\n H.E. Howe, Jr., & M.M. Page (Eds.), Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, 1979: AWt.udes, values, and bel/efs (pp. 111-194). Lincoln: University of Nebraska Pre55. 1980. ., The Role of Action in Attitude Change Herbert C. Kelman Haruara Ulliversily he relationship of action to attitude change has been a central and recurrent theme ill my work ever since Tmy doctoral dissertation (Kelman, 1953). I have written several theoretical papers on this issue over the years (Kelman, 1¢2a, 1974a, I974b, 1978), and during the 19605 several colleagues and I were engaged in an experimental pflJgram on the relationship of discrepant action and attitude change. 1 Some of the results of this progwm aIT' described ill Kelman and Baron (1974), but most of the experiments are still unpublished." The relationship between action and attitude change has also entered importantly into my work in various applied contexts. induding psychotherapy (Kelman, 11}63), international exchange (Kelman, J962b, 1975), and conflict resolution (Kelman, [972; Kelman & Cohen, 1979), I therefore welcome the opportunity, provided by the Nebraska Symposium, to draw together some of my ideas in thi:-; area and to distill some of the generalizations that have emerged from my work. I am particularly intrigued with noting some of the continuities and changes in my Ihinking over the years, as I have moved back and forth between experimental and applied work, It is I, Thr research was supported by grants from the Naljonallnslitlrle of "-fenl.,1 Health, which arc gratefullyacknowledged. 2, A series af papers reporting these experiments ha,'e !J.:,l·" ",rilll'n ,1'ld will eventually be published in a book by Kelman, Baron. She posh. i1nJ luoolin (Nule I). In addltiun to these four authors, contributors 10 the vnlume 'ndude N..n,,· Adfer, Nina Rcssomando, Eugene Johnsan, James M. Dabbs, Ken! S. Crawford. and MOIrtiu s. Greenberg. I ,...ant 10take this occasion III thank these colleagues for their 'limu­ rating ideas, Iheir crcati ...e work, their personal friendship. and their bound[(,55 patience. - . , . 118 NEBRASKA SYMPOSIUM ON MOTIVATION, 1979 exciting 10 observe the wa)' these two lines of activity inform and stimulate each other and thus contribute to theoretical refinement. The purpose of this paper, then, is to develop a general view or the relationship between action and attitude change. as I now visualize it. It is presented in the spirit of a work-in-progress-as an attempt to bring together a variety of observations and generaliza­ tions and to discover what they add up to, The biases that I bring to this analysis will become abundantly clear as rgo along. Let me, however, state them briefly at the au tset. (I) I view attitude as a dynamic process, rather than as a static entity or stable equilibrium point. Attitudes are constantly shifting and changing as people interact with the attitude object and with their social environment. This view contrasts with that implicit in many criticisms of the attitude concept which point to the frequent finding of low relationships between measures of attitude and be­ havior. Such criticisms tend to conceive of attitudes in static rather than dynamic terms. (2) [ take social interaction as the starting point of my analysis and look (It altitudes in that context. Attitudes flow from social inter­ action and evolve in the course of it. 11\ turn. attitudes feed into social interaction and help to guide the interaction process. (3) [ view attitudes as links between individuals and the various collectivities to which they belong. Atti tudes are shared, to vilrying degrees, within relevantcollectivities. The formation, expression, and functioning of attitudes simultaneously represent both indi­ vidual and collective processes. (4) I assume that the behavior of individuals within any given situation can best be understood in functional terms. That is. I see individuals as seeking to achieve a variety or goals within that situation. as coping with environmental forces that have a bearing on these goals, and as processing information in relation to these concerns. This functional view provides the framework for an­ alyzing attitudes. actions, and the relations between them. A functional analysis of attitude-action discrepancy contrasts, in many important ways, with an analysis derived from consistency models, particularly as exemplified by dissonance theory. ('5) As a further elaboration of a functional \'iew, I regard the individual as oriented not Dillytoward defense and equilibrium, but also toward growth, new learning, self-development, and self­ utilization. This view suggests the possibility that the rerctionshlp between action and attitude change may represent not only .1 "9 Action ill Altitude Change reactive process, but also an active one. That Is. action may not only precipitate attitude change, but it may also represent a step in an active effort to transform one's altitudes. THE BASIC PROPOSITION The basic proposition to be argued