Being-in-the-World A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time, Division I Hubert L. Dreyfus The MIT Press Cambridge, Massachusetts London, England Fqr Stephen and Gabrielle Sixth printing, 1995 © 1991 Massachusetts Institute of Technology All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or infor­ mation storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from the publisher. Quotations from Beingand TiTlU! by Martin Heidegger, translated byJohn Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, ©1962 by SCM Press Ltd., are used here by permission of SCM Press Ltd. and Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. This book was set in New Baskerville by The MIT Press and printed and bound in the United States of America. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Dreyfus, Hubert L Being-in-the-world: a commentary on Heidegger's being and time, division I / Hubert L. Dreyfus. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 0-262-04106-5. - ISBN 0-262-54056-8 (pbk.) 1. Heidegger, Martin, 1889-1976. Sein und Zeit. 2. Ontology. 3. Space and time. I. Title. B3279.H48S462 1990 I11-dc20 89-38812 CIP Contents Preface vu Introduction: Why Study Being and Time? 1 1 Heidegger's Substantive Introduction 10 2 Heidegger's Methodological Introduction 30 3 A Preliminary Sketch of Being-in-the-World 40 4 Availableness and Occurrentness 60 5 Worldliness 88 6 Heidegger's Critique of Recent Versions of Cartesianism 108 7 spatiality and space 128 vi Contents 8 The "Who" ofEveryday Dasein 141 9 The Three-Fold Structure ofBeing-In 163 10 Affectedness 168 11 Understanding 184 12 Telling and Sense 215 13 Falling 225 14 The Care-Structure 238 15 Philosophical Implications of a Hermeneutics of Everydayness 246 Appendix: Kierkegaard, Division II, and Later Heidegger Hubert L. Dreyfus and Jane Rubin 283 Notes 341 Index 363 Preface This commentary has been circulating in gradually changing ver­ sions for over twenty years. It started in 1968 as a set of "Fybate Lecture Notes" transcribed from my course on Beingand Time at the University of California, Berkeley. In 19751 started circulating my updated lecture notes to students and anyone else who was inter­ ested. For a decade thereafter I revised the notes each year, incorporating and responding to what I learned from my students and teaching assistants. By 1985 there were so many requests for 'The Heidegger Transcripts" that I was encouraged to transform them in to a book. The first draft of the book was finished in time for a 1988 NEH Summer Institute held at the University of California, Santa Cruz. On the basis of what I learned from colleagues and participants there and during the following summer, when I taught a course on Being and Time at the University of Frankfurt, I did one final revision for this MIT Press edition. About all that has stayed constant over twenty years of revising has been my decision to limit the notes to Division I of Part One of Being and Time. I still consider this the most original and important section of the work, for it is in Division I that Heidegger works out his account of being-in-the-world and uses it to ground a profound critique of traditional ontology and epistemology. Division II of Part One, which makes up the rest of what we have of Heidegger's proposed two-part book (Division III of Part One and all of Part Two were never published) , divides into two somewhat independent enterprises. First, there is the "existentialist" side of Heidegger's thought, which focuses on anxiety, death. guilt, and resoluteness and which, although highly influential on its own and in its Sartrian version in Being and Nothingness, was, for good reasons, later aban­ doned by Heidegger himself. And second, there is the laying out of the temporality of human being and of the world, and the ground- viii Preface ing of both of these in a more originary temporality whose past, present, and future dimensions are not to be thought ofas successive. Although the chapters on originary temporality are an essential part of Heidegger's project, his account leads him so far from the phenomenon ofeveryday temporality that I did not feel I could give a satisfactory interpretation of the material. Moreover, the whole of Division II seemed to me much less carefully worked out than Division I and, indeed, to have some errors so serious as to block any consistent reading. (I subsequently learned that when Heidegger was up for the equivalent of tenure , he submitted only Division I for publication, but the Ministry of Education considered it "insuffi­ cient." He agreed, in exchange for tenure, to publish a hastily finished version of Division II.) In the end, thanks to two of my former students, the book has turned out somewhat differently than I had originally planned. Jane Rubin, who was then teaching the Kierkegaard course at Berkeley, agreed to collaborate with me on an article on Kierkegaard's influence on early Heidegger. At roughly the same time, Berkeleywent on the semester