Intelligence and Security Committee Could 7/7 Have Been Prevented? Review of the Intelligence on the London Published by TSO (The Stationery Office) and available from: Online Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005 www.tsoshop.co.uk Mail,Telephone Fax & E-Mail TSO PO Box 29, Norwich, NR3 1GN Telephone orders/General enquiries 0870 600 5522 Order through the Parliamentary Hotline Lo-Call 0845 7 023474 Fax orders: 0870 600 5533 E-mail: [email protected] Chairman: Textphone: 0870 240 3701 The Rt. Hon. Dr Kim Howells, MP The Parliamentary Bookshop 12 Bridge Street, Parliament Square, London SW1A 2JX Telephone orders/ General enquiries: 020 7219 3890 Fax orders: 020 7219 3866 Email: [email protected] Internet: http://www.bookshop.parliament.uk TSO@Blackwell and other Accredited Agents Customers can also order publications from TSO Ireland 16 Arthur Street, Belfast BT1 4GD 028 9023 8451 Fax 028 9023 5401 Intelligence and Security Committee Could 7/7 Have Been Prevented? Review of the Intelligence on the London Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005 Chairman: The Rt. Hon. Dr Kim Howells, MP Presented to Parliament by the Prime Minister by Command of Her Majesty May 2009 Cm 7617 £19.15 © Crown copyright 2009 The text in this document (excluding the Royal Arms and other departmental or agency logos) may be reproduced free of charge in any format or medium providing it is reproduced accurately and not used in a misleading context.The material must be acknowledged as Crown copyright and the title of the document specified. Where we have identified any third party copyright material you will need to obtain permission from the copyright holders concerned. For any other use of this material please write to Office of Public Sector Information, Information Policy Team, Kew, Richmond, Surrey TW9 4DU or e-mail: [email protected] ISBN: 978-0-10-176172-7 From: The Chairman, The Rt. Hon. Margaret M. Beckett, MP INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMITTEE 70 Whitehall, London SW1A 2AS 8 July 2008 Rt. Hon. Gordon Brown, MP Prime Minister 10 Downing Street London SW1A 2AA I enclose the Intelligence and Security Committee’s Review of the Intelligence on the London Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005, commissioned last year by your predecessor. Our investigation, which began in May 2007, has taken a considerable time to conclude due to the very detailed nature of our inquiries and the substantial volume of evidence we have reviewed. The Review addresses the many unanswered questions which arose following the conviction of the 2004 fertiliser bomb (CREVICE) plotters. In making our judgements about whether anything was missed or overlooked, we have focused on the information available at the time. The Review contains some highly sensitive intelligence and an unprecedented level of operational detail. As a result, there are some instances where we have agreed that information must be redacted from the published version of the Review in order that individuals are not put in danger, that current operations are not compromised and that our enemies do not learn of the capabilities of the UK’s intelligence and security Agencies. There are also some instances where the courts have ruled that information cannot be published. These redactions have been agreed with the Agencies, the police, the Crown Prosecution Service and government departments. We wish to note that the iii Security Service, the Metropolitan Police Service and West Yorkshire Police not only co-operated fully with our inquiries, but were helpful in seeking to ensure that we could publish as much material as possible and thereby provide the public with as full an account of these matters as possible. Given the seriousness of this issue and the considerable public interest in this Review, we trust that you will publish the Report as soon as possible (subject to the conclusion of certain legal proceedings), and that debates will be held in both Houses of Parliament shortly thereafter. MARGARET M. BECKETT iv From: The Chairman, The Rt. Hon. Dr Kim Howells, MP INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMITTEE 35 Great Smith Street, London SW1P 3BQ 6 May 2009 Rt. Hon. Gordon Brown, MP Prime Minister 10 Downing Street London SW1A 2AA Further to my predecessor’s letter of 8 July 2008, covering the Committee’s Review of the Intelligence on the London Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005, I am writing to provide you with an update. The Review was a complete and thorough investigation of, and report on, the facts as they were known up until July 2008. However, since the Committee sent you the Review there have been further developments in relation to two specific issues covered in the Review. These developments do not affect the central theme of the Review – the links between the CREVICE fertiliser- bomb plotters and the 7/7 bombers – or our overall conclusions. Despite this, we felt that it was important that when the Review was published it was brought up to date. We have therefore produced an “Update” to the Review – enclosed here – which we trust you will publish with it, as an Annex. v The “Update” also explains why the Review could not be published when it was originally sent to you in July 2008. We are aware of the frustration caused by the delay in publishing the Review and consider that it is important that – now that it is possible to do so – the legal reasons for the delay are made public. KIM HOWELLS vi CONTENTS INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................ 3 Purpose of this Review................................................................................................. 3 Why the Intelligence and Security Committee?........................................................... 3 How we have conducted this Review ........................................................................... 4 How we have written this Report ................................................................................. 5 PART A: WHAT HAPPENED? ........................................................................................ 7 Operation CREVICE.................................................................................................... 7 What happened next? ................................................................................................. 11 PART B: QUESTIONS RAISED.................................................................................... 15 Who were the 7 July bombers? .................................................................................. 15 Had MI5 and the police previously come across any of the bombers? ...................... 16 So when did they first come across the 7 July bombers?........................................... 16 Mohammed Siddique KHAN................................................................................ 16 Shazad TANWEER................................................................................................ 17 Jermaine LINDSAY............................................................................................... 17 Hasib HUSSAIN ................................................................................................... 18 So when did MI5 first come across them in connection with CREVICE?................ 18 When did MI5 first see Mohammed Siddique KHAN and Shazad TANWEER meeting the CREVICE bomb plotters? ...................................................................... 20 Did MI5 see Mohammed Siddique KHAN and Shazad TANWEER meeting Omar KHYAM after they had discovered the bomb plot? ......................................... 21 What did MI5 do about these unidentified men they saw with KHYAM?................. 23 (i) Did they put the men under surveillance? ........................................................ 23 (ii) Did they follow up on the leads they had?....................................................... 24 (iii) So they did have details on Mohammed Siddique KHAN prior to 7/7? ........ 25 (iv) So why did they say they had not identified Mohammed Siddique KHAN?.. 26 Why was UDM E (Mohammed Siddique KHAN) only “desirable”?........................ 27 (i) “Essential” targets............................................................................................. 29 (ii) “Desirable” targets........................................................................................... 29 If MI5 overheard Mohammed Siddique KHAN with the CREVICE group and Mohammed Momin KHAWAJA when they discussed bomb-making in February 2004, surely that should have made him an “essential” target? ................................. 30 But MI5 did hear Mohammed Siddique KHAN talking about operations in Pakistan – should that not have made him an “essential” target? .............................. 32 Nevertheless, surely someone who had been training in Pakistan or Afghanistan should be a serious target for MI5?............................................................................ 37 (i) Two individuals training in Pakistan in 2003.................................................... 37 (ii) An extremist in Afghanistan in the late 1990s................................................. 38 (iii) If MI5 had identified “IBRAHIM” or “Saddique ***” as Mohammed Siddique KHAN, would that have made a difference?................................... 39 1 PART C: WHAT DOES THIS MEAN? .......................................................................... 40 Introduction ...............................................................................................................