This article was downloaded by: [Randy Rezabek] On: 01 April 2013, At: 12:39 Publisher: Taylor & Francis Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK Cryptologia Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ucry20 TICOM and the Search for OKW/Chi Randy Rezabek To cite this article: Randy Rezabek (2013): TICOM and the Search for OKW/Chi , Cryptologia, 37:2, 139-153 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01611194.2012.687430 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae, and drug doses should be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand, or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material. Cryptologia, 37:139–153, 2013 Copyright # Taylor & Francis Group, LLC ISSN: 0161-1194 print DOI: 10.1080/01611194.2012.687430 TICOM and the Search for OKW/Chi RANDY REZABEK Abstract In the final days of the Third Reich, the Allies sent TICOM intelligence assault teams into Germany in search of the signal intelligence secrets of the Wehrmacht. Chief among their targets was the Wehrmacht cryptologic service OKW=Chi. As OKW=Chi dissolved in the final days of the war, its archive disap- peared, resulting in a months-long search from the northern most border of Germany to the mountains of Bavaria and Austria. This is the story of that search, of which details had remained classified for over 60 years1. Keywords 30 A.U., OKW=Chi, Russian FISH, Schliersee archive, TICOM, ULTRA, Wilhelm Fenner Introduction World War II has been described as a signal intelligence (SIGINT) war. The efforts to intercept, locate, and decrypt the radio communications of the enemy became a salient characteristic of the conflict [10]. Never before in history had belligerent nations expended so much effort in intelligence gathering to such great effect. On the allied side, tens of thousands of people across the world, laboring with some of the most sophisticated technology of its day, produced an intelligence triumph, which staved off defeat, shortened the war, and saved lives. From discovering the Japanese plans to attack Midway, to eavesdropping on Admiral Do¨nitz’s orders to his wolf packs, to decoding Admiral Yamamoto’s flight schedule, to confirming German belief that the invasion was yet to come at the Pas de Calais, SIGINT provided a decisive edge. Downloaded by [Randy Rezabek] at 12:39 01 April 2013 Origins of TICOM By the summer of 1944, Anglo-American leaders, well aware of this advantage and planning for the defeat of Germany, became concerned about the efforts of their enemies in this secret war. It was assumed that Germany, like all other major states, had an active program in diplomatic and strategic SIGINT, and experience had pro- vided plenty of evidence as to their capabilities in tactical SIGINT on the battlefield. Address correspondence to Randy Rezabek, 213 Colonial Drive, Webster, NY 14580, USA. E-mail: [email protected] 1Many of the TICOM reports cited in this article can be found on the author’s website, the TICOM Archive, available at https:==sites.google.com=site=ticomarchive=. Additional TICOM documentation can be found on Chris Triantafyllopoulos’ website, Christos Military and Intelligence Corner, available at http://chris-intel-corner.blogspot.com/. Click on the links under TICOM Reports. 139 140 R. Rezabek Questions arose as to the German’s actual capabilities, their level of success against Anglo-American codes and ciphers, and their level of cooperation with their Japa- nese allies. In order to find answers to these questions, Colonel George A. Bicher, Director of the Signals Intelligence Division, ETOUSA, along with senior managers at the Government Code and Cypher School (GC&CS) began planning a program to actively seek out and capture the cryptologic secrets of Germany as soon as cir- cumstances permitted. U.S. Army Chief of Staff General George Marshall, acting on the recommendation of Colonel Bicher and with the support of U.S. Navy Admiral King, ordered General Eisenhower to cooperate with the this effort, and a secret joint operation was formed, codenamed TICOM (Target Intelligence Com- mittee) [15].2 The basic concept of TICOM was to form teams of cryptologic experts, mainly drawn from the codebreaking center at Bletchley Park, to go into Germany with the front line troops and to capture the documents, technology, and personnel of the various German SIGINT organizations before these precious secrets were destroyed, looted, or captured by the Russians. Initial planning revolved around a risky plan to drop TICOM teams into Berlin with the 101st Airborne to capture the various intel- ligence headquarters in that city [18]. Changing conditions on the ground, mainly the evacuation of the various agencies further west and south to escape the approaching Russian offensive, cancelled that plan. The actual collection effort began in April 1945 when six teams, with representatives from the British GC&CS, the U.S. Army’s ASA (Army Security Agency), and the U.S. Navy’s OP-20-G, deployed to the continent. Allied intelligence knew of the existence of SIGINT agencies of the German Foreign Ministry, the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and that of the Supreme Command of the German Armed Forces, the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht Chiffrierabteilung (abbreviated OKW=Chi). However, little of its structure, opera- tions, or successes were known. As the highest echelon SIGINT service of the Ger- mans, it was assumed that it was similar to Bletchley Park, coordinating and directing the SIGINT work of all the German armed services and employing the ablest cryptanalysts. Consequently, OKW=Chi was the first priority among TICOM targets [15, Vol. 3, p. 1]. This article will trace TICOM’s long search for the intelligence heart and soul of OKW=Chi.3 Downloaded by [Randy Rezabek] at 12:39 01 April 2013 TICOM teams were flexible in organization and composition, ranging from as little as two officers to over a dozen depending upon the nature of the targets they were searching. Often, additional officers were attached or detached from the team as events developed in the field. The teams were supported by a number of enlisted drivers and radio operators, and were often assisted by intelligence and signals offi- cers from the Army areas they were searching. Each TICOM officer underwent two 2Hereafter referred to as TICOM. See Vol. 1, p. 2–4. Also see Vol. 8, p. 51–54, and memos from Marshall to Eisenhower, p. 55; COMINCH to Commander Twelfth Fleet, p. 57; and Eisenhower to Bicher, p. 58. 3The April 2011 release of NSA documents to NARA contained a number of items that pertain to TICOM’s investigation of OKW=Chi (accession numbers follow): ‘‘Order of Battle of OKW=Chi,’’ 4 June 1945, #2912; ‘‘Notes and Minutes of High-Level Meetings Held at OKW=Chi,’’ 18 November 1945, #5637; ‘‘Notes on Cipher Security and Minutes of Meetings Held at OKW=Chi,’’ 6 December 1945, #5639; ‘‘TICOM I Reports 151–194,’’ 22 March 1946, #716; and ‘‘Report by Uffz Heinz W. Beyreuther on the Organization of OKW=Chi,’’ 23 October 1945, #6997. TICOM and OKW=Chi 141 months of additional training at Bletchley Park to be designated as a TRO (Target Reporting Officer). Each team faced challenges in coordination, communications, transportation, and other liaison issues in the field. Although TICOM teams were issued with spe- cial identification cards and orders from SHAEF, they still had to coordinate with the local Army and Army Group authorities. The top-secret ULTRA classification of their mission meant that only a small number of field officers at the top under- stood the nature of their work. Extensive coordination was required, with stops in Paris first for liaison with the Signals Intelligence Division of the European Theatre command, and then further stops to introduce themselves to each Army or Army Group headquarters in whose area they were assigned to operate, and upon whom they were dependent for clearances, berthing, transportation, and sub- stance. Communications for the teams were a concern because an unknown trans- mitter sending encrypted communications from behind Allied lines would set off alarms among their own Communications security organizations. This problem was solved by borrowing radio operators from Special Liaison Units=Special Communications Units (that worked the ULTRA intelligence circuits) to transmit TICOMmessagesalongtheirestablishedfrequencies. Encryption was via one-time pads. The physical security of the teams was also a concern. The first teams were on the road just prior to the German surrender, and since the TICOM officers were all ULTRA cleared, they needed to be protected from capture. Even after the surrender, the chaotic conditions within Germany meant that German forces were still armed and occupying many of the target areas. For instance, a party from Team 6 was among the first allied troops to enter Flensburg, still under the control of Do¨nitz’s Nazi government. Field security and the troops necessary to seal off and protect enemy crypto targets were provided by attaching the TICOM team to 30 Assault Unit, a Royal Marine Commando that had been formed in 1942 under the supervision of Commander Ian Fleming, RNVR,4 to act as a special intelligence assault unit.