JOBNAME: No Job Name PAGE: 1 SESS: 10Toppan OUTPUT: Best-set MonPremedia Jul 29Limited 16:24:53 2013 SUM: 7B382D06 /Xpp84/wiley_journal/PHIB/phib_v54_i3/phib_12023Journal Code: PHIB Proofreader: Elsie Article No: PHIB12023 Delivery date: 29 Jul 2013 Page Extent: 14 Copyeditor: Ariel Analytic Philosophy Vol. 54 No. 3 September 2013 pp. 350–363 1 WHAT DID YOU CALL ME? SLURS AS PROHIBITED 2 1 WORDS SETTING THINGS UP bs_bs_query 3 4 LUVELL ANDERSON 5 University of Memphis 6 7 ERNIE LEPORE 8 3 •• bs_bs_query 9 10 It is no secret that slurs offend. Yet public figures regularly manage to embar- 11 rass themselves or worse because of their unreflective uses of these explosive 12 words. Not long ago radio personality Dr. Laura Schlesinger got into trouble 13 by repeatedly uttering ‘nigger’, much to the dismay of a shocked African- 14 American caller. Even though it was clear Dr. Schlesinger did not intend to 15 insult anyone, her callous use caused such a stir it ultimately led to her 16 resignation from the show. 17 The bottom line is slurs are messy, and so, require great care in their 18 analysis; in particular, two important features of slurs must be explained: 19 first, why do slurs vary in offense both across groups (‘chink’ is more 20 offensive that ‘cracker’, ‘gimp’ more than ‘suit’, and ‘bitch’ more than ‘pig’) 21 and even for co-referring slurs (‘nigger’ is worse than either ‘coon’ or 22 ‘darkie’). Second, how can slurs admit of nonoffensive uses within certain 23 specially marked didactic contexts, and perhaps with quotation, but more 24 commonly with so-called appropriated (or reclaimed) uses among in-group 25 members? 26 Recent literature in the philosophy of language and linguistics divides the 27 explanatory landscape into two broad camps: content-based and non-content- 28 based, with the consensus being that (uses of) slurs express negative attitudes 29 toward their targets. Content-based theorists adopt different strategies for 30 implementing this view, but all agree that slurs (or their uses) communicate 31 offensive content. 32 In this essay, we will challenge the consensus and defend a non-content- 33 based view. According to us, slurs are prohibited not on account of offensive 34 content they manage to get across, but rather because of relevant edicts 35 surrounding their prohibition. We will argue that Prohibitionism, a term we 36 coined, accounts for all the relevant data, namely, both variation in de- 37 grees of offense among slurs and their nonoffensive uses, better than the 38 content-based competitors. We will proceed as follows: First, we will present 39 our positive view and address specific issues that arise for it. Next, we 40 will defend our view from objections, possible and actual. And finally, 41 we will compare Prohibitionism with certain alternatives and show why we 42 believe it to be superior. Before we dive in, several clarifications are in 43 order. 350 Analytic Philosophy Vol. 54 No. 3 © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. JOBNAME: No Job Name PAGE: 2 SESS: 10 OUTPUT: Mon Jul 29 16:24:53 2013 SUM: 643433B9 /Xpp84/wiley_journal/PHIB/phib_v54_i3/phib_12023 1 I. Terms of Enragement 2 3 Slurs are distinct from their neutral counterparts, that is, co-referential expres- 4 sions for the same group without any derogation, but what distinguishes them? 5 In an earlier paper (see Anderson and Lepore, forthcoming), we wrote: 6 7 What’s clear is that no matter what its history, no matter what it means or 8 communicates, no matter who introduces it, regardless of its past associa- 9 tions, once relevant individuals declare a word a slur, it becomes one. 10 11 Note that we are not insisting a declaration is necessary for slurring, but only 12 sufficient for a word to become a slur. Also, we are not claiming anyone can 13 create a slur. 14 A relevant individual must declare a word a slur for it to become one; but who 15 are these individuals, and how do they acquire their authority? Typically, they 16 will be members of the targeted group. But even a recognized spokesperson for 17 a targeted group may lack the authority to establish that a word is a slur, 18 especially should enough fellow members refuse to respect the edict. This is what 19 happened when the Reverend Jesse Jackson tried at the 1988 Democratic 20 National Convention to convert ‘black’ from a neutral counterpart into a slur. 21 His attempt failed, because not enough targeted members went along with him.1 22 Determining the basis for a group’s right to decide its own referential status 23 is complex. An ability to do so may seem to fit in with the right to self- 24 determination. It is widely noted that, for instance, groups have a right for their 25 culture to be respected, and perhaps, supported.2 Names are often important 26 aspects of a group’s culture, and so, it is reasonable to include the manner in 27 which a group is referenced as a part of its right to self-determination generally. 28 If this is correct, it is a short step from a right to determine whether the use 29 of a name is permissible to one to determine whether its use is impermissible.3 30 If groups have power over naming legitimacy through a right of self- 31 determination, then to address them by a nonapproved name might easily 32 result in insult. What is not clear is how approved and nonapproved names are 33 determined. Within a particular group there may be differences of opinion as 34 to which names are acceptable and which are not. And since usually no actual 35 congress settles these issues, acceptability, then, must be determined organi- 36 cally. The names that happen to “take” among a significant portion of the 37 relevant linguistic community are the ones deemed acceptable. 38 A further important distinction between slur words and acts of slurring should 39 also guide our investigation into how to identify slurs.4 Slurring as a speech act 40 41 1. In addition to members of the targeted group, caretakers of members who cannot object 42 themselves can declare an expression a slur. This is obviously what happened with the slur 43 ‘retarded’. 44 2. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rights-group/ 14 bs_bs_query 45 3. By ‘name’ here we mean nothing more than a referential kind term. Whether slurs are natural 46 kind terms, nonnatural kind terms, or something else is an issue left for another day. 47 4. Hom and May (in this volume) draw a similar distinction between slurs as parts of token speech 48 acts, and pejoratives as linguistic expressions employed in those speech acts. 351 © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. JOBNAME: No Job Name PAGE: 3 SESS: 10 OUTPUT: Mon Jul 29 16:24:53 2013 SUM: 66E72ECA /Xpp84/wiley_journal/PHIB/phib_v54_i3/phib_12023 1 can be performed with expressions that are not themselves slurs. (2) can be used 2 to slur Mexicans even though ‘those people’ is not itself a slur (imagine heavy 3 emphasis on those people), 4 5 (1) A: Carrie’s Mexican gardener asked her on a date. 6 (2) B: I hope she said no. She can’t possibly find those people attractive. 7 8 Tone or emphasis on locution could render clear that the speaker intends her 9 use of the phrase as an insult.5 The speaker intended to “disparage, depreciate, 10 calumniate, asperse,” as the Oxford English Dictionary describes it. However, B’s 11 slurring use of ‘those people’ does not establish that the expression is a slur 12 anymore than verbing a noun makes it a verb.6 13 What, then, exactly is a slur? A Gay-Straight Alliance (GSA) network anti- 14 slur campaign defines it as “any offensive, insulting remark or comment that is 15 meant to ridicule someone based on their race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, 16 gender, religion, class, etc.”7 This definition is a commonsense description that 17 captures popular attitudes but is inadequate since it fails to distinguish slurs 18 from slurring. Besides, not all slurs are offensive. It is doubtful whether ‘cracker’ 19 and ‘suit’ still generally evoke much offense. 20 Another worry about the GSA definition is breadth. In filling out the lin- 21 guistic category for slurs, we do not want to include every single insulting 22 remark or comment. That would be too expansive, and ultimately, unhelpful 23 since many offensive remarks are contextually determined. It is, after all, 24 possible to use virtually any locution to derogate; what makes many comments 25 derogatory has more to do with conditions under which they are uttered rather 26 than anything about the locutions themselves. A more nuanced proposal, and 27 indeed, the received view, is that slurs are better categorized on the basis of 28 their literal content. A word is a slur only if “predicating it of a subject is a 29 conventional means of denigrating its subject.”8 This definition presumes there 30 is a particular negative content communicated through the use of a slur as a 31 matter of meaning alone. But, of course, is not necessarily so. 32 Look up any slur in the dictionary, and you will find pretty much the same 33 entry, that is, ‘is a derogatory term for group y’. This sort of listing seems to 34 reveal more about function rather than about what is communicated. Of 35 course, there are those who would suggest a slur’s function is a part of its 36 meaning; that is, that slurs are performatives whose utterances constitute a per- 37 nicious action.