
The Carl Beck Papers in Russian & East European Studies Number1506 MarkB. Tanger Natural Disaster and Human Actions in the SovietFamine of 1931-1933 Mark B. Tauger is Associate Professorof History at West VIrginia University. He has published numerous articlesand reviews on Sovieteconomic and agrarianhistory. Hisworkhas beensupported by!REX, theSocialScience Research Council,theUCLA History Department, theWestVtrginia Humanities Council, andtheWestVirginia Uni­ versity History Department Heispreparing a bookonfamine andagricultural develop­ mentin lateimperial Russiaand the USSR. ~o. 1506, June 2001 © 2001 by The Centerfor Russianand East European Studies, a programof the University CenterforInternational Studies, University ofPittsburgh ISSN0889-275X The Carl BeckPapers William Chase,BobDonnorummo, Ronald H.Linden, Co-Editors EileenO'Malley,Managing Editor MikeSavitski, CoverDesign Submissions to The Carl Beck Papers are welcome. Manuscripts must be in English, double-spaced throughout, and less than 100pagesin length.Acceptance is basedon anonymous review. Mail submissions to: Editor, The Carl Beck Papers, Center for Russian andEastEuropean Studies, 40-17 W. W. PosvarHall,University ofPittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA15260. Introduction Untilrecentlybothscholarly andpopulardiscussions ofthecatastrophic famine intheSovietUnionin 1931-1933 invariably havedescribeditas anartificial or"man­ made"famine. Certainwell-known scholars have dominatedthisdiscussion, expressing two main interpretationsof thefamine. AUkrainian nationalistinterpretation holds thattheSovietregime,andspecifically IosifStalin, intentionally imposedthefamineto suppressthenationalistaspirations ofUkraine andUkrainians; revisionists argue that theleadership imposed thefamineto suppress morewidespreadpeasantresistance to collectivization. Accordingtotheseviews, anatural disasterthatcouldhavecauseda faminedidnot take place in thoseyears.1 Whiletheintentionalistinterpretations ofthefamine remainwidely held, recent researchhascastsubstantial doubtonthem. Several studiesanddocumentcollections haveshownconclusively thatthefamine didnotstopatUkraine'sborders,butaffected rural and urban areas throughout the SovietUnion,and even the military.' Studies based on this evidence, and on a reevaluationof published Sovietstatistics, have shown that the grain harvests of 1931 and 1932must have been much smallerthan officiallyacknowledged. As tables 1and2show, whatthe regime called"net grain marketings" fromthe 1932harvest-theamounts ofgrainremovedfromthevillages, includinggovernmentprocurementsandestimated privatesalesby peasants,minus the seed, food,and fodder aidreturnedtofanns-approximated 13.7 milliontons. Table 1: Soviet omdal Harvest and Marketing Data, 1930-1934, (sown area in million hectares, harvest in million metric tons, yields in centners per hectare) Harvest Yields Sown Bio- Biological Biological Barn Barn Procure- Area logical Bam Average Kolkhoz Average Kolkhoz ments 1930 101.8 83 8.5 22.1 1931 104.4 69.5 6.7 22.8 1932 99.7 69.9 7.0 6.8 18.5 1933 101.6 89.9 68.5 8.8 8.5 6.7 22.9 1934 104.7 89.4 67.7 8.5 6.5 22.7 Sources: Sel'skoekhoziaistvoSSSR.Ezhegodnik 1932(Moscow, 1936),215,243-49,269; I. E. Zelenin,"Osnovnyepokazatelisel'skokhoziaistvennogo proizvodstvav 1928-1935 gg," in 1 Ezhegodnik: po agramoi tstorii vostochnoi Evropy 1965 g. (Moscow: Nauka, 1970), 473. The biological yield was a projection made before the harvest, by a special network of agencies established in 1933, which took little account of potential harvesting losses; the biological harvest was calculated based on regional average biological yields and estimated crop areas. The barn yield was in principle based on actual harvestsand harvestyields drawn from annual farm reports, which were prepared long after procurementsand hence could not be used as a basis for demandingreduced procurementquotas, and thereforewere considered reliable. The figuresfor kol/chozy are disaggregatedfrom total averageyieldsand harvests in the sources. For further informationon sources,see Tauger,"The 1932Harvestand the Soviet Famine of 1932­ 1933,"SlavicReview,50,no. 1(Spring1990): 72. Table 2: Soviet Rural Grain Balance from Official Data (million metric tons) Barn Est. Gross Returns to Net Rural Harvest Marketings Agriculture Marketings Remainder 1931 69.5 23.7 4.9 18.8 50.7 1932 69.6 19.4 5.7 13.7 55.9 1933 68.5 25.6 1.3 24.3 44.2 1934 67.7 27.1 1.1 26.0 41.6 Sources: Tauger,"The 1932Harvest," 74; A. A. Barsov,Balans stoimostnykk obmenov mezhdu gorodom i derevnei (Moscow: Nauka, 1969), 103, citing archival sources on grain returned to agriculture in 1931-1932; Iu. V.Moshkov,Zemovaia problema v gody sploshnoi kollektivhatsii(Moscow: MOU,1966),131,forgrainreturned to agriculture in 1933; Spravochnik partiinogo rabomika, (Moscow, 