CHAPTER THREE Cognitivitist Theories Of Religious Language Contents: 1. Religious Experience 1 -1. Introduction 118 1-2. Theories of Religious Experience 120 1-2-1. Lewis, Theory 122 1-2-2. Wilson’s Theory 124 1-2-3. Ewing’s Theory 125 1-2-4. Buber’s Theory 126 1-2-5. Price’s Theory 127 1-3. Criticism 127 1-4. Conclusion 134 2. Theory of Analogy. 2 -1. Introduction 135 2-2. Aquinas’ Theory of Analogy 138 2-3. Mascall’s Theory 139 2-4. Crombie’s Theory 142 2-5. Criticism 143 3. R.L. as Falsifiable Statements 3-1. Introduction 146 3-2. R.L. Is Falsifiable 147 3-3. Theory of Eschatology 150 3-4. Criticism 151 4. Theory of Symbol. 4-1. latroduction 152 4-2. Tillich’s Theory of Symbol 154 4-3. Functions of Religious Language 156 4-4. Meaningfulness of Religious Symbols 157 4-5. Justification of Religious Symbols 160 4-6. C riticism 161 5. Theory of Metaphor. 5-1. Introduction 163 5-2. What Is Metaphor? 164 5-3. Theories of Metaphor 166 5-4. Metaphor and Model in Religion 169 5-5. Justification of Religious Metaphor & Model 171 5-6. Criticism 174 # Notes and References 177 117 The set of theories presented in this chapter argues that religious language is descriptive, though in different ways and different degrees. Obviously, the central religious assertions do seem to be making statements about certain superamundane objects, states of affairs, or dimensions of experience. The descriptivist challenges the nondescriