ABOLISHING THE TABOO: PRESIDENT EISENHOWER AND THE PERMISSIBLE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY by BRIAN MADISON JONES B.A., Appalachian State University, 1997 M.A., University of North Carolina at Greensboro, 1999 AN ABSTRACT OF A DISSERTATION submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of History College of Arts and Sciences KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY Manhattan, Kansas 2008 Abstract As president, Dwight Eisenhower believed that nuclear weapons, both fission and fusion, were permissible and desirable assets to help protect U.S. national security against the threat of international communism. He championed the beneficent role played by nuclear weapons, including both civilian and military uses, and he lauded the simultaneous and multi-pronged use of the atom for peace and for war. Eisenhower’s assessment of the role and value of nuclear technology was profound, sincere, and pragmatic, but also simplistic, uneven, and perilous. He desired to make nuclear weapons as available, useful, and ordinary for purposes of national security as other revolutionary military technology from the past, such as the tank or the airplane. He also planned to exploit nuclear technology for a variety of peaceful, civilian applications that he also believed could contribute to national strength. However, Eisenhower did not possess a systematic view of national security in the nuclear age as some scholars have argued. Rather, Eisenhower approached the question of how to defend national security through nuclear weapons with an array of disparate ideas and programs which worked simultaneously toward sometimes divergent objectives that were unified only by a simple conception of national strength. In this effort, Eisenhower occasionally pursued what might seem to be conflicting initiatives, but nonetheless consistently advanced his view that strength through nuclear technology was possible, necessary, and sustainable. Because he believed nuclear technology effectively served his goal to defend national security through strength, Eisenhower sought to reverse the perception that nuclear weapons were inherently dangerous by advocating steadily and consistently for the proper and acceptable use of nuclear technology to contribute to the safety of the republic. He conceived policies such as the New Look, massive retaliation, Project Plowshare, and Atoms for Peace in part to convince the American public and the international community of the U.S.’s genuine desire for peace as Eisenhower simultaneously entrenched atomic and thermonuclear weapons into the American national conscience. Through his efforts, Eisenhower made nuclear weapons and nuclear technology ordinary, abundant, and indispensable to U.S. national security in the twentieth century. ABOLISHING THE TABOO: PRESIDENT EISENHOWER AND THE PERMISSIBLE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY by BRIAN MADISON JONES B.A., Appalachian State University, 1997 M.A., University of North Carolina at Greensboro, 1999 A DISSERTATION submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of History College of Arts and Sciences KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY Manhattan, Kansas 2008 Approved by Co-Major Professor Dr. Jack M. Holl Co-Major Professor Dr. Donald J. Mrozek Copyright ABOLISHING THE TABOO: PRESIDENT EISENHOWER AND THE PERMISSIBLE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY BRIAN MADISON JONES 2008 Abstract As president, Dwight Eisenhower believed that nuclear weapons, both fission and fusion, were permissible and desirable assets to help protect U.S. national security against the threat of international communism. He championed the beneficent role played by nuclear weapons, including both civilian and military uses, and he lauded the simultaneous and multi-pronged use of the atom for peace and for war. Eisenhower’s assessment of the role and value of nuclear technology was profound, sincere, and pragmatic, but also simplistic, uneven, and perilous. He desired to make nuclear weapons as available, useful, and ordinary for purposes of national security as other revolutionary military technology from the past, such as the tank or the airplane. He also planned to exploit nuclear technology for a variety of peaceful, civilian applications that he also believed could contribute to national strength. However, Eisenhower did not possess a systematic view of national security in the nuclear age as some scholars have argued. Rather, Eisenhower approached the question of how to defend national security through nuclear weapons with an array of disparate ideas and programs which worked simultaneously toward sometimes divergent objectives that were unified only by a simple conception of national strength. In this effort, Eisenhower occasionally pursued what might seem to be conflicting initiatives, but nonetheless consistently advanced his view that strength through nuclear technology was possible, necessary, and sustainable. Because he believed nuclear technology effectively served his goal to defend national security through strength, Eisenhower sought to reverse the perception that nuclear weapons were inherently dangerous by advocating steadily and consistently for the proper and acceptable use of nuclear technology to contribute to the safety of the republic. He conceived policies such as the New Look, massive retaliation, Project Plowshare, and Atoms for Peace in part to convince the American public and the international community of the U.S.’s genuine desire for peace as Eisenhower simultaneously entrenched atomic and thermonuclear weapons into the American national conscience. Through his efforts, Eisenhower made nuclear weapons and nuclear technology ordinary, abundant, and indispensable to U.S. national security in the twentieth century. Table of Contents Acknowledgments ...................................................... ix Dedication ............................................................ xi CHAPTER ONE: Introduction .............................................1 CHAPTER TWO: Historiography..........................................13 a. Initial Impressions and Orthodox Scholarship . 14 b. Revisionism and Post-Revisionism . 21 c. The Intellectual Eisenhower ......................................35 d. Eisenhower and Hiroshima.......................................50 CHAPTER THREE: Restoring Economic Strength . 59 a. Cold War Economics ...........................................61 b. The Fear of the Garrison State ....................................74 c. A New Look at Financial Strength .................................87 CHAPTER FOUR: Projecting Military Strength . 112 a. Tactical Atomic War in Korea ...................................113 b. The Threat of Massive Retaliation ................................131 c. Projecting Strength in Asia ......................................161 CHAPTER FIVE: Supporting Industrial Strength . 176 a. “A Wasting of Strength” ........................................179 b. Civilian Nuclear Power.........................................189 c. The Promise of Nuclear Science ..................................199 CHAPTER SIX: Bolstering Moral Strength . 218 a. Eisenhower’s Crusading Religion.................................220 b. Disarmament through Deterrence .................................227 c. Moratorium for Peace ..........................................240 d. The Hope of Peace in the Nuclear Age . 257 CHAPTER SEVEN: Conclusion ..........................................271 Bibliography..........................................................282 viii Acknowledgments Though this has been a selfish project, it has not been a solitary effort nor is the achievement mine alone. Many people have helped my pursuit of this goal as if it was their own. I feel the deepest gratitude for those who have given selflessly of their hearts and minds, their thoughts and encouragement, their kindness and patience, their time and money to support the completion of this dissertation. My most immediate thanks go to Jack Holl, who served enthusiastically as my major professor during my entire time at Kansas State University and who guided me through this project from the beginning to the bitter end. I will forever be indebted to him and his wife, Jackie, for their generous sacrifices of time, thought, and energy. My thanks also go to Donald Mrozek, whose commitment to academic rigor and speed helped me both to improve and finish this manuscript. I am grateful also to Sue Zschoche, David Graff, John McCulloh, Joseph Unekis, Chad Litz, and Tracy Turner for their help in improving this project. This dissertation would not have possible without the help of Jim Leyerzapf, Herbert Pankratz, and David Haight at the Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library and Patricia Hand and Matthew Schaefer at the Herbert Hoover Presidential Library. My thanks also go to John Smail, George Warren, Daniel Butcher, and Deborah Quick for providing me opportunities to teach while completing this manuscript. To my friends, some of whom are also colleagues and all of whom have shouldered this burden, I extend my thanks: To Jason and Angela Buchanan, who were there at the beginning; To Chris and Sonya Vancil for the many terrific dinners, comic relief, and steadfast comradeship; To Lisa and Mike Mundey for their sincere friendship, ix solid advice, and commitment to excellence; To Dan and Sally Friedman, for their inspiring achievements, thoughtful encouragement, and vocal determination to see me finish