City University of New York (CUNY) CUNY Academic Works All Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects 6-2014 Evolution And Ethics Franklin Roy Bennett Graduate Center, City University of New York How does access to this work benefit ou?y Let us know! More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/169 Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu This work is made publicly available by the City University of New York (CUNY). Contact: [email protected] Evolution and Ethics by Franklin Roy Bennett A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Philosophy in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York. 2014 © 2014 Franklin Roy Bennett All Rights Reserved i This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Philosophy, in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. William Earle _________________________________________ _______________ _________________________________________ Date Chair of Examining Committee Iakovos Vasiliou _________________________________________ _______________ _________________________________________ Date Executive Officer Stephen Cahn _______________________ Stephan Baumrin _______________________ Douglas Lackey _______________________ Doctoral Committee THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK ii Abstract Evolution and Ethics by Franklin Roy Bennett Advisor: Professor S.M. Cahn Does evolution inform the ancient debate about the roles that instinct (emotion/passion/sentiment/feeling) and reason do and/or should play in how we decide what to do? Evolutionary ethicists typically adopt Darwinism as a suitable explanation for evolution, and on that basis draw conclusions about moral epistemology. However, if Darwinism is to be offered as a premise from which conclusions about moral epistemology are drawn, in order to assess such arguments we must assess that premise. This reveals the highly speculative and metaphysical quality of our theoretical explanations for how evolution happens. Clarifying that helps to facilitate an assessment of the epistemological claims of evolutionary ethicists. There are four general ways that instinct and reason can function in moral deliberation: descriptive instinctivism asserts that moral deliberation is necessarily a matter of instincts because control of the instincts by our faculty of reason is regarded (descriptively) as impossible; descriptive rationalism asserts that moral deliberation is necessarily a matter of reasoning, which (descriptively) must control instinct; prescriptive instinctivism asserts that moral deliberation can involve both rationality and instinct but prescribes following our instincts; prescriptive rationalism also asserts that deliberation can be either instinctive or rational but iii prescribes following reason. Micheal Ruse (2012), Peter Singer (2011), and Philip Kitcher (2011) each adopt Darwinism and on that basis arrive at descriptive instinctivism, descriptive rationalism, and prescriptive instinctivism, respectively. Our current level of understanding about evolution implies that prescriptive rationalism is a more practical approach to ethical deliberation than the other three alternatives described. Evolution can inform moral epistemology, but only very generally by helping to inform us of what we can justifiably believe about ourselves and nature. iv Table of Contents Introduction.....................................................................................................................................................1 Darwinism serves as a premise from which conclusions about moral epistemology are drawn, which requires investigating the theoretical alternatives regarding evolution; this reveals the speculative quality of evolution theory in contrast to our knowledge that evolution exists (Part I); that clarification facilitates an assessment of evolution and moral epistemology; there are four ways that instinct and reason can function in moral deliberation; descriptive instinctivism (Part II); descriptive rationalism (Part III); prescriptive instinctivism (Part IV); and prescriptive rationalism (Part V); only the latter is defensible in the context of evolution. [The terms 'instinctivism' and 'rationalism' are sometimes employed but are not intended to infer or suggest any entailments of other theories in ethics (especially not 'emotivism') but only to refer to the epistemological relations of instinct and rationality that are outlined in the introduction.] Part I: Evolution § 1 – Preliminaries.........................................................................................................................................3 Currently there are no testable generalizations amongst evolutionary biologists but only metaphysical perspectives; evolution theory is generally not metaphysically or epistemologically consistent or sophisticated; evolution and Darwinism are not synonymous; we need an evolution theory of greater precision than either Lamarck or Darwin were able to offer; empirical evidence has gotten out in front of the theories; the two main (traditional) alternatives are characterized as 'natural' and 'organic' selection. § 2 – 'Natural' Selection i – Malthus.......................................................................................................................................14 Natural selection relies on the idea of exponential population growth; it cannot be assumed that this is a significant enough factor to serve as the central concept in a general theory of evolution; it functions as an explanatory platitude in a materialistic alternative to creationism. ii – Natural Selection......................................................................................................................15 Darwinism reduces organisms to accidental trait or gene carriers which succeed on the basis of chance; belief in natural selection involves a prerequisite belief in materialist determinism; purposiveness is simply what we observe; natural selection cannot avoid the issue of determinist metaphysical bias overriding reproducible observation. iii – Fitness.......................................................................................................................................17 It is obvious that some individuals reproduce more than others; on Darwinism organisms have little if anything to do with their own fitness, because on determinism either they get lucky by way of inheritance or circumstance or they do not; nature does not have to be interpreted that way; 'fitness' is no more explanatory than 'selection' unless materialist- determinism is added. v iv – Tautology..................................................................................................................................19 'Evolution is caused by natural selection' is a tautology if natural selection is defined neutrally, without reference to determinism; when the full meaning of Darwinism is included there is no tautology, since evolution is not necessarily caused by strictly (known) mechanical forces; avoiding the tautology exposes Darwinism as metaphysical rather than empirical; by interpreting observations deterministically theoretical content is added to observations of differential reproductive success. v – Difference..................................................................................................................................21 Darwin denies anything other than basic physicality to organisms; this leaves no difference between that which is supposedly selecting and that which is supposedly selected; that which appears to have directionality is denied it while that which does not appear to have directionality is assigned it; mechanicism allows no difference between organic and inorganic matter sufficient enough to warrant the concept of selection, but just random motion. vi – Teleology ..............................................................................................................................23 Arguments revolve around the use of teleological language as if the existence of purposiveness is unimportant; Darwinism is committed to the non-existence of organic purposiveness for the sake of theoretical coherence; observation of purposiveness supposedly amounts to ignorance; until the directionality of organic matter is proven to be determined responses to physical and chemical stimuli teleology is simply the reporting of objective human experience. vii – Probability...............................................................................................................................25 It is difficult to see any meaning added moving from defining 'fit' in terms of 'survival' to 'probability of survival'; organic life creates its own probabilities; successful matching of accidentally generated traits to habitats must involve blind luck; if traits can be acquired, or organisms can react non-deterministically, or niches can be constructed not merely inhabited, then selection may be non-random, but not 'natural' so much as 'organic'. viii – Variation.................................................................................................................................27 Since the cause of variation is unknown we can not be certain that it is random; Darwinism supposes that there is neither mutation pressure to expand into ecological niches, nor mutations