THE LEGACY OF CHE GUEVARA NORMAN GALL To the memory of Father John Higgins (1925- must wage a general-type action with the tactical 1967) of Nashville and La Paz, a servant of the goal of drawing the [U.S.] enemy out of his sur- Bolivian people who understood their revolu- roundings, forcing him to fight in places where his tion. living habits clash with the actual situation." But E RNESTO "CHE" GUEVARA, who had Che's guerrilla diary, captured by the Bolivian Become to be Latin America's most army, contrasts strongly with this prophecy; it feared and famous professional revolutionary, contains bitter complaints in his own handwriting died this October on the southern fringe of the about the indifference of the local peasants to Amazon basin, in a jungle area of tortured ra- revolution: "The inhabitants of this region are vines where a thousand streams make their way as impenetrable as rocks. You speak to them, but from the Andean highlands into the wild conti- in the deepness of their eyes you note they do not nental heartland below. The circumstances of his believe you." Indeed, in the seven years since Che death are still unclear. There is some reason to wrote Guerrilla Warfare, there has been no proof suspect that considerable time elapsed between of the "three fundamental lessons that the Cuban his capture by the Bolivian army and the day he Revolution contributed to the conduct of revolu- "died of his wounds." It may also be that the tionary movements in America: (1) Popular forces guerrillas he led had been infiltrated by agents can win a war against an army; (2) It is not neces- since the beginning of their Bolivian operations a sary to wait until all conditions for making a rev- year ago. This possibility is supported by the un- olution exist, [since] the insurrection can create usually high quality of documentary evidence, them; (3) In underdeveloped America the coun- intended to prove Cuban "foreign intervention" tryside is the basic area for armed fighting." In- in Bolivia, that was presented by Bolivian Foreign stead, the chronicle of guerrilla disasters so far Minister Walter Guevara Arce (no relation) be- is a tale of hardship, failure, and wasted idealism. fore a meeting of the Organization of American Just a few examples will illustrate this point. In States in Washington last September 22-evidence Ecuador, some forty students of the Revolution- which included a false Uruguayan passport, com- ary Union of Ecuadorean Youth were captured in parative fingerprints, a guerrilla diary, and excel- 1962 by army paratroopers near Santo Domingo lent photos of "Che" in the guerrilla camp. de los Colorados, just two days after the youths These suspicions may never be resolved. One arrived to set up a guerrilla camp. In Paraguay, thing, however, is clear: Che's death at age thirty- since 1959, at least three guerrilla movements nine at the hands of the ragged Bolivian army, have been dismantled by the authorities before after less than six months of guerrilla combat, tes- they carried out a single action. In the Domin- tifies less to one man's failure than to the pro- ican Republic in 1963, members of the found weakness and incompetence of the current Castroite June 14th Movement were supplied wave of "Marxist" revolutionary struggle in Latin with defective arms from a government munitions America. In his last manifesto, published in April factory by a German-born CIA collaborator (who 1967 as an article in the Cuban magazine Tri- fled the country a few days later); seventeen of continental, Guevara declared: "Fresh outbursts them were killed in cold blood when they found of warfare will arise in the American countries, as their weapons useless, and surrendered.* In Argen- has already occurred in Bolivia. They will con- tina, police in December 1964 raided key training tinue to grow with all the vicissitudes involved in this dangerous business of a modern revolution- * These unfortunate youths constituted a sufficient "Com- ary. Many will die, the victims of their errors. munist menace" for the Johnson administration, then [But] new fighters and new leaders will emerge barely three weeks in power, to reverse President Kennedy's in the heat of the revolutionary struggle.... We policy of denying recognition to the provisional regime which, in a September 1963 military coup, had deposed NORMAN GALL is a Fellow in Public Affairs at Princeton's President Juan Bosch, the first freely-elected Dominican Woodrow Wilson School, and the recipient of a Houghton- ruler in 38 years; however, the puppet head of the new Mifflin Fellowship Award for a work in progress, The provisional government resigned in protest a few days Andean Revolution. later when it was learned that his nephew was among the guerrillas slain. 