NEW LIES FOR OLD The Communist Strategy of Deception and Disinformation ANATOLIY GOLITSYN TO THE MEMORY OF Anna Akhmatova CONSCIENCE AND SOUL OF RUSSIAN LITERATURE Contents Editors's Foreword xiii Author's Note xvii PART ONE The Two Methodologies 1 The Problems Facing Western Analysts 3 The General Difficulties 3—The Special Difficulties: Disinformation 4—Disinformation in Communist Regimes S 2 The Patterns of Disinformation: "Weakness and Evolution" 10 The "Weakness and Evolution" Pattern 10—The Precedent of the NEP 11—The Results of the NEP 16—The Lesson of the NEP 3 The Patterns of Disinformation: "Facade and Strength" 18 Official Speeches and Party Documents 20—Special Disinformation Operations 21 4 The Patterns of Disinformation: Transition 23 The Misrepresentation of De-Stalinization 24—Anticommunism 25— Anti-Stalinism 26—De-Stalinization in Practice 29—Improvised De- Stalinization from 1953 to 1956 29—Re-Stalinization 31 5 The New Policy and Disinformation Strategy 33 The New Policy 34—The Disadvantages of Apparent Unity 36— The Advantages of Apparent Disunity 37—The Political Use of De- Stalinization 39—Sources of Inspiration 41 6 The Shelepin Report and Changes in Organization 46 Department D. 50 vii viii CONTENTS 7 The New Role of Intelligence 52 8 Sources of Information 58 Western Sources 58—Communist Sources 61—The Analysis of Infor- mation from Communist Sources 62 9 The Vulnerability of Western Assessments 65 The Consequences of Different Patterns of Disinformation 67—The Crisis in the Bloc, 1949-1956 68—The Second World War 68 10 Communist Intelligence Successes, Western Failures, and the Crisis in Western Studies 70 Factors in Communist Intelligence Successes 71—Obsolete Western Methods of Analyzing Communist Sources 73—The Western Failure to Detect Disinformation and Its Current Pattern 76 11 Western Errors 79 12 The New Methodology 85 Factors Underlying the New Methodology 86—The New Methodology and Western Sources 93—The New Methodology and Communist Sources 96—Official Communist Sources 96—Unofficial Communist Sources 100—"Secret" Communist Sources 101—To Sum Up . 102 PART TWO The Disinformation Program and Its Impact on the West 13 The First Disinformation Operation: The Soviet-Yugoslav "Dispute" of 1958-60 107 Yugoslavia's Final Reconciliation with the Bloc 107—Open Evidence of Yugoslav Participation in the Formulation of the Policy 110— Further Anomalies in the "Dispute" 114—Objectives of the Soviet-Yugoslav "Dispute" of 1955-60 118 14 The Second Disinformation Operation: The "Evolution" of the Soviet Regime, Part One: Major Changes in the USSR 120 Economic Changes 120—Political Changes 124 -- Changes in Diplo- CONTENTS ix macy 127—The Influence of Ideology 131—The Revival of De-Stalin- ization 135—The Position of Soviet Scientists and Other Intellectuals 139—Objectives of Strategic Disinformation on Soviet "Evolution" and "Moderation" 141 15 The Third Disinformation Operation: The Soviet-Albanian "Dispute" and "Split" 143 The Overt Picture of Soviet-Albanian Relations 143—Inside Informa- tion and Its Interpretation 144—Anomalies in the "Dispute" and "Split" 147—Comparison with the Tito-Stalin "Split" 149—Conclusion 151— Objectives of the Disinformation Operation 152 16 The Fourth Disinformation Operation: The Sino-Soviet "Split" 153 CPSU-CPC Collaboration, 1944-49, 153—Sino-Soviet Friction, 1950- 57, and Its Removal 156—The Historical Evidence of Sino-Soviet Differences 162—The Form of Sino-Soviet Differences 163— The Content of Sino-Soviet Differences 168—Ideological Differences 168—Economic Differences 170—Military Differences 172—Differ- ences in National Interest 175—Differences in Political and Diplomatic Strategy and Tactics 177—Differences over Tactics for Non-bloc Communist Parties 179—The Technique of the "Split" 179— Strategic Objectives of the "Split" 182 17 The Fifth Disinformation Operation: Romanian "Independence" 183 Special Relations between the Romanians and Soviets 184—The "Evidence" of Soviet-Romanian Differences 186—The Motives for the Projection of Romanian "Independence" 191—Objectives of the Disinformation Operation 194 18 The Sixth Disinformation Operation: The Alleged Recurrence of Power Struggles in the Soviet, Chinese, and Other Parties 195 Succession in the Soviet Leadership: New Stabilizing Factors 196— The Failure of Lenin and Stalin to Solve the Succession Problem 197— Khrushchev's "Removal"an Agreed Transfer of the Leadership to Brezhnev 200—Objectives of Disinformation on Power Struggles 206 x CONTENTS 19 The Seventh Disinformation Operation: "Democratization" in Czechoslovakia in 1968 208 The Western Interpretation 208—Western Errors 209—A Rein- terpretation of Czechoslovak "Democratization" 210—The Role of Historians and Economists in "Democratization" 