City University of New York (CUNY) CUNY Academic Works All Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects 6-2016 Darwinian Debunking Reconsidered Amanda J. Favia Graduate Center, City University of New York How does access to this work benefit ou?y Let us know! More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/1322 Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu This work is made publicly available by the City University of New York (CUNY). Contact: [email protected] DARWINIAN DEBUNKING RECONSIDERED by AMANDA J. FAVIA A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Philosophy in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York 2016 ©2016 AMANDA J. FAVIA All Rights Reserved ii DARWINIAN DEBUNKING RECONSIDERED by AMANDA J. FAVIA This dissertation has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Philosophy to satisfy the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor in Philosophy. Rosamond Rhodes ______________ ________________________________________________ Date Chair of Examining Committee Iakovos Vasiliou ______________ ________________________________________________ Date Executive Officer Supervisory Committee: Bernard S. Baumrin, Advisor Rosamond Rhodes Gary Ostertag Virginia Held Jesse Prinz THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK iii Abstract DARWINIAN DEBUNKING RECONSIDERED by Amanda J. Favia Adviser: Bernard S. Baumrin What can evolutionary theory tell us about morality? From descriptive claims that explain morality as an evolved trait to normative (or prescriptive) claims that rely on evolution to describe how humans ought to behave, philosophers have debated whether or not evolutionary theory can or should inform moral theory. Most recently, the debate about evolutionary ethics has shifted to metaethics. In this case, philosophers have sought after evolutionary explanations in the hopes of resolving long-standing debates between moral realists and moral antirealists. These metaethical debates have centered on what are called Darwinian debunking arguments. Proponents of the Darwinian debunking argument, such as Michael Ruse, Sharon Street, and Richard Joyce, seek to use evolutionary explanations to undermine moral realism. Opponents of Darwinian debunking arguments, such as David Enoch and Erik J. Wielenberg, attempt to defend moral realism by establishing a brand of moral realism consistent with the same evolutionary explanations that debunkers use to undermine moral realism. While those engaged in the debate generally agree that morality is an evolved trait and that evolutionary explanations can help resolve the metaethical controversy, they disagree over which metaethical position—moral realism, moral antirealism, or moral skepticism—those evolutionary explanations support. This essay provides an analysis of Darwinian debunking arguments, the debate that surrounds it and, more generally, the use of evolutionary explanations to resolve questions about iv the nature and justification of moral claims. The debunking debate ends in a deadlock, however, since, as I argue, evolutionary premises fail to yield any substantive metaethical conclusions. This occurs for several reasons. First, evolutionary explanations turn out to be not only inherently speculative or hypothetical, but also historical and irregular in such a way that renders them unsuitable for resolving this metaethical debate. This leads to the second problem, that of “inferential opaqueness”: the precise connection between the evolutionary explanations (the premises) and the rejection (or acceptance) of moral realism (the conclusion) at stake in the debunking literature remains unclear. The third problem rests with the theoretical assumptions— epistemological, ontological, moral and scientific—that are embedded in both sides of the debunking debate. Such assumptions are essential to how evolutionary explanations are interpreted and thus how they are meant to support various metaethical conclusions. As a result, evolutionary considerations play a far less significant role in establishing metaethical claims than these views suggest. Finally, the challenge provided by the genetic arguments utilized on either side of the debunking debate is much more limited then their adherents seem to realize. Here I draw on and develop recent work by Kevin C. Klement and Katia Vavova. v Acknowledgments This dissertation would not have been possible without the love, support, and encouragement of so many. I owe a great deal to my adviser, Stefan Baumrin, whose initial enthusiasm about this project gave me the confidence to believe it was a worthy endeavor— thank you for the steady support, insightful questions, and suggestions throughout the writing of this