1935),9:212,for grainreturnedto agriculturein 1934. The latter two sourcesrefer only to stale seed and provisionaid and probablyunderestimatethe amountof grainreturned. Gross marketings includegovernment grainprocurements andestimatesof private market sales by peasants; returns to agriculturecomprises procured grain that the government returned to villages for food, forage, and seed; net marketingsare the difference resulting from subtractingreturns to agriculturefrom gross marketings,and representthe total available to the governmentfor extra-ruraluse; the rural remainderis the differenceobtained by subtracting net marketings from the "barn harvest," and represent the amounts left in and returned to the countrysideafter grainprocurementswerecompleted. 2 Thisamount wassubstantially less thanthenetgrain marketings fromthe 1931harvest, 18.8million tons. Consequentlythe 1932 procurements should have leftmorefood in the villages during fall 1932 and spring 1933than in 1931-1932. The fact that a disastrousfamine followedthe 1932procurements musthave beenat least in part the result ofasrnallerharvest Newarchival sources,including annual reports from collective farmspreparedafter allharvest workandgrainprocurementswerecompleted,show that collective and state farms (kolkhozy and sovkhozy) produced much less grain than official statistics indicated. These data, partially presented in tables 3 and 4, indicate that the 1932 harvest was in the range of 50-55 million tons, some 20-30 percent below the official figure of almost70 milliontons, and even this may be an overestimate. These data also show that the harvest of 1933 was much larger than thoseof 1931and 1932: in Ukraine theyieldincreased fromfive centnersperhectare toeight; in Azovo-Chernomorskiikrai (territory), formerlythe most fertile partof the North Caucasus,from less than fourcentnersto morethan six.' Table 3: Official and Archival Kolkhoz Yie lds and Implied Harvests, 1932 (harvests in million metric tons, yields in centners per hectare) Percentage of Official Official Official All Kolkhozy Archival Implied Kolkho z Kolkhoz Grain Kolkhoz inNKZ Yield Kolkhoz Region Yield Sown Area Harvest Reports NKZ Harvest USSR 6.8 69.1 46.99 40 5.6 39.5 RSFSR 6.5 53.0 34.45 33.6 6.0 31.8 UkrSSR 8.0 13.0 lOAD 47.3 5.1 6.6 NorthCau. 6.1 7.1 4.30 86.6 3.9 2.8 Sources: Tauger, "The 1932 Harvest," 78, 85, based on Sel'sko e khoziaistvo SSSR, 27 1; RGAE 7486.3.4456,112 ff. The archival yields are averages ofkolkhoz annual reports contained in Narkornzem archival documents for internal use; the implied kolkhoz harvest is the product ofthe archival yield and the official kolkho z grain sown area. 3 Table 4: Recent Estimates of Soviet Rural Grain Balance (million metric tons) Wheatcroft& Davies Tauger Net ImpliedRural ImpliedRural Marketings Harvestest Remainder Harvestest. Remainder 1931 18.8 56±9% 38 1932 13.7 56± 10% 42.3 50 36.3 1933 24.3 65±4% 41.7 Sources: R. W. Davies, Mark Harriston, and S. G. Wheatcroft, eds., The Economic Transformation o/the Soviet Union, 1913-1945(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 286; figures obtained by reducing official harvest statistics by a percentage based on rainfall data; Tanger, "The 1932Harvest," 76,84, estimatebased on archivalsummariesof yields and sownareasfromannualkolkhoz reportsfor 1932containedin thearchivesofNarkomzem and the CentralStatistical Administration. Certainly, theharvest decline wasnottheonlycauseoftheSovietfamine: the regimeexportedfoodduringthecrisis," Theamountof grainexportedduringthe peak of thefaminein thefirsthalfof 1933,however, approximately 220,000tons, wassmall,lessthan 1percentof the lowestharvestestimates,andtheregimewas usingvirtually alltherestoftheavailable harvest to feedpeople. Theactual amounts ofgrainneeded andutilizedforthispurpose canonlybeapproximated. A I. Mikoian, thecommissar oftrade (Narkomtorg) estimated in 1928thattheregimeneeded11.2 milliontonsof grainto meetthedemands of townspeople, militarypersonnel,and othergroups whodidnotproduce theirownfoodor sufficient food. Withtherapid industrialization, collectivization, anddekulakization measures inthefollowing years, however, thenumberof consumerswhomtheregimesuppliedrapidlyincreased. Simultaneously,cropfailures andfamine conditions in 1927 and1928, the"graincrisis," forced theSovietregime toestablish afood rationing systemthatby1932encompassed morethan40million peopleintowns andindustrial sites. Inaddition, several million moreinthemilitary, inprisons andcamps, andevenmanypeasants andotherpeople invillages receivedfood supplies through otherrationing systems. Despite theincreasing numberofconsumers, theSovietgovernment's capacitytosupplythemdecreased during thefamine crisis. According toofficial figures, thesupply systemdistributed
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