2 PROJECT BACKGROUND Oxfam and SCA, with the support of CAFOD Close to 10 years after the Oxfam report on aid have sought to commission a report assessing effectiveness the context has drastically the level of aid effectiveness in Afghanistan. changed in Afghanistan. First, domestic Broadly, the purpose of this report is to assess revenues increased from around USD 750 to what extent the international community million in 2008 to USD 2.1 billion in 2016. and the government are fulfilling their Despite this massive increase in revenue commitments in terms of aid effectiveness, aid generation, Afghanistan remains heavily promises and disbursement. SCA and Oxfam dependent on international aid. Second, one of intend to use the findings of this assessment to the major aid actors, the international military conduct evidence-based advocacy. (mostly through the Provincial Reconstruction Teams – PRTs), which invest in the Although there have been some reports development sector was heavily criticized by written on aid effectiveness in Afghanistan civil society has almost completely over the past decade, there has been no disappeared, with the departure of most comprehensive evaluation on aid foreign military troops in 2014. Third, effectiveness since Oxfam and ACBAR’s report considerable efforts have been made by the in 2008.1 Therefore, this report has aimed to Afghan government and the donor community be the most comprehensive literature on this to better align and coordinate aid, with the important subject, in the hope of attracting development of national priority programs considerable attention amongst the aid (NPPs) and the strengthening of the JCMB. On community within Afghanistan and beyond. a more negative aspect, the Afghan economy The report has focused on providing quality, has badly suffered from the troops accurate information and analysis, presented withdrawal, leading to unemployment and in a manner which maximizes audience uncertainties for investors. engagement, in order to best support advocacy and lobbying work throughout 2018. This report has been prepared by ATR Consulting, in Kabul, Afghanistan, the views and recommendations presented in this report are those of ATR, and do not necessarily reflect those held by SCA, Oxfam or CAFOD. ATR Consulting, Kabul, March 2018 Cover Photo: Christoffer Hjalmarsson/SCA 1 ‘Falling Short: Aid Effectiveness in Afghanistan’, Waldman, Oxfam, 2008 3 4 TABLE OF CONTENTS Acronyms .................................................................................................................................................................................... 6 1. Executive Summary and Recommendations ........................................................................................................... 7 2. Objectives of the Study ................................................................................................................................................... 12 3. Scope of the Study ............................................................................................................................................................ 12 4. Key Findings........................................................................................................................................................................ 13 4.1 Have the Afghan government and the international community met their aid effectiveness commitments of the past four international conferences on Afghanistan? ............................................. 13 4.2 How has the volume of aid changed over the years (2010-2016)? ...................................................... 24 4.3 To what extent has the international community fulfilled its aid promises to Afghanistan, and what is the actual amount of aid disbursed to Afghan government and spent? ..................................... 26 4.4 To what extent has the aid spent by Afghan government been effective and spent on intended purposes, and similarly what has been the effectiveness of the aid spent by the international community directly? ........................................................................................................................................................ 28 5. Conclusions ......................................................................................................................................................................... 37 6. Recommendations ............................................................................................................................................................ 38 7. Annexes ................................................................................................................................................................................. 41 Tables Table 1 Volume of development aid disbursed from 2010-2015 ..................................................................... 24 Table 2 Volume of committed aid vs disbursed aid from 2009/10 – 2016/17 ........................................... 27 Table 3 List of Interview Subjects................................................................................................................................... 43 Figures Figure 1 Development aid disbursed by international community from 2010-2015 .............................. 24 Figure 2 Development aid disbursed by international community by country from 2011-2015 ....... 25 Figure 3 Committed &. disbursed development aid to GIRoA from 2010-2015 ......................................... 26 Figure 4 Committed vs. disbursed aid from 2009/10-2016/17 (Million USD) ........................................... 27 Figure 5 Disbursed bilateral ODA to Afghanistan by purpose 2011-2015 (Million USD) ...................... 28 5 ACRONYMS AGCSO Central Statistics Organisation AITF Afghan Infrastructure Trust Fund ANPDF Afghan National Peace and Development Framework ARTF Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund ATR Assess Transform Reach CAFOD Catholic Agency For Overseas Development CSO Civil Society Organisation DFID Department for International Development GIRoA Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan JCMB Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board JICA Japan International Cooperation Agency KII Key Informant Interview MEC International Joint Anti-Corruption Monitoring and Evaluation Committee MOF Ministry of Finance MOE Ministry of Education MOPH Ministry of Public Health MRRD Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development NESP National Education Strategic Plan NGO Non-Government Organisation NPP National Priority Program NSP National Solidarity Program NUG National Unity Government ODA Official Development Assistance OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Ru-Watsip Rural Water Supply, Sanitation and Irrigation Programme SCA Swedish Committee for Afghanistan SOM Senior Officials Meeting SMAF Self-reliance through Mutual Accountability Framework TMAF Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework UN United Nations UNAMA United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan USAID United States Agency for International Development 6 1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY In the years since 2010, Afghanistan has seen In Afghanistan’s most recently completed improvements in life expectancy, infant budget for the financial year of 1396 (March mortality, school enrolment rates, and Gross 2017- Feb 2018), two thirds (66%) was Domestic Product. However, poverty and funded through international donor support, unemployment rates have increased, amidst a with one third (33%) funded through worsening security situation, that sees civilian domestic revenue. The USD 6.659 billion causalities at their highest levels since 2002, budget was split into two categories, 62% for and unprecedented levels of displacement due the operating budget and 38% for the to conflict and natural disasters.2 Moreover, development budget. Donors gave money to according to UNAMA’s Strategic Review in mid both (USD 1.9 billion for operating budget and 2017, Afghanistan is no longer a post-conflict USD 2.214 billion for the development state, but a country undergoing a conflict that budget), but in the development budget, shows few signs of abating.3 donors provide both discretionary (USD 493 million) and non-discretionary (USD 1.674 At the same time, international aid to billion) funding.6 Afghanistan has decreased, from nearly USD 6.5 billion in 2010, down to USD 4.2 billion in Donors also give money to Afghanistan ‘off- 2015, with donors4 honouring the pledges budget’, where it is disbursed through made at international conferences (for the development partners, UN agencies, and non- purpose of this study, all aid money is government organisations. However, regarded as that which is provided for according to interview respondents, Official development purposes. Military aid is not Development Assistance (ODA) is more measured or assessed in this report.).5 Yet fragmented when provided off-budget, which donors have been informing the government overwhelms the institutional capacity of the of Afghanistan that they should get used to government to effectively monitor donor- having less financial support in the coming financed projects.7 In 2014, the majority years. Despite these warnings from donors, (58.7%) of donor financed ‘off-budget’ Afghanistan remains financially dependent on projects were below USD 1 million, and nearly international support. a third between USD 1-10 million. By contrast, 2 ‘Afghanistan Country Snapshot: Overview’, The World https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ALLD.C