dissertation. I am also extremely grateful for the help and advice provided by Rosamond Rhodes. My development as a philosopher and an ethicist have been greatly influenced by all of the opportunities you have given me as an Ethics Fellow at the Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai. This dissertation has also greatly benefited from the guidance of Gary Ostertag— thank you for taking the time to engage in countless conversations and for encouraging me to strive for excellence. I also greatly appreciate the time and effort of my readers, Virginia Held and Jesse Prinz. To all of my former classmates at the CUNY Graduate Center who have helped me develop both intellectually and personally, I am forever grateful. In particular, I’d like to thank Chris Sula, Kamili Posey, Jason Altilio, Lily Frank, Paul Cummins, Ornaith O’Dowd, Steven Birnbaum, and Leonard Finkleman. Many conversations with my colleagues at Mount Sinai, including Nada Gligorov, Katherine Mendis, Phoebe Friesen, and Carolyn Plunkett, as well as many members of the Oxford-Mount Sinai Consortium, have also helped shape this work. I appreciate all of the support my colleagues at Nassau Community College have given me as well. Specifically, I want to thank Frank Pupa for reading, revising, and always listening. There has also been endless emotional support and encouragement from so many wonderful friends over the years. Very special thanks go to my dear friends Lisa Barkley, Meredith Grausso, Heather Hallam, Tara Power, Joselyn Allen, Laura Salvaggio, Christine vi Heller Murphy, Caitlin Healy, Weishun Cheung, Sean Noyce, Katya Usvitsky, Heidi Ryti, and Josephine Atria. I owe the biggest debt of gratitude, however, to Kamili Posey, Chris Sula, and Abbi Leman—this dissertation wouldn’t have been possible without you. Finally, I am extremely grateful for my family. Specifically, I want to thank my brother- in-law Chris Grzymala, my uncle Brad Broadhead, and my cousins Rich and Mary Beth Broadhead for their emotional and economic support over the years. A very special thank you to my “uncle”, Dr. Dexter Jefferies, who has provided intellectual guidance and inspiration since I was a little kid. And to my sister Emma Grzymala—thank you for the love and laughter that motivates me. Last, but certainly not least, to my parents, Frank and Pamela Favia. Thank you for providing a home that fostered the intellectual and creative freedom to let me be “just the way I am”. vii Table of Contents Introduction………………….………………………………………………..............…………..1 Chapter One: The Origins of Morality........................................................................................6 A. The Role of Explanation and Justification………………………………………...7 B. Where Does Morality Come From?.......................................................................12 Chapter Two: Darwinian Moral Nativism................................................................................22 A. A Combined Approach: Darwinian Moral Nativism…….………………………22 i. Darwin’s Moral Sense……………………………………………………26 a. The British Moralists Influence on Darwin’s Moral Sense..…….30 ii. Spencer’s Moral Sense…………………………………………………...41 B. Historical Criticisms and their Impact on Contemporary Darwinian Moral Nativism………………………………………………….………………………50 i. The Naturalistic Fallacy and Hume’s Thesis: Why They are No Longer Knock Out Arguments…………………………………………………...51 C. A New Critique of Evolutionary Ethics………………………………………….57 Chapter Three: The Debunking of Morality…………………………………….……………60 A. Darwinian Moral Nativism and Debunking Arguments…………………………60 i. Metaethical Debunking Arguments.……………………………………..64 a. Ontological Debunking…………………………………………..67 1) Michael Ruse’s Debunking Argument…………………...67 2) Sharon Street’s Darwinian Dilemma: The Euthyphro Dilemma for Moral Realism……………………………..75 viii b. Epistemological Debunking: Richard Joyce’s Epistemological Challenge……………………………………………….………..88 B. Global Skepticism and Debunking Non-evaluative Beliefs……………………101 Chapter Four: Realist Responses to Evolutionary Debunking………………………….....108 A. Darwinian Moral Realist Responses to Debunking……………………...……..111 i. The Explanatory Challenge and Third Factor Explanations……………112 B. Problems with Third Factor Explanations……………………………………...124 i. Theoretical Assumptions……………………………………………….132 ii. Inference to the Best Explanation………………………………………134 iii. Inferential Opaqueness………………………………………………….137 C. Conclusion……………………………………………………………………...150 Chapter Five: The Limitations of Evolutionary Ethics…………...………………………...151 A. The Genetic Fallacy…………………………………………………………….151 B. The ‘Skeptical Challenge’ Challenge…………………………………………..164 C. Evolutionary Explanations, Moral Assumption and the Indeterminacy of Moral