A Joint Evaluation Evaluation A Joint A Joint Evaluation Afghanistan was a troubled country in 2001. Not only is Afghanistan one of the poorest HUMANITARIAN 2001-05 AFGHANISTAN, ANDTO RECONSTRUCTION ASSISTANCE countries in the world, but protracted armed confl ict since 1978 had forced 6 million HUMANITARIAN AND out of a population of some 25 million people to fl ee to neighbouring countries, caused massive destruction of infrastructure and paved the way for warlords to rule over large RECONSTRUCTION ASSISTANCE parts of the country. The 2001 11 September attack by Al Qaeda placed Afghanistan at the centre of international politics and provoked the US-led ‘Coalition of the Willing’s attack on 7 October on Al Qaeda bases in Afghanistan in collaboration with a loose alliance of TO AFGHANISTAN, 2001-05 Northern Afghan groups and the subsequent overthrow of the Taliban regime. After the international military operation and up to mid-2004 Afghanistan received close FROM DENMARK, IRELAND, THE NETHERLANDS, SWEDEN to Euro 3.2 billion in total of humanitarian and development aid to rebuild the country. Of this, 25 % - Euro 791 billion came from fi ve bilateral donors: the United Kingdom, AND THE UNITED KINGDOM the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark and Ireland. In 2004 the fi ve donors decided to commission a joint evaluation of their aid programmes 2001-2005. The evaluation was carried out by a consortium led by Chr. Michelsen Institute, Bergen, Norway, contracted by Danida’s Evaluation Department on behalf of the fi ve donors. The donors’ support to Afghanistan was not just another humanitarian operation. It was a multi-dimensional intervention combining the objectives of development co-operation with broad foreign and domestic policy objectives, where the donors – of whom some had taken an active part in ousting the old regime – also aimed at supporting Afghanistan’s new start through putting into place a new and democratically elected government and market economy. Bosnia, Kosovo, Cambodia, East Timor and Iraq have seen similar interventions and more are likely to follow. Evidently such interventions have to cope with novel problems, for which ready answers are as yet scarce. The fi ndings of this evaluation regarding a range of central issues can serve as lessons learnt in the process of developing adequate answers to the new challenges. iÛi«iÌÊ «iÀ>ÌÊ Ài>` OOmslag_Evaluation_A4.inddmslag_Evaluation_A4.indd 1 110/10/050/10/05 116:19:146:19:14 Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan 2001-05 From Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom. A Joint Evaluation Main Report Chr. Michelsen Institute (Lead Agency), Copenhagen Development Consulting and German Association of October 2005 Development Consultants © Ministry of Foreign Affairs October 005 Production: Evaluation Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Cover photo: Open air school in Surkh Rod District, Nangarhar Province (Holger Munsch), other photos by Merete Taksdal, Gunnar Olesen and Holger Munsch.. Graphic production: Scanprint A/S, Aarhus, Denmark ISBN (report): 87-7667-310-3 e-ISBN (report): 87-7667-311-1 ISBN (Summary): 87-7667-313-8 ISSN: 1399-497 This report can be obtained free of charge by ordering on www.evaluation.dk or from DKB Logistik Service Mimersvej 4 DK - 4600 Koege Denmark Phone + 45 3697788 The report can be downloaded through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ homepage www.um.dk or directly from the Evaluation Department’s homepage www.evaluation.dk Contact: [email protected] Responsibility for the content and presentation of findings and recommendations rests with the authors. The views and opinions expressed in the report do not necessarily correspond to the views of the Danish and Dutch Ministries of Foreign Affairs, the Development Cooperation of Ireland (DCI), the Swedish International Development Agency (Sida), and the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DfID), the recipient government, or the implementing organisations. The report is printed on Multi Fine and the cover is printed on Invercote. Preface Preface The international assistance to Afghanistan following the ousting of the Taliban-regime at the end of 001 has in many ways been unique. First, it has sought to combine the immediate humanitarian and rehabilitation efforts with a longer-term post-conflict reconstruction and development perspective. Secondly, the donor countries at a very early stage attempted to coordinate a joint strategic approach of harmonised efforts, including prioritisation of a limited number of selected sector interventions by each donor. Finally, by focusing on capacity building of the new Afghan government aligning the donor assistance mainly through the government-administered programmes, a new agenda of post-conflict assistance has been set. The evaluation of the assistance to Afghanistan has also set new standards of collabora- tion. Even before the new government had been elected, representatives of the evalu- ation departments of the five donor organisations, the Danish and Dutch Ministries of Foreign Affairs, the Development Cooperation of Ireland (DCI), the