system, at which time I decided to add Division II to my Being and Time course. Under these con­ ditions I became more and more involved in sorting out the existentialist side of Heidegger, and our article grew into the appendix of this book. With regard to the very difficult chapters on time, I was saved by William Blattner, who, after working on Heidegger as an under­ graduate at Berkeley, wrote his doctoral dissertation with John Haugeland at Pittsburgh on temporality in Kant and Heidegger. His account of temporality in Beingand Timepinpoints and corrects Heidegger's confusions and makes sense of even the most difficult passages. When Blattner publishes his work, it will be an important contribution to an understanding ofHeidegger on time and can be thought of as completing this commentary. Another event that required radically revising the transcripts was the posthumous publication of Heidegger's lecture courses, in­ cluding those from the years immediately preceding and following the publication of Being and Time in 1927. History of the Concept of Time (1925), The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (1927), and The MetaphysicalFoundations of Logic (1928) cast floods of new light on Heidegger's magnum opus. Many passages that are unintelligible in Being and Time are spelled out in clear and simple terms in the lectures. These new publications also confirmed a hypothesisJohn zx Preface Haugeland and I had made in 1978 that Being and Time could be understood as a systematic critique of Husserl's phenomenology, even though Husserl and his basic concept, intentionality, are hardly mentioned in the book. The appearance of Basic Problems, which explicitly undertakes "the task of . interpreting more radically the phenomena of intentionality and transcendence" seemed a confirmation ofour approach. It also justified my emphasis on the nonmentalistic approach to intentionality in Being and Time, which, thanks to the constant friendly opposition ofJohn Searle, already figured prominently in my commentary. When Being and Time was published in 1927, it was immediately recognized as a classic. Perhaps for this reason Heidegger never made any substantive changes to the text, although he did make small stylistic changes in the fourteen subsequent reprintings. He also kept several copies of the book in which he made notes correcting passages that had been or could be misunderstood and criticizing the book's substantive claims from the perspective of his later thought. (Heidegger's writings are divided by him into two periods: those dating roughly from before 1930, and those written from 1930 on.) Quotations from Being and Time in this book are followed by two sets of page numbers; the first (in parentheses) refers to a page of the standard English translation, the second (in brackets) to a page of the standard German. When I quote from Heidegger' s marginal notes, I cite the page number from Sein & Zeit in the Gesamtausgabe [Collected works] edition in braces. Chapters in Being and Timeare cited with roman· numerals, chapters in this book with arabic numerals (and a lower-case c for clarity). Being and Time is notoriously hard to translate. Heidegger was determined to avoid the mistaken ontology built into traditional philosophical terms, but he was also convinced that ordinary language was inevitably misleading and had contributed to and reciprocally been corrupted by philosophy. He therefore made up many of his own technical terms. Heidegger's translators have struggled with this problem with varying degrees of success. In the Macquarrie-Robinson translation of Being and Time, which is the only one in English, Heidegger's prose is generally well rendered, but many of the technical terms have been translated into English terms that either lack the connotations Heidegger is relying on to get his point across or, worse, have just the connotations Heidegger x Preface is trying to avoid. In some cases the translators of the three volumes of lectures from the period of Being and Time have come up with better terms, but their diverse ideas only further complicate mat­ ters when one needs to assemble quotations from all four texts. In the face of these problems, and in the hope of ultimately decreasing rather than augmenting the number of English varia­ tions in print for each German term, John Haugeland, William Blattner, andl have made an attempt to standardize our terminology. I have tried to keep to this agreement, though in some contexts I have felt forced to strike out on my own. Thus the occasional use of the word "I" in the following list of modifications of the standard translations: Augenblick means literally "the glance of an eye." It is Luther's translation of the biblical "twinkling of an eye" in which ''we shall be changed." Kierkegaard uses Oieblik as a technical term that is translated as "the moment"; since Heidegger derives his usage from Kierkegaard, I shall translate Augenblick not as "the moment of vision" but simply as the moment.