in this paper is that significant altitude change always occurs in the context of action. In speaking of action, I refer to overt behavior that produces some change in the environment and has real-life consequences for the actor. There are various other criteria that come to mind when one thinks of an action, although I would not include them as defining characteristics. Thus, I would be more inclined to speak of action insofar as the behavior is public and irreversible and insofar as it represents an active involvement and long-term commitment. All these conditions enhance the "action-character" of the behavior by strengthening the two defining characteristics. That is, the more public, irreversible, active, and committing the behavior is, the greater the change it produces in the environment and the more real-life consequences it has for the actor. An anonymuus. one-time donation to an organization represents an action. But when the donation is public, or when it involves a commitment to solicit matching donations from others, or when it takes the form of a binding pledge to contribute a certain percentage of one's income to the organization, then the action is clearly stronger-or "more of an action." It is nontrivial actions of this kind-that is, actions charac­ terized by active participation, public commitment, and important real-life consequences-that I have in mind as the usual context for significant attitude change. The statement that significant attitude change always occurs in the context of action clearly does not represent a formal proposition, 10be subjected to empirical test. It is hedged in by the requirements that the attitude change be "significant" and that the action be nontrivial. Although the word "always" may sound daring, I can easily handle exceptions by declaring the attitude change to be insignificant or the action to be trivial. Needless to say, for pur­ poses of empirical testing this proposition would have to be broken down into a series of much more specific conditional statements. For the moment, however, my purpose is not to propose specific ~- -~-~._-~ .---------­ . 120 NEBRASKA SYMPOSIUM ON MOTIVATION, 1979 hypotheses, but to develop a general framework for understanding major attitude changes in the real world. I shall try to argue that such changes are particularly likely to occur when people are in­ volved in action vis-a-vis the attitude object. The types of action that may provide the context for attitude change vary widely. Social-psychological research on the relation­ ship between action and attitude change (particularly in the dis­ sonance tradition) has generally been restricted to a single para­ digm: the individual engages in a discrepant or counterattitudinal action and, as a consequence of that action, an attitude-change process is set into motion. In this paradigm, the impetus for action comes from the outside-that is, it is unrelated to the person's cttitodes. Moreover, attitude change is a post-action phenomenon, designed to justify or explain the action that has already been taken. In my view, this is only one of 01 number of possible ways in which action may be related to attitude change. My discussion is not confined to counterattitudinal actions, nor to actions that entirely precede the onset of a change process. A logical distinction can be made between four types of action, each of which may provide a context for attitude change (see Table 1): (I) Response 10 sitl/ational demands. People may engage in action vis-a-vis an object for 01 variety of reasons-csuch as situational demands, role requirements, or social pressures-that are largely unrelated to their initial attitudes toward that object. Indeed, often­ times the action may be counterattitudlnal. This is the kind of action that is involved in the typical forced compliance experiment, popu­ larized by dissonance theory. Such actions, for the reasons postu- Table 1 Types of action that may prooidc COlitext forattitude cJlflllge Source of Actioll Social forces Personal attitudes Prior to Response to Manifestation of Change process situational demands Timillg of attitude Action In midst of Adherence to Testing of change process new policy new attitude ra r ,. Action ill Attitude Challge lated by dissonance theory or other theoretical orientations, may create the conditions for subsequent attitude change. (2) Adherence to lIW policy. Changes in social policy may set into motion a process of behavioral and attitudinal change. In keeping with the new policy, individuals may engage in novel actions vis-a­ vis the attitude object and thesein turn may create the conditions for attitude change. Research on desegregation (Allport, 1954; Saenger, (953) provides illustrations of the conduciveness of this type of action to attitude change in the direction of acceptance of the new policy, (3) Manifestatioll ofattitude. Nat surprisingly, people often engage in actions vis-a-vis an object that flow directly from their attitudes toward that object.