31 32 COMMENTARY/DECEMBER 1967 camps and underground supply depots of the lent of $18 a month for colonel to about $8 for "People's Guerrilla Army" (which police agents the lowest noncommissioned officer grade. For had previously infiltrated), killing six guerrillas that reason it is officially approved that service and capturing twelve others before the "army," personnel are given sufficient free time to earn a after six months of training and preliminary con- supplementary income." The morale of the Boliv- tacts with the rural population, could even begin ian army is such that officers often earn this operations. In Peru, three Castroite guerrilla "supplementary income" by selling the food bands, which in 1965-66 had tried to establish raised for army rations on the open market, and themselves along the eastern slopes of the Andes, by letting recruits go home months before com- were knocked out of action within seven months pletion of the usual one-year hitch in order to of their first ambush. In the La Convencion capitalize on their maintenance allotments and to Valley of southern Peru, the guerrilla band of reduce the "political risks" of barracks revolts. Luis de la Puente Uceda, an old friend of Castro, The Bolivian army, it should be noted, has be- was literally destroyed by internal quarrels; de la come the nation's leading political party since the Puente himself was shot by the army a few days November 1964 coup which ousted President after he was captured without resistance.* In Victor Paz Estenssoro and the Movimiento Na- Guatemala, two rival insurgency movements that cional Revolcionario (MNR) and installed Rene were gaining ground steadily for four years have Barrientos, the former Vice President and air been inactivated over the past year by an army force chief of staff and a kind of Latin campaign of rural slaughter in which peasants American Captain Marvel. Between 1964 and 1965 have been impressed into right-wing vigilante or- the military budget was doubled, army officers were ganizations (using weapons supplied in the U.S. named to key administrative posts, and General military aid program). Barrientos's incumbency was formalized in rigged elections twenty months after the coup. An astute HE DEATH OF Ernesto Guevara in Bolivia and glamorous loudmouth who, a Uruguayan Seems to fall quite naturally into place in journalist once wrote, "even looks like an Amer- this general history of failure and rout. But the ican," Barrientos has maintained a popular base by Bolivian disaster is also compounded by the fact buying off the leaders of the peasant sindicatos that that country seemed to be a relatively com- created by the 1952 revolution, and by being very fortable theater for guerrilla operations. It is a kind to the faction-ridden officers' corps. He react- country with a strong revolutionary tradition; ed to the outbreak of guerrilla warfare by scream- its army has been twice defeated by popular up- ing for $1 million worth of modern U.S. military risings since World War II; and its sparsely- hardware: mortars, jeeps, jet aircraft, tanks, na- populated national territory contains vast areas palm, helicopters, and automatic weapons. This of lowland jungle and savannah-abundant in equipment was meant to replace the old Mauser water and game animals-capable of hiding and rifles from the Chaco War with Paraguay (1932-35) supporting a small guerrilla movement for many with which his army had been combating the years. In his 1965 article, "Castroism: The Long guerrillas. In turn, U.S. Ambassador Douglas March in Latin America,"t Regis Debray, the Henderson initially cabled Washington that Bar- young French theorist of Castroism, rhapsodized: rientos was exaggerating the guerrilla emergency "Bolivia is the country with the best subjective to exploit it for his own purposes. One U.S. offi- and objective conditions, the only South Ameri- cial said: "We are certainly not going to supply can nation where revolution is the order of the the means for Bolivian army hotheads to start day, despite the reconstitution of an army totally bombing and napalming villages or even suspect- destroyed [in battles with the workers and ed guerrilla jungle hideaways. Civilians would in- miners] in the 1952 revolution. It is also the only evitably be killed and we have a long experience country where the revolution can restore the clas- that this inevitably produces a stream of recruits sic Bolshevik form-the proof is the 1952 prole- for the guerrillas."** Shortly thereafter, Barrientos tarian insurrection-on the basis of soviets, that complained publicly that Bolivia was fighting "all burst the state apparatus with a short and de- America's war," in the long-range interests of cisive armed struggle." The U.S. Army Area the United States, without adequate support. (His Handbook for Bolivia (1963) noted that in the problems were complicated during the guerrilla fifteen-thousand-man Bolivian army "conscripts insurrection by the sudden need to send troops (mainly Indians speaking little Spanish) receive iAto the nationalized tin mines to suppress a re- no regular pay for their services.