U.S.-Iran Tensions and Implications for U.S. Policy Kenneth Katzman Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs Kathleen J. McInnis Specialist in International Security Clayton Thomas Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs July 1, 2019 Congressional Research Service 7-.... www.crs.gov R45795 SUMMARY R45795 U.S.-Iran Tensions and Implications for U.S. July 1, 2019 Policy Kenneth Katzman Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs In the spring of 2019, U.S.-Iran tensions have escalated. The Trump Administration, [email protected] following its 2018 withdrawal from the 2015 multilateral nuclear agreement with Iran Kathleen J. McInnis (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, JCPOA), has taken several steps in its campaign Specialist in International of applying “maximum pressure” on Iran. Iran or Iran-linked forces have targeted Security commercial ships and infrastructure in U.S. partner countries. [email protected] U.S. officials have stated that Iran-linked threats to U.S. forces and interests, and attacks Clayton Thomas on several commercial ships in May and June 2019, have prompted the Administration Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs to send additional military assets to the region to deter future Iranian actions. President [email protected] Donald Trump, while warning Iran not to take action against the United States, has said he prefers a diplomatic solution over moving toward military confrontation. The For a copy of the full report, Administration has expanded U.S. sanctions against Iran, including sanctioning its please call 7-.... or visit mineral and petrochemical exports during May-June 2019, placing further pressure on www.crs.gov. Iran’s economy. Iranian leaders have refused to talk directly with the Administration, and they have announced an intent to no longer comply with some aspects of the JCPOA. U.S. allies and other countries such as Russia and China have expressed a preference to reduce tensions. Several countries, including Japan, Germany, Oman, Qatar, and Iraq, have sought to de-escalate U.S.-Iran tensions by sending high-level officials to Tehran for talks. An expanding action-reaction dynamic between the United States and Iran has the potential to escalate into significant conflict. The United States military has the capability to undertake a large range of options against Iran in the event of conflict, both against Iran directly and against its regional allies and proxies. However, Iran’s alliances with and armed support for armed factions throughout the region, and its network of agents in Europe, Latin America, and elsewhere, give Iran the potential to expand any confrontation into areas where U.S. response options might be limited. Members of Congress have received additional information from the Administration about the causes of the uptick in U.S.-Iran tensions and Administration planning for further U.S. responses. They have responded in a number of ways; some Members have sought to pass legislation requiring congressional approval for any decision by the President to take military action against Iran. Additional detail on U.S. policy options on Iran, Iran’s regional and defense policy, and Iran sanctions can be found in: CRS Report RL32048, Iran: Internal Politics and U.S. Policy and Options, by Kenneth Katzman; CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by Kenneth Katzman; CRS Report R44017, Iran’s Foreign and Defense Policies, by Kenneth Katzman; and CRS Report R43983, 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force: Issues Concerning Its Continued Application, by Matthew C. Weed. Congressional Research Service U.S.-Iran Tensions and Implications for U.S. Policy Contents Context for Recent U.S.-Iran Tensions ..................................................................................... 1 Iranian Responses and Actions .................................................................................................. 2 Iran Downing of U.S. Drone ............................................................................................... 3 International Responses to the Current Dynamic ...................................................................... 4 JCPOA-Related Iranian Responses ........................................................................................... 5 U.S. Military Deployments ....................................................................................................... 7 Scenarios and Possible Outcomes ................................................................................................... 7 Further Escalation ..................................................................................................................... 7 Status Quo ................................................................................................................................. 8 De-Escalation ............................................................................................................................ 8 U.S. Military Action: Considerations, Options, and Risks .............................................................. 9 Resource Implications of Military Operations ................................................................... 11 Congressional Responses .............................................................................................................. 12 Possible Issues for Congress ................................................................................................... 13 Figures Figure 1. Iran, the Persian Gulf, and the Region ........................................................................... 15 Appendixes Appendix A. Selected Statements by U.S. and Iranian Leaders on Recent Tensions .................... 16 Contacts Author Contact Information .......................................................................................................... 18 Congressional Research Service U.S.-Iran Tensions and Implications for U.S. Policy Context for Recent U.S.-Iran Tensions U.S.-Iran relations have been mostly adversarial—but with varying degrees of intensity—since the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran. Since then, U.S. officials consistently have identified Iran’s support for militant Middle East groups as a significant threat to U.S. interests and allies. Attempting to constrain Iran’s nuclear program took precedence in U.S. policy after 2002 as that program advanced. The United States also has sought to block Iran’s ability to purchase advanced conventional weaponry and to develop ballistic missiles. In May 2018, the Trump Administration withdrew the United States from the 2015 nuclear agreement (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, JCPOA) on the grounds that the agreement did not address a broad range of U.S. concerns about Iranian behavior and would not permanently preclude the potential for Iran to develop a nuclear weapon.1 Administration officials, such as Secretary of State Michael Pompeo and his senior adviser on Iran affairs, Ambassador Brian Hook, say that Administration policy is to apply “maximum pressure” on Iran’s economy to (1) compel it to renegotiate the JCPOA to address the broad range of U.S. concerns and (2) deny Iran the revenue to continue to develop its strategic capabilities or intervene throughout the region. 2 Administration statements also suggest that an element of the policy could be to create enough economic difficulties to stoke unrest in Iran, possibly to the point where the regime collapses.3 As the Administration has pursued its policy of maximum pressure, bilateral tensions have escalated significantly, with U.S. steps going beyond the re-imposition of all U.S. sanctions that were in force before JCPOA went into effect in early 2016. Key developments since April 2019 include: On April 8, 2019, the Administration designated the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO),4 representing the first time that an official military force was designated as an FTO. The designation stated that: “The IRGC continues to provide financial and other material support, training, technology transfer, advanced conventional weapons, guidance, or direction to a broad range of terrorist organizations, including Hizballah, Palestinian terrorist groups like Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Kata’ib Hizballah in Iraq, al-Ashtar Brigades in Bahrain, and other terrorist groups in Syria and around the Gulf… Iran continues to allow Al Qaeda (AQ) operatives to reside in Iran, where they have been able to move money and fighters to South Asia and Syria.”5 Iran’s parliament responded by enacting legislation declaring U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and related forces in the Middle East to be terrorists. As of May 2, 2019, the Administration ended a U.S. sanctions exception for any country to purchase Iranian oil, aiming to drive Iran’s oil exports to “zero.”6 1 For information on the JCPOA and the rationale for the U.S. withdrawal, see: CRS Report R43333, Iran Nuclear Agreement and U.S. Exit, by Paul K. Kerr and Kenneth Katzman. 2 Speech by Secretary of State Michael Pompeo. Heritage Foundation. May 21, 2018; Testimony of Ambassador Brian Hook before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Middle East, North Africa, Hearing on U.S.-Iran Relations. June 19, 2019. 3 Secretary of State Pompeo speech to the Heritage Foundation, op.cit. 4 Statement from the President on the Designation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. April 8, 2019. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-designation- islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps-foreign-terrorist-organization/