MOBILIZATION IN CIVIL WAR: LATENT NORMS, SOCIAL RELATIONS, AND INTER-GROUP VIOLENCE IN ABKHAZIA by ANASTASIA SHESTERININA B.A., Summa Cum Laude, York University, 2008 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE AND POSTDOCTORAL STUDIES (Political Science) THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA (Vancouver) November 2014 © Anastasia Shesterinina, 2014 Abstract What explains individual and small group mobilization for inter-group violence? How does participation in inter-group violence inform high-risk action in subsequent cycles of mobilization? This dissertation poses four puzzles of violent mobilization across the pre-, civil war, and post-war stages in the conflict cycle to analyze mobilization in civil war. These puzzles place the question of civil war mobilization in a historical trajectory of conflict and include pre-war violent mobilization despite the risks of state repression and inter-group opposition; immediate mass mobilization on a weaker side in the war at the stage of civil war onset; retention of fighters in the course of civil war; and protracted violent mobilization in the post-war period. Analysis is based on over 150 in-depth interviews with participants and non-participants in mobilization and extensive archival and secondary material gathered through fieldwork over 2010- 2013 in Abkhazia—a case of civil war and Georgia’s breakaway territory,—Georgia, and Russia. The wide scope of Abkhaz mobilization in the pre- (1921-1992), civil war (1992-1993), and post- war (1993-2008) periods allows examining within-case temporal and spatial variation, tracing the process of mobilization across the conflict cycle, and drawing generalizable conclusions. The study adopts a normative, socially-embedded approach to mobilization in civil war and critically engages with rationalist approaches to civil war. Explanation of mobilization is achieved through the conceptual and theoretical development of the latent normative framework activation mechanism. This normative framework for action, comprising underlying social norms, emergent understandings of history and identity, and resultant prescribed action, forms in the pre-war period, to be activated at the civil war onset stage through threat-framing triggers at the micro, meso, and macro levels of the social structure. Individuals and small groups adopt varying mobilization roles depending on whether threat perception is self- or collectivity-oriented. The normative framework transforms and continues to affect mobilization in the course of the war and in the post-war period. ii This research contributes to our conceptual and theoretical understanding of participation and organization of inter-group violence, the interaction between norms and social relations in civil war mobilization, research methods in conflict zones, and the understudied case of Abkhazia. iii Preface This dissertation is an original intellectual product of the author, Anastasia Shesterinina. The fieldwork reported in Chapters 3-7 was covered by UBC Ethics Certificate number H11-02222 of 21 September, 2011. iv Table of Contents Abstract…………………………………………………………………………………………. ii Preface…………………………………………………………………………………………... iv Table of Contents………………………………………………………………………………... v List of Tables…………………………………………………………………………………..... xi List of Figures………………………………………………………………………………….. xii List of Abbreviations………………………………………………………………………….. xiv Acknowledgements………………………………………………………………………….. xviii Dedication……………………………………………………………………………………… xx Chapter 1: Introduction………………………………………………………………………… 1 1.1 Civil War Mobilization: Stages and Vignettes……………………………………….. 1 1.1.1 Pre-War Stage………………………………………………………………. 1 1.1.2 War Stage…………………………………………………………………... 2 1.1.3 Post-War Stage……………………………………………………………... 2 1.2 Four Puzzles of Violent Mobilization………………………………………………… 5 1.2.1 Pre-War Mobilization and Violence Onset…………………………………. 7 1.2.2 Mobilization in Civil War…………………………………………………... 9 1.2.3 Retention and Civil War Outcome………………………………………… 11 1.2.4 Post-War Mobilization and Protracted Violence…………………………... 12 1.2.5 Summary………………………………………………………………….. 14 1.3 Argument……………………………………………………………………………. 15 1.4 Research Design…………………………………………………………………….. 17 1.4.1 Scope Conditions………………………………………………………….. 17 v 1.4.2 Case Selection…………………………………………………………....... 18 1.4.3 Methodology…………………………………………………………….... 22 1.4.4 Data Collection…………………………………………………………..... 27 1.5 Contributions………………………………………………………………………... 35 1.6 Chapter Organization………………………………………………………………... 37 Chapter 2: The Concept and Theories of Mobilization……………………………………… 39 2.1 Mobilization in Civil War Research………………………………………………… 42 2.1.1 Pre- and Post-War Processes in Civil War Research……………………… 43 2.1.1.1 The Concept of Conflict Cycle………………………………….. 