MORALITY, DIGNITY AND PRAGMATISM AN ESSAY ON THE FUTURE OF MORALITY JAMES GEORGE SCOTT WILSON University College London Submitted for the examination of PhD, January 2002 2 Abstract of Morality, Dignity and Pragmatism This thesis is an examination and reconstruction of morality. It divides into three parts. Part one argues that morality is best considered as the tradition of ethical thinking that begins with the Stoics, develops in Christian thought and reaches its apotheosis in Kant. This tradition structures ethical thinking around three basic concepts: cosmopolitanism, or universal applicability to human beings as such, the dignity of human beings and reciprocity. It is this tradition of morality that Nietzsche sets out to destroy. Part one criticises pre-Nietzschean theories of morality, such as Kant’s, that take universal and exceptionless rules to form the core of morality. It critiques both the possibility of putting forward an adequate set of such rules and the proposed relationship between morality and human life that is implicit in these theories. Part two begins with Nietzsche’s challenge: that morality is a system of values rooted in nihilistic resentment at the vitality of other, stronger modes of living. It argues that this challenge must be taken seriously, and that the best way to do this is to make it clear that morality has as its fundamental basis a responsiveness to the value of human life; hence it is Nietzsche’s ethics that should be called nihilistic. The rest of part two examines the possibility of answering Nietzsche’s challenge by demonstrating a necessary connection between human selfhood and the acknowledgement of the dignity of human beings. Here I criticise Christine Korsgaard’s arguments and consider Charles Taylor’s more promising approach to the self. Part three turns towards pragmatism, and in so doing gives up on the attempt to show that morality is somehow necessary for all human beings. Nietzsche’s challenge is answered more subtly: an empirically backed theory of human selfhood explains the point of morality in terms of our basic need for recognition. I complete the reconstruction of morality by reinterpreting the dignity of human beings in a naturalistic way and adopting a conception of moral rules that is informed by Jürgen Habermas’ discourse ethics. 4 For my parents ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like to thank those who have supervised me for this thesis: Malcolm Budd, Michael Otsuka and Mark Kalderon. Those of my friends who have argued with me about the ideas contained herein: Amber Carpenter, for discussion of Charles Taylor and the role of asceticism in moral life; Mark Fielding for his comments on chapters four and five and for discussions about Habermas; Sam Fremantle for his unflinching utilitarianism; Keith Horton for a series of wide ranging discussions covering the whole thesis; Saladin Meckled-Garcia for discussions about normativity and Sharon Shatil for comments on chapter five. Special thanks to Magda Egoumenides for encouragement and listening; Abigail Patrick for discussion of chapters six to eight; and Raj Sehgal, who helped more than anyone. CONTENTS PART ONE: TRADITIONAL ACCOUNTS OF MORALITY.............................................12 MAP OF PART ONE ............................................................................. 13 1. The Very Idea of Morality.............................................................14 1.1 My usage of ‘morality’ as compared to the others I have canvassed ............................................................................................................ 16 1.2 An introduction to morality........................................................... 21 1.3 On the varieties of morality...........................................................28 2. Against Kant, for the sake of Morality.......................................... 34 2.1 Introduction...................................................................................34 2.2 Kant’s presuppositions about morality .........................................35 2.3 The impossibility of moral obligation on Kant’s account of morality ............................................................................................................ 42 2.4 Why Kant’s account of morality gets human life wrong................63 2.5 Conclusion.................................................................................... 73 PART TWO: DIGNITY.............................................................................................. 75 MAP OF PART TWO..............................................................................76 3. Nietzsche’s Critique and the Necessity of Affirmation..................78 3.1 Introduction...................................................................................78 3.2 Nietzsche’s interpretation of morality............................................78 3.3 The very idea of dignity................................................................ 84 3.4 The positive justification............................................................... 85 3.5 Conclusion: the necessity of a sceptical justification.....................95 4. Korsgaard’s Argument for the Normativity of Morality................97 4.1 Introduction...................................................................................97 4.2 From self-consciousness to reason governed action....................100 4.3 From acting for reasons to universal principles ..........................107 4.4 From the categorical imperative to the moral law........................114 4.5 Conclusion.................................................................................. 127 5. Charles Taylor’s Ethics of the Good............................................128 5.1 Introduction.................................................................................128 5.2 Situating Taylor........................................................................... 129 5.3 Taylor’s critique of the disengaged worldview............................131 5.4 Taylor’s philosophical anthropology...........................................148 5.5 The argument for moral universalism..........................................157 5.6 Conclusion.................................................................................. 162 PART THREE: A PRAGMATIST REINTERPRETATION OF MORALITY...........................164 MAP OF PART THREE.........................................................................165 6. Recognition and Human Life...................................................... 167 6.1 Introduction.................................................................................167 6.2 Winnicott’s theory of child development.....................................170 6.3 Recognition and domination in adult relationships......................175 7. Dignity and Vulnerability............................................................179 7.1 Introduction.................................................................................179 7.2 The Pro-Pity tradition..................................................................182 7.3 The Anti-Pity tradition.................................................................184 7.4 Dignity in the Pro-Pity tradition.................................................. 187 8. Reconstructing Universality........................................................191 8.1 Introduction.................................................................................191 8.2 Moral rules.................................................................................. 197 8.3 Believing in the dignity of all human beings in a full-blooded sense .......................................................................................................... 209 8.4 Moral life.................................................................................... 219 AFTERWORD...................................................................................... 221 BIBLIOGRAPHY.................................................................................. 225 8 9 PREFACE This thesis is a constructive work in the tradition of morality. Although the argument is long and complex, the aims are simple: to explain the point and value of goodness without straying into wishful thinking or laughable metaphysics; to maintain the idea of moral duty whilst frankly admitting that the heart of morality is elsewhere; and to provide an honest document that may actually be of some use to those who read it in the conduct of their lives. It is also in large part an essay about the meaning of Kant for moral philosophy. Although I see no good reason why this should be so, my position on Kant appears to be somewhat unusual, combining as it does a profound respect and admiration for his contribution to moral philosophy with a series of searching and rather brutal criticisms of it. I can only say that this has always seemed to me to be the best way to do philosophy: to take the work of those whom one admires most and submit it to a thorough critique, in the hope that one can build something better on the foundations that they have laid. NOTE ON REFERENCES AND ABBREVIATIONS References to Kant’s texts are abbreviated as follows: G – Groundwork to the Metaphysics of Morals; C1 – Critique of Pure Reason; C2 – Critique of Practical Reason; C3 – Critique of Judgment; MM – Metaphysics of Morals; PP – Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch; R– Religion within the limits of reason alone. All page references are to