UNITY JOURNAL Sources of Nepali Army’s military effectiveness during the Anglo-Nepal War Phanindra Subba Abstract during the Anglo-Nepal War by ensuring Nepal’s continued survival as an independent, Military effectiveness is the process by which sovereign state ever. the military converts available material and political resources into military power. Keywords: Prithivi Narayan, military The organizational revolution that took effectiveness, nation-state, Anglo-Nepal War, place in Europe during the period, 1500- Nepali Army 1700, multiplied the military effectiveness of the European states. This paper, however, Background aims to assess the military effectiveness To prosecute a war effectively a high degree of of the Nepalese Army during the Anglo- organization, training, leadership, discipline, Nepal War, 1814-16, in the context of the morale, loyalty, obedience, sense of duty failure of many of the armies of South Asia and esprit de corps are required. “Military to mount an effective resistance against the effectiveness is the process by which armed colonial onslaught. Further, it explores the forces convert resources into fighting power” sources of the Nepali Army’s effectiveness in (Millett, Murray & Watman, 1986, p. 37). performance rooted in Prithvi Narayan Shah’s The revolution in military organization and national army in its formative phase. His doctrine during the period 1500-1700 is concept of the nation-state, the creation of a based on these factors produced much more permanent army and his policy of not limiting powerful, cohesive armies in Europe and recruitment and promotions to the natives multiplied their military effectiveness. “The of Gorkha laid the foundation for a loyal, creation of modern nation-state was based on competent multi–ethnic army. Moreover, this organized and disciplined military power in paper states that the institutional stability the seventeenth century” (Sloan, 2002, p. 22). provided by his successors during a period of As a result, “during the first wave of British political turbulence spared the army time to Imperialism groups of several thousand consolidate and pass its institutional memory European soldiers repeatedly defeated Indian to the following generation. War is a brutal armies many times their size” (Rosen, 1996, business, and the military effectiveness of p. 14). The poor battlefield performance armies is tested in the battlefield in which cannot be explained in terms of material weaknesses are severely punished after their strength alone. India’s economic power was exposures. Strong states fight to win, the formidable. “The Mogul emperor Aurungzeb weak to survive. The paper concludes that the had ten times the revenue of his contemporary Nepali Army proved its military effectiveness Louis XIV, the richest monarch in Europe” 114 UNITY JOURNAL (Boot, 2006, p. 99). “Careful historical studies nerve was strained and every resource have shown the technological advantages exploited” (Pemble, 2008, p. 356). “During enjoyed by the Europeans over the Indians the Victorian and Edwardian war times it at the middle and end of eighteenth century was the only Indian war the British wanted to have been marginal, if they existed at to forget” (Pemble, 2009, p. 361). How was a all” (Rosen, 1996, p. 165). It was Europe’s small hill state able to generate such military transition into a new organizational form, the power from the limited resources available national state and new European methods of and extract such a heavy price from the military organizational techniques that gave invader? What were the sources of Nepali them the decisive advantage. South Asia Army’s military effectiveness? had to pay a heavy price for missing the Nation-state organization revolution. The political system in South Asia in the The string of decisive victories gave the eighteenth and nineteenth century is often colonial armies a sense of superiority and portrayed as being devoid of the concept of disdain for their enemies. Such a mindset the territorial nation-state as being the source was reflected in the thinking of the British who dismissed the military capabilities of the of legitimacy and focus of loyalty. However, Nepalis on the eve of the Anglo-Nepal War in “it is in fact arguable that more than other 1814. “Ochterlony anticipated little resistance units in South Asia in the eighteenth century, from the Gorkhas, whom he disparaged as a Nepal was a nation-state in embryo with a body of ill-armed and undisciplined barbarians distinct identity retained in territorial and (Cross, 2004, p. 367).” “Hastings (Governor- cultural factors”. Although the modern General) even envisaged a possibility of concept of nation state had not yet fully submission so hastily as to prevent the actual developed in Nepal, Prithivi Narayan had an commencement of hostilities” (Pemble, instinctive feeling for the fundamentals of 2008, p. 133). The ensuing events, however, this concept. In the course of his conquests, belied their expectations. This