist Terrorism in Northwestern Africa departments are focused on overcoming several key addresses some of America’s counterterrorism policy challenges in the medium term to make TSCTP an challenges in the region, focusing primarily on how the effective initiative. United States can empower local governments to con- This paper looks at the nature of the terrorist threat front a set of terrorists with whom American counter- in and emanating from northwestern Africa and terrorism practitioners have had little contact. viii Policy Focus #65 Operating Environment A T E R R O R I ST G R O UP ’ S operating environment or the 2004–2006 series of bombings in Egypt’s Sinai helps determine its structure, opportunities, and modus Peninsula is within the realm of possibility. Morocco’s operandi. Factors including physical and human geog- substantial tourist industry and strategic location on raphy as well as the domestic and international politi- the Straits of Gibraltar produce a high flow of Western cal context can significantly affect terrorists’ operations visitors and commerce and provide terrorists with an directly and indirectly. unusually target-rich environment. Terrorists’ ability to “swim like revolutionary Self-radicalizing urban terrorist cells have been less fish”—to paraphrase Mao Tse-Tung—within the sea problematic in Algeria, largely because of the restric- of the population is crucial to their success in attack- tive security environment left over from the civil war. ing and evading security forces.1 Most northwestern The Algerian security services have established a tight Africans do not actively collude with militants sympa- network of informants in Algiers and other important thetic to al-Qaeda and have frequently shown them- cities and have isolated many of the most hardcore mil- selves hostile to al-Qaeda’s ideology and violent tactics. itants in the mountains outside the capital. Several risk Terrorists of both local and international origin are factors suggest that Algeria’s terrorism challenge may on the outer fringe of society. Nevertheless, a host of assume a more urban dimension like that of Morocco geographical, political, and historical factors combine in the future,2 but currently the regime’s main challenge to make northwestern Africa a more hospitable envi- is in rural areas of northern Algeria and in parts of the ronment for Islamist terrorists than suggested by the southern desert. Islamic militants, led by the GSPC, population’s traditional attitude. have expanded into the Sahara in recent years. More aggressive counterterrorism tactics in urban areas pro- Physical Geography vided an impetus for militants to explore other areas of Morocco and Algeria are at the epicenter of terrorist operation, while lucrative organized criminal opportu- activity in northwestern Africa; however, the expan- nities drew them to the desert.3 The Sahara is character- sion of operations, exploitation of the internet, move- ized by immense open space that facilitates illicit trade ment of people in and out of the region, and militants’ of all manner of goods. The area would be extremely growing participation in organized crime have com- difficult for even the best-trained and equipped force pounded the international dimension of locally based to police. The security forces in the Sahara region enjoy radical networks.