Swedish International Development Agency (Sida), and the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DfID), in 003 agreed to undertake a joint evaluation of the Afghanistan humanitarian and reconstruction assistance. The Evaluation aimed at assessing the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, coherence and connectedness of the assistance identifying lessons for improving the response by donor organisations in future complex security, humanitarian, rehabilitation and development situations. In addition, a special focus within the evaluation was also to assess the degree to which the assistance responded to the needs of internally displaced persons (IDPs) within Afghanistan. The preparation of the Evaluation has been quite extensive. The approach was discussed at a workshop at King’s College, London, in the summer 003, and several pre-studies were undertaken. Peter Marsden and David Turton, Refugee Council, UK, produced a preliminary study of assistance to IDPs in Afghanistan, and John Cosgrave and Rie Andersen, Channel Research, collected and analysed the information of the aid flows to Afghanistan from the five bilateral donors. Moreover, the Public Expenditure Review made for DCI, has also been available. The evaluation was commissioned by Danida in December 004 on behalf of the five donors to a consultant consortium led by Christian Michelsen Institute, Bergen. After visits to the partners’ headquarters, the extensive field work in Afghanistan was under- taken in March-April, completed with a workshop in Kabul with participation of key Afghan stakeholders. Finally, the draft reports have been submitted to the reference group, and commented upon by all involved through June-August. A number of key recommendations and lessons learnt are highlighted by the Evaluation as undertaken by the international consultant team. It should be noted that while the draft reports have been commented upon by the five donors the responsibility of the analysis and the conclusions of the evaluation rests with the Evaluation team. However, we would like to express our thanks to all individuals and officials involved for the sup- port and valuable information which the team received and which highly facilitated the work of the Evaluation. 3 Preface This report is the Main Evaluation Report of the findings and recommendations of the Evaluation. A short version, intended for a wider audience, the additional Sector Studies, and the pre-studies are available from the website of Danida’s Evaluation Department www.evaluation.dk Danida’s Evaluation Department October 2005 4 Table of Contents Table of Contents Preface 3 Table of Contents 5 Abbreviations, Acronyms and Afghan Terms 8 Executive Summary 13 1. Introduction and Methodology 13 . The Afghan Context for Aid Provision 14 3. Main Findings 16 4. Main Recommendations 4 5. Lessons Learned 5 1. Introduction 27 2. Methodology 31 .1 The Evaluation Process 31 . Clarification of the Terms of Reference 3 .3 Team Composition and Limitations for its Work 3 .4 Field Methodology 34 3. The Afghan Context for Aid Provision 37 3.1 Introduction 37 3. The Humanitarian Situation 39 3.3 Nation and State-Building – the Challenges 41 3.4 National Programmes and Migration 4 4. Deciding and Designing the Five Donors’ Interventions 45 4.1 Factors Informing and Influencing Decisions 45 4. The Approaches of the Donors 49 4.3 Donors’ Perceptions of the Results 51 4.4 Conclusion 53 5. Nation-building, State-building and Stabilisation 55 5.1 Introduction 55 5. Methodology 55 5.3 Nation-building 56 5.4 State-building 60 5.5 The Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission 70 5.6 The Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme 71 5.7 The Provincial Reconstruction Teams 74 5.8 Conclusions Related to the Evaluation Criteria 83 5 Table of Contents 6. Asylum Seekers, Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons 87 6.1 Introduction 87 6. Volunteer Returnees and Rejected Asylum Seekers 87 6.3 Refugees 88 6.4 Internally Displaced Persons 9 6.5 The Lead Agency Role 97 6.6 Conclusions Related to the Evaluation Criteria 98 7. Meeting Basic Needs and Securing Livelihoods 101 7.1 The Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund 101 7. The Agricultural Sector and Mine Action 10 7.3 Education 104 7.4 Health 109 7.5 Water and Sanitation 11 7.6 Livelihoods 115 7.7 Conclusions Related to the Evaluation Criteria 119 8. Cross-Cutting Issues 127 8.1 Gender 17 8. Environment 131 8.3 Needs Assessment, Monitoring and Evaluation 133 8.4 Good Humanitarian Donorship 135 9. Assessment of Main Implementing Channels 137 9.1 Introduction 137 9. Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund 137 9.3 The Government of Afghanistan 138 9.4 The United Nations Agencies 138 9.5 International Organisations 139 9.6 Non-Governmental Organisations 139 9.7 Cost effectiveness 140 9.8 Interaction with and Support for the Indigenous Recovery Processes 140 10. Conclusions 143 10.1 Related to the Evaluation Criteria 143 10. Comparative Conclusions Regarding Sectors 145 10.3 Comparative Conclusions Regarding Individual Donors 148 10.4 Overall Conclusions 150 6 Table of Contents 11.