was the Prithivi Narayan evolved beyond traditional first war in which the Company had been ways of thinking and gradually fleshed out involved in India in which they had three a new concept of state that while adapting to one advantage over the enemy. However, to local conditions was at variance with the instead of achieving a quick victory, the then prevalent thinking. “Prithivi stated that campaign became an extended, hard fought the state was not a private property. After one and lasted eighteen long months. The the fall of Kathmandu Valley PNS brothers British had to reduce their troops on their demanded that they be given their share as was frontiers in order to commit more troops the practice. PNS replied that the ‘dhungo’ to the campaign. “By 1815, EIC deployed (state) cannot be divided” (Manandhar, 2015). 48,000 troops against Nepal” (Marston & “Prithivi Narayan had created an entity to be Sundaram, 2008, p. 12). This was the largest protected and preserved independently of number of troops fielded in India until then. allegiance to an individual” (Whelpton, 1991, Of the five commanders deputed to lead the p. 25). invasion of Nepal, one was killed in action and three were dismissed for incompetence. The extent to which the concept of ‘dhungo’ “When success was finally achieved, every was internalized by army leadership was 115 UNITY JOURNAL reflected in the Nepali Army commanders and honor. But such total commitment also conduct during the Anglo-Nepal War. They requires financial security. Since military rejected lucrative British enticements to finance was closely related to land during this change sides. “Bom Shah was offered the period, Prithivi Narayan assigned revenues kingship of Doti by the British but he rejected of the allocated land to individual soldiers in it despite the threat to his life he faced from the form of jagir. But it was not his intention Bhimsen Thapa” (Panta, Interview, 2015). that the officers wallow in wealth and lead a The British success in large parts of South Asia decadent, sedentary life. He was well aware was due to its adroit use of political intrigue that the quest for luxury would lead to the and bribery. In South Asia commanders and erosion of fighting skills. “Do not let the whole armies changed sides on a regular Bhardars grow rich because the wealthy basis. In such a context the behavior of the cannot kill or be killed and the enemy will commanders of the Nepali Army stands out. prevail” (Panta, 2015). Although the ideal Their proverbial loyalty to the state was a had been diluted to some extent by the time major force multiplier in times of war. of Anglo-Nepal War and some elements in the leadership began to focus more on corporate Permanent army self-interest and individual gain than service “The small Hill States did not have a to the state, the field army remained a standing, unified army. Similar was the case formidable fighting machine. with Gorkha. When in AD 1763 Prithivi Prithivi Narayan understood the forces under Narayan won the war with Makwanpur he his command. “In his Dibya Upadesh Prithivi realized that the Gorkhali Army would also Narayan set down the directive that the have to deal with foreign forces. Immediately children of those soldiers who had fallen in after the war he established four companies” battle be provided for” (Stiller, 1995, p. 244). (Manandhar, 2015). Prithivi Narayan thus Such a sense of accountability from the part adopted a new system of military organization of the head of the state addressed a major area that would have profound implications for of concern of the ordinary soldier and freed Nepal’s future war-making potential. He them to totally focus on the task at hand. In started the process of transforming a feudal, return, PNS demanded complete loyalty and militia-based seasonal army into a centralized commitment. The effort to create and sustain permanent army that would monopolize a viable and cohesive professional military military power within the territorial state and slowly began to take shape. Eventually lessen dependence on forces and revenue Prithivi Narayan left behind a formidable controlled by the umrao. The permanent military establishment. army would henceforth be loyal only to the state and not to the local leaders and be Institutional stability totally focused on training and preparing for and fighting the nation’s wars. In patrimonial armies’ troops owe primary allegiance to an individual rather than to a The standing army offered an important dynasty or an office. “Mughal military units means of employment and the only channel of were based on the principle of loyalty to social mobility for the peasants. Meritorious individual chiefs, the deaths of those chiefs performance would be rewarded with status in battle often lead to the disintegration of 116 UNITY JOURNAL those units” (Rosen, p. 149). However, the “There was difference in the administrative bitter political infighting between Rajendra and military policy of Prithivi Narayan.