Concentrate to Annihilate: A Strategic Analysis of the Rwandan Genocide By Jeff Stonehouse B.A., University of British Columbia, 2009 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS In The College of Graduate Studies (Interdisciplinary Studies) THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA (Okanagan) January 2016 © Jeff Stonehouse, 2016 Abstract This thesis has two goals. First, drawing upon centuries of strategic theory, I develop an analytical framework called the ‘strategy hierarchy’. This heuristic device simplifies the diffuse field of strategic theory by focusing analysis on three interconnected themes: policy, grand strategy and military strategy. I argue that by using this framework it is possible to transfer the contributions of conventional strategic theory to episodes of genocidal violence. Second, I use the ‘strategy hierarchy’ as a lens through which to base an analysis of the Rwandan genocide (1994). The ‘policy’ that preceded the genocide was developed by an entrenched political, economic and social elite called the akazu. In the late 1980s, this group of elites encountered three threats to their continued dominance: calls for multipartyism, an economic downturn and an invasion from the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). The diverse methods of meeting this threat were the domain of ‘grand strategy’. Prior to the outbreak of mass violence, the akazu and their network of supporters tackled these challenges politically, economically, socially, culturally and diplomatically. One of the key processes paralleling this multifaceted assault was the development of a genocidal ideology. According to this belief system, non-violent threats from the political opposition and from the Tutsi ethnicity were conflated with the armed and aggressive RPF. On 6 April, 1994, President Habyarimana was assassinated. This ‘strategic shock’ resulted in a dramatic shift in grand strategic priorities. Pursuing elite policy, ‘military strategy’ took precedence over non-martial means. Two types of military strategy emerged. The primary strategy targeted Hutu politicians and rival elites. This strategy was largely successful within the first week of the genocide. Then, a new strategy emerged. The organizers of the genocide took ii advantage of and encouraged the traditional Tutsi practice of converging upon the churches for sanctuary during times of political upheaval. With thousands gathered at public locations, the perpetrators commissioned a series of extensive and high fatality massacres. iii Table of Contents Abstract....................................................................................................................................... ii Table of Contents ....................................................................................................................... iv List of Tables ............................................................................................................................ vii List of Figures .......................................................................................................................... viii Acknowledgements .................................................................................................................... ix Chapter 1: Introduction ............................................................................................................... 1 1.1 A Place Called Nyarubuye ................................................................................................ 1 1.2 Overview of the Thesis ..................................................................................................... 3 1.3 Purpose and Research Question ...................................................................................... 5 1.4 Analytical Framework ....................................................................................................... 6 1.5 Argument .......................................................................................................................... 7 1.6 Significance of the Study .................................................................................................. 9 1.7 Research Design and Sources ......................................................................................... 9 1.8 Organization of Thesis .....................................................................................................11 Chapter 2: Literature Review .....................................................................................................14 2.1.1 Lemkin and the United Nations Genocide Convention ..............................................14 2.1.2 First Generation Comparative Genocide Studies .......................................................16 2.1.3 Definitional Conundrums ...........................................................................................17 2.2 War and Genocide ...........................................................................................................19 2.2.1 War as a Catalyst for Genocide .................................................................................20 2.2.2 War as Inspiration for Genocide ................................................................................21 2.2.3 Mark Levene’s Typology of War ................................................................................22 2.2.4 Martin Shaw and ‘Degenerate War’ ...........................................................................24 2.3 Massacre .........................................................................................................................25 2.3.1 Jacques Sémelin and Massacre ................................................................................28 2.3.2 ‘Genocidal Massacres’ as a Problematic Concept .....................................................29 2.4 Uses of ‘Strategy’ in Genocide Literature .........................................................................30 2.4.1 Benjamin Valentino and the ‘Strategic Perspective’ ...................................................31 Chapter 3: The ‘Strategy Hierarchy’ Analytical Framework .......................................................33 3.1 Why Link Strategy and Genocide?...................................................................................34 3.2 Origins of Strategy ...........................................................................................................36 iv 3.3 Definitions of Strategy......................................................................................................37 3.4 The ‘Strategy Hierarchy’ Analytical Framework................................................................40 3.5 Strategic Behaviors and the Intentionalist/Functionalist Debate .......................................42 3.6 Strategy: Science or Ideal Type? .....................................................................................44 3.7 A Caveat: Adversarial and Non-Adversarial Enemies ......................................................45 3.8 Non-Adversaries and Strategy .........................................................................................48 3.9 Summary .........................................................................................................................50 Chapter 4: The Strategic Context: Political Violence in Rwanda (1959 to 1990) .......................52 4.1 “Race” in Pre-Colonial and Colonial Rwanda ...................................................................53 4.2 Revolutionary Violence (1959) .........................................................................................55 4.3 Inyenzi Raids and Retaliation against the Tutsi................................................................57 4.4 Genocide in Burundi and the Habyarimana Coup ............................................................61 4.5 The Role of Sanctuaries ..................................................................................................63 4.6 Summary .........................................................................................................................65 Chapter 5: Policy, Ideology and the Rwandan Elite ...................................................................67 5.1 Policy and Policymakers ..................................................................................................68 5.2 Policy’s Normative Control over the Strategy Hierarchy ...................................................70 5.3 Genocidal Ideology and Policy .........................................................................................72 5.4 Rwanda: The Emergence of the Akazu ...........................................................................75 5.5 Rwanda: Strategic Shocks ...............................................................................................76 5.6 Creating the Adversary ....................................................................................................80 5.6.1 Print: Kangura and the ‘Hutu Ten Commandments’ ..................................................81 5.6.2 Radio: Radio-Télévision Libre des Mille Collines .......................................................84 5.6.3 The ENI Commission ................................................................................................85 5.6.4 Léon Mugesera's Party Speech.................................................................................86 5.7 Summary .........................................................................................................................87