47 2.1.2 Norms in Civil War Research……………………………………………... 49 2.2 Defining Mobilization in Civil War…………………………………………………. 53 2.3 Explaining Mobilization in Civil War……………………………………………….. 58 2.3.1 Normative and Socially-Embedded Theory of Mobilization……………… 59 2.3.2 Alternative Explanations………………………………………………….. 71 2.3.2.1 Relative Deprivation…………………………………………….. 71 2.3.2.2 Collective Action………………………………………………... 76 2.3.2.3 Strategic Interaction…………………………………………….. 78 2.4 Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………... 80 Chapter 3: Norms, Social Relations, and Mobilization………………………………………. 81 3.1 Dimension One: Underlying Norms and Social Relations………………………….. 84 3.1.1 Intra-Abkhaz Norms and Social Relations………………………………… 84 3.1.1.1 Basic Intra-Abkhaz Norms: Reciprocity, Honor, and Conformity to Custom………………………………………………………………….. 84 vi 3.1.1.2 Intra-Abkhaz Norms of Mobilization: Patriotism, Heroism, and Masculinity……………………………………………………………… 88 3.1.2 Inter-Group Norms and Social Relations………………………………….. 94 3.1.2.1 Demographic Changes………………………………………….. 95 3.1.2.2 Georgianization of Abkhazia…………………………………... 102 3.2 Dimension Two: Emergent Understandings of History and Identity………………. 112 3.3 Summary of Findings………………………………………………………………. 123 Chapter 4: Pre-War Mobilization and Violence Onset……………………………………... 125 4.1 Pre-War Violence in Civil War Research…………………………………………... 126 4.2 Pre-War Violence, Intra-Group Cohesion, and Inter-Group Relations…………….. 129 4.2.1 Stage I: Movement Formation…………………………………………… 131 4.2.2 Stage II: Lykhny Gathering and April Clashes…………………………… 133 4.2.3 Stage III: Independence Day Celebration………………………………... 138 4.2.4 Tbilisi State University and July Clashes………………………………… 141 4.2.5 Intra-Abkhaz Cohesion: The General Strike……………………………... 148 4.2.6 Escalation to War?……………………………………………………….. 152 4.3 Macro-Level Escalation to War……………………………………………………. 155 4.4 Summary of Findings………………………………………………………………. 161 Chapter 5: Mobilization in Civil War……………………………………………………….. 163 5.1 Mobilization in Civil War Research………………………………………………... 164 5.1.1 Strategic Interaction and Abkhaz Mobilization for War………………….. 167 5.1.2 Selective Incentives and Abkhaz Mobilization for War………………….. 174 5.2 Civil War Onset and Immediate Mass Abkhaz Mobilization (14-18 August, 1992).. 177 vii 5.2.1 Abkhaz Mobilization in Response to Georgian Advance from the East….. 178 5.2.2 Abkhaz Mobilization in Response to Georgian Advance from the West… 185 5.3 Explaining Immediate Mass Mobilization: Framing and Perception of Threat……... 189 5.3.1 Macro-Level Triggers……………………………………………………. 190 5.3.2 Meso-Level Triggers…………………………………………………….. 193 5.3.3 Micro-Level Triggers……………………………………………………. 199 5.4 Importance of Latent Norms……………………………………………………….. 203 5.4.1 Local Georgian Participation and Intra-Abkhaz Cohesion……………….. 204 5.4.2 Georgia’s Aggression and “The Only Land We Have”…………………... 209 5.5 Variation in Mobilization Roles: Interaction between Threat and Norms………….. 216 5.6 Summary of Findings………………………………………………………………. 223 Chapter 6: Retention and Civil War Outcome……………………………………………… 224 6.1 Actors and Tactics in Civil War Research………………………………………….. 226 6.2 Abkhaz Army Formation and Retention…………………………………………… 232 6.2.1 Armed Actors at War Onset……………………………………………… 233 6.2.2 Army Building “In the Heat of Battle” …………………………………... 235 6.2.2.1 The Gagra Battle: October, 1992………………………………. 238 6.2.2.2 From First Success to Army Formation………………………... 244 6.3 War Process and Asymmetric Victory……………………………………………... 251 6.3.1 Emergent Army and Failed Battles: January and March, 1993…………... 251 6.3.2 Learning and Victory: July and September, 1993………………………... 256 6.3.3 Norms and Fighters’ Commitment……………………………………….. 261 6.3.4 A Comment on External Factors…………………………………………. 266 viii 6.4 Summary of Findings………………………………………………………………. 271 Chapter 7: Post-War Mobilization and Protracted Violence………………………………. 272 7.1 Post-War Mobilization and Violence in Civil War Research………………………. 274 7.2 Mobilization and Violence in Post-War Abkhazia…………………………………. 279 7.2.1 Stage I: Formation of the Patterns of Violence (1993-1994) …………….. 279 7.2.1.1 Georgian Post-War Mobilization………………………………. 285 7.2.1.2 Abkhaz Post-War Mobilization………………………………... 289 7.2.2 Stage II: Large-Scale Fighting (1990s-2000s) …………………………… 293 7.2.2.1 Gal/i Recidivism (May, 1998) …………………………………. 294 7.2.2.2 Kodor/i Operation (August, 2008) …………………………….. 300 7.3 Normative and Social Structure of Post-War Mobilization for Violence…………... 306 7.3.1 Intra-Abkhaz Norms and Understandings in Post-War Violent Mobilization… …………………………………………………………………………………. 306 7.3.2 Inter-Group Social Relations in Post-War Violent Mobilization………… 313 7.3.3 A Comment on External