Hylomorphism Got the Facts Wrong

Hylomorphism Got the Facts Wrong

ON HOW PERSPECTIVAL HYLOMORPHISM GOT THE FACTS WRONG Abstract This thesis proves the essential relevance of ​Aristotelian mereology​, in particular of its notion of ​form​, within the contemporary debate about ordinary objects. I focus on Sattig’s theory of ​perspectival ​hylomorphism (Sattig, 2015) and its analysis of ordinary objects. I criticize the key notion of this theory, namely thAT of ​K-Path for it entails an unnecessary commitment to the “questionable” category of ​facts​. My criticism of facts, in general, follows Betti (Betti, 2015). I argue that K-Paths as complex facts are not able to perform the role of individual form ascribed to them by Sattig. On the contrary, I suggest that the Aristotelian notion of form is a better fit for Sattig’s novel framework while avoiding the problems deriving from its involvement of facts. Chapter 1 introduces the notion of ordinary objects and outlines several approaches in which ordinary objects have been analyzed. Chapter 2 describes the metaphysical account of Perspectival Hylomorphism, namely ​Q-hylomorphism​, and the notion of K-Path. Chapter 3 deals closely with Aristotle’s hylomorphism and mereology. Moreover, in chapter 3, I offer my own interpretation of Aristotle’s notion of form. Chapter 4 compares the notion of K-Paths with Aristotle's form. It shows that the notion of Aristotle’s form can play the same role as a K-path while avoiding the commitment to facts. 1 Table of Contents 1 Introduction 3 2 Perspectival Hylomorphism 8 2.1 Q-Hylomorphism 8 2.1.1 Classical Mereology 9 2.1.2 Aristotelian Hylomorphism 17 2.2 K-paths and Complex facts 18 3 Aristotle’s Hylomorphism 24 3.1 Form, Matter, and Compound 25 3.1.1 Form and Matter 26 3.1.2 Compound 29 3.2 Part and Whole 30 3.2.1 Part 31 3.2.2 Whole 33 4 Aristotle’s Forms versus K-Paths 35 4.1 Horizontal and Vertical Unity 37 4.2 Forms and K-Paths 41 4.3 What is a K-path? 46 Conclusion 51 2 1 Introduction Ordinary objects, among other things, are part of the furniture of our everyday world. Along with being objects of common use, they have always been highly disputed in philosophical debates, especially in metaphysics. The metaphysical debate about ordinary objects is extremely vast and variegated. For the purpose of this thesis, I focus on what we usually call “things” every day, namely ordinary material objects, e.g. the laptop in front of you, the sandwich you had for lunch, and also you yourself. My metaphysical analysis of ordinary objects is based on a number of assumptions that although are not fully discussed in this work, I shall make them explicit in what follows. First, the ​existence of objects, and especially of ordinary objects, is here taken for granted. I assume that ordinary objects exist and that they are involved in our everyday life because their existence is exactly what makes them interesting and relevant in metaphysics. Most of the controversial issues about ordinary objects simply evaporate as soon as the existence of ordinary objects is denied, and the debate becomes flat. If there are no objects, then there is no object to be discussed. In particular, I assume that ordinary objects exist and that they have parts. In this thesis, I examine the mereology of ordinary objects, that is how ordinary objects considered as wholes relate to their parts (Korman, 2016; Varzi 2016). Second, when I talk about ordinary objects, I have in mind the category of concrete particulars or, to put it differently, of particular material objects. As in Loux (2006, p.85), concrete particulars are objects with the following features. They are (i) particulars entities that exemplify a number of attributes. In other words, concretes particulars are objects with a given number of properties. Moreover, their existence is limited in time (ii), that is they come into existence, exists and then go out of existence. In addition, concrete particulars are subject to change during their existence (iii), i.e. they can have different (and even incompatible) attributes at different times. Furthermore, concrete particulars are located in a unique region of space at each time of their existence (iv)— i.e. they cannot be in different places at the same time— that makes them individual. Finally, concrete particulars are objects with physical parts that occupy a determined region of space (iv), namely they have material parts. Therefore, in this work, I leave aside other ontological categories, such as abstract objects, universals, events, etc. On the basis of this description of ordinary objects as concrete particulars, my aim is to investigate the mereological composition of these objects, i.e. how they relate to their parts. 3 In this thesis, I will closely examine a specific theory of ordinary objects, namely Perspectival Hylomorphism (Sattig, 2015). To be precise, I will focus on the metaphysical account of this theory, that of ​Q-hylomorphism or quasi-hylomorphism. The latter claim that ordinary objects are compound of form and matter — they have a formal and a material part (Sattig, 20015, p.13). As it will become clearer in the next chapter, ordinary objects are described in this way also according to another metaphysical account, that of ​Aristotle’s hylomorphism​. However, Q-hylomorphism characterizes the notion of form in a completely different way Aristotle’s characterization. It maintains that forms are K-paths, namely complex facts about a material object (ibid.). Conversely, I will contend that there is no need to appeal to complex facts and that my interpretation of Aristotle’s notion of form can play exactly the same role. I will argue that Aristotle’s notion of form is to be understood as the relation obtaining among the material parts of an object. Let us take a step back to place in context my argument. I shall give a brief summary of the theories of ordinary objects. Needless to say, this is not an exhaustive overview of all theories of ordinary objects. However, it is useful to outline the broader debate in which the topic of this thesis is placed. At this point, my starting question is: “Is there ​only the category of ordinary objects?”. There are multiple answers to this question and they branch out into many theories of objects. I will take into account the three most general answers to my question and give an outline of the theories they include. First, conservatism ​answers positively to my question. According to it, the only category of objects that exists is that of ordinary objects (Korwan, 2016, Sec. 1.1). Ordinary objects are entities that belong to kinds that we ordinarily recognize as being exemplified in our everyday life, e.g. human being, tree, statue (ibid.).This view relies on common sense as it identifies existing objects with ordinary objects that we are familiar with and that we perceive by the senses. Conservatism has been endorsed (among others) by Elder (2004, 2011), Hirsch (2005), Lowe (2007), Markosian ( 008, 2014), Korman (2010), Koslicki (2008), Simons (2006). Second, ​eliminativism answers negatively to my question “Is there ​only the category of ordinary objects?”. It claims that there are ​fewer ​categories of objects and denies the category of ordinary objects (Korwan, 2016, Sec. 1.2). Eliminativism ​has many variants and it is usually combined with nihilism, namely the view that there are no composite objects (ibid.). If ordinary objects are conceived as composite objects, i.e. objects that have parts, then eliminativism together with nihilism implies that no ordinary object exists (ibid.). ​Mereological nihilism ​is a version of eliminativism that endorses nihilism as it denies the existence of composite objects, but that accepts the existence of simple objects, namely atoms (e.g., Hossack, 2000; Contessa, 2014). This view maintains that what exists are (infinitely) many microscopic objects. By contrast, ​existence monism argues that there exists only one single object, that includes everything else and that is simple at the same time (e.g., Horgan & Potrč, 2000; Rea 2001). Additionally, there is also a version of eliminativism that denies the existence of objects ​tout court​, namely ​extreme nihilism ​(e.g, Turner, 2011). Nonetheless, there 4 are also versions of nihilism that deny nihilism and agree that there are ​some objects that are composite. Therefore, while endorsing that there is no category of ordinary objects, this kind of eliminativism accepts that some objects have parts. A well-known version of this view is ​organicism ​and it claims that organisms are the only composite objects that exist (e.g. van Inwagen, 1990)(Korwan, 2016, Sec. 1.2). Before moving on to the third possible answer to my question “Is there only the category of ordinary objects?”, I shall make clear on one point. In this thesis, I will leave aside eliminativism for it is not relevant for my purpose. I will examine ordinary objects considered as composite objects, while eliminativism (or the many versions of it) deny their existence. Nevertheless, I summarized eliminativism to show the variety of the theories of objects, and especially to place my thesis in this broader scenario. We shall now give particular attention to the third (and last) answer left as the debate of this work finds its place there. Permissivism ​denies that there is only the category of ordinary objects and it maintains that there are ​more categories than the category of ordinary objects (Korman, 2016, Sec.1.3). The idea of permissivism is that ordinary objects are a special class of objects within the wider category of objects, that also includes, for example, abstract objects, material objects, fictional objects, etc.

View Full Text

Details

  • File Type
    pdf
  • Upload Time
    -
  • Content Languages
    English
  • Upload User
    Anonymous/Not logged-in
  • File Pages
    63 Page
  • File Size
    -

Download

Channel Download Status
Express Download Enable

Copyright

We respect the copyrights and intellectual property rights of all users. All uploaded documents are either original works of the uploader or authorized works of the rightful owners.

  • Not to be reproduced or distributed without explicit permission.
  • Not used for commercial purposes outside of approved use cases.
  • Not used to infringe on the rights of the original creators.
  • If you believe any content infringes your copyright, please contact us immediately.

Support

For help with questions, suggestions, or problems, please contact us