211—The Roles of Barak and Sik 212—The Role of Writers in "Democratization" 214— The "Struggle" between the Novotny "Conservatives" and the Dubcek "Progressives" 216—Conclusions 220—Communist Gains and Losses from "Democratization" 221—Possible Implications of "Democratization "for the West 223—Objectives of the "Quiet Revolution" 224 20 The Second Disinformation Operation: The "Evolution" of the Soviet Regime, Part Two: The "Dissident" Movement 227 Sakharov 231—Objectives of Disinformation on "Dissidence" 241 21 The Eighth Disinformation Operation: Continuing Eurocommunist Contacts with the Soviets—The New Interpretation of Eurocommunism 243 The Manifestations of Eurocommunism 244—The French Party 245— The Italian Party 246—The Spanish Party 246—The British Party 247—Joint Statements 247—The Soviet Attitude 248—The Yugoslavs and Romanians 249—The New Analysis 240—The Emergence of Eurocommunism 250—The Revival of Dead Issues 251— Exploitation of the "Independent" Image of Eurocommunist Parties 252—The Inconsistencies in Eurocommunism 253—Continuing Eurocommunist Contacts with the Soviets 255—The New Interpretation of Eurocommunism 257—The Possible Adverse Effects on International Communism 259—Implications for Western Propaganda 261— Conclusion 261—Objectives of Eurocommunism 262 22 The Role of Disinformation and Intelligence Potential in the Realization of the Communist Strategies 263 The Major Strategy 264—The Disinformation and Strategic Role of Yugoslavia 266—Sino-Soviet Disinformation and the Cultural Rev- olution: A New Interpretation 268—Sino-Soviet Duality and Commu- nist Strategy in the Third World 272—Sino-Soviet Duality and Mili- CONTENTS xi tary Strategy 274—Sino-Soviet Duality and the Revolutionary Move- ment 279—The Advantages of Sino-Soviet Duality 281—The Intelli- gence Potential and Agents of Influence 282—Strategic Exploitation of KCB Agents among Prominent Soviet Intellectuals and Religious Leaders 291 23 The Evidence of Overall Co-ordination between the Communist Governments and Parties 295 Coordination within the Bloc 295—Summit Meetings 296—Coordi- nation through Diplomatic Channels 299—Bilateral Coordination within the Bloc 301—Coordination between Bloc and Non-bloc Parties 306—Conclusions 307 24 The Impact of the Disinformation Program 309 The Shaping of Western Assessments of the Communist World 309— The Effect on Western Policy Formation 313—The Practical Effects on Western Policies 316—Conclusion 317 PART THREE The Final Phase and the Western Counter-Strategy 25 The Final Phase 327 Western Interpretation of Events in Poland 328—A New Analysis 328—Developments in the 1970s 320—Final Preparations for the "Renewal" 330—The Polish Communist Party within Solidarity 332— Motives for the Creation of Solidarity 332—The Threat to the West from the Polish "Renewal" 335—Sino-Soviet Relations 343—The Third World 344—Disarmament 345—Convergence 345—The Worldwide Communist Federation 346—Comments on the Appointment of Andropov and on Other Developments Following the Death of Brezhnev 347—Sino-Soviet Developments 350—The Attempted Assassination of the Pope 351 26 Where Now? 355 Reassessment 357—End to National Rivalries 360—Ideological Soli- darity 361—Inward Heart-Searching 362—Widening Defense Alli- ances 362—Reorientation of Intelligence Services 363—Diplomatic xii CONTENTS Disengagement 363—Denial of Trade and Technology 364— Isolating Communist Parties 364—Addressing the Peoples of the Communist Bloc 365—The Next Half Century 365 Glossary 367 Notes 371 Editors' Foreword VERY RARELY disclosures of information from behind the Iron Curtain throw new light on the roots of communist thought and action and challenge accepted notions on the operation of the communist system. We believe that this book does both these things. It is nothing if not controversial. It rejects conventional views on subjects ranging from Khrushchev's overthrow to Tito's revisionism, from Dubcek's liberalism to Ceausescu's independence, and from the dissident movement to the Sino-Soviet split. The author's analysis has many obvious implications for Western policy. It will not be readily accepted by those who have for long been committed to opposing points of view. But we believe that the debates it is likely to provoke will lead to a deeper understanding of the nature of the threat from international communism and, perhaps, to a firmer determination to resist it. The author's services to the party and the KGB and the unusually long periods he spent in study, mainly in the KGB but also with the University of Marxism-Leninism and the Diplomatic School, make the author uniquely well qualified as a citizen of the West to write about the subjects covered in this book. He was born near Poltava, in the Ukraine, in 1926. He was thus brought