burke chair in strategy The Iranian Sea-Air-Missile Threat to Gulf Shipping By Anthony H. Cordesman August 14, 2014 with the assistance of Aaron Lin Request for comments: This draft has been prepared for the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies conference on Arab-U.S. Relations in Doha in June 2014, and is being circulated for comments and suggestions. Please provide them to [email protected]. ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy [email protected] Cordesman-Lin: Iranian Danger to Maritime Traffic August 2014 2 Table of Contents I. THE ROLE OF ENERGY EXPORTS IN DETERMINING THE IMPORTANCE OF THE IRANIAN THREAT .................................................................................................................................... 5 THE GROWING GLOBAL IMPORTANCE OF MARITIME TRAFFIC TO AND FROM THE GULF .......................... 6 CHOKEPOINTS AND THE BROADER MARITIME THREAT ................................................................................... 9 POTENTIAL GLOBAL AND US IMPACTS .................................................. ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED. THE IRANIAN MARITIME THREAT TO IRAN ...................................................................................................... 11 II. THE STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF IRAN’S NAVAL FORCES .................................... 17 THE RANGE OF MARITIME THREATS ................................................................................................................. 17 Submarines .............................................................................................................................................................. 25 Corvettes and Major Surface Ships .............................................................................................................. 28 Missile Patrol Boats ............................................................................................................................................. 29 Other Patrol Boats and Smaller Vessels ..................................................................................................... 29 Mine Warfare ......................................................................................................................................................... 29 Amphibious Vessels .............................................................................................................................................. 31 Hovercraft ................................................................................................................................................................ 31 Naval Aviation ....................................................................................................................................................... 31 Anti-Ship Missile Forces ..................................................................................................................................... 32 NAVAL GUARDS, MARINES, SPECIAL FORCES, AND MARINES ....................................................................... 34 Structure and Organization ............................................................................................................................ 34 Ships and Small Craft ......................................................................................................................................... 35 Probable Effectiveness ....................................................................................................................................... 35 THE NAVAL SIDE OF THE SHIFT TO ASYMMETRIC WARFARE ....................................................................... 37 IRANIAN OFFICERS AND OFFICIALS ON IRAN’S NAVAL POSTURE IN THE GULF ......................................... 39 III. THE IRANIAN AIR FORCE: A WEAK AND AGING FORCE .................................................... 43 THE UNCERTAINTIES AFFECTING IRAN’S AIRCRAFT AND MODERNIZATION ............................................. 43 IRAN’S NAVAL AVIATION BRANCH ..................................................................................................................... 46 IRANIAN CLAIMS TO AIR MODERNIZATION AND COMBAT CAPABILITY ...................................................... 46 IRAN’S STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES IN FIGHTING A SIGNIFICANT AIR WAR ........................................ 48 THE IMPACT OF THE AIR BALANCE: THE US, THE SOUTHERN GULF PROBLEM, AND IRAN’S CAPABILITY FOR AIR COMBAT .................................................................................................................................................. 60 IV. LINKAGES TO IRAN’S BALLISTIC MISSILE AND NUCLEAR PROGRAMS ........................ 63 ACCURACY, RELIABILITY, AND NUCLEAR FORCES ........................................................................................... 63 ASYMMETRIC WARFARE AND WARS OF INTIMIDATION ................................................................................ 65 ANTI-SHIP BALLISTIC MISSILE: THE KHALIJ FARS ......................................................................................... 65 V. FOCUSING ON THE BROADER THREAT FROM ASYMMETRIC FORCES .......................... 72 IRANIAN VIEWS OF IRAN’S ASYMMETRIC FORCES ........................................................................................... 73 ASYMMETRIC FORCES AND THE ART OF LIMITED WAR ................................................................................. 76 ONGOING DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAN’S GROWING MIX OF ASYMMETRIC WARFARE FORCES .................... 76 A PROVEN HISTORY AND UNCERTAIN FUTURE ............................................................................................... 77 USING ASYMMETRIC FORCES TO COMPENSATE FOR CONVENTIONAL WEAKNESS .................................... 78 VI. “CLOSING THE GULF:” IRAN’S REAL WORLD MILITARY OPTIONS FOR ASYMMETRIC WARFARE ................................................................................................................................................ 79 STRATEGIC, ENERGY, AND GLOBAL ECONOMIC IMPACTS .............................................................................. 81 STRATEGIC DEPENDENCE ON THE OVERALL FLOW OF GULF EXPORTS ...................................................... 84 Cordesman-Lin: Iranian Danger to Maritime Traffic August 2014 3 SHIFTS IN FUTURE GLOBAL DEPENDENCE ....................................................................................................... 89 The Critical Impact of Asian Dependence on Maritime Traffic Out of the Gulf ....................... 89 The Uncertainties in US Import Dependence ............................ Error! Bookmark not defined. GLOBAL ECONOMIC IMPACT OF SUSTAINED INTERRUPTIONS....................................................................... 95 IRAN’S MILITARY ASSETS FOR SUCH A MISSION ........................................................................................... 101 Iran’s Submarines ............................................................................................................................................. 101 Iran’s Submersibles and Midget Submarines ...................................................................................... 104 Swimmer Delivery Vehicles (SDVs) ........................................................................................................................................ 104 Major Surface Warships................................................................................................................................................................ 105 Fast-attack Watercraft, Speedboats, Patrol Craft, and Hovercraft. .......................................................................... 106 Shore and Ship-based ASCMs ................................................................................................................................................... 110 Naval Mines .......................................................................................................................................................... 113 Maritime Patrol Aircraft ............................................................................................................................................................... 116 Helicopters .......................................................................................................................................................................................... 116 Torpedoes ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 116 UCAVs and UAVs................................................................................................................................................. 118 IRAN’S BASES AND OTHER ASSETS FOR “CLOSING THE GULF” .................................................................. 118 Figure ? Iranian Military Installations in the Gulf ............................................................................................................ 119 Prioritizing These Threats ............................................................................................................................ 121 VII. US AND ARAB GULF OPTIONS FOR COMPETING WITH IRAN’S ASYMMETRIC FORCES ................................................................................................................................................... 123 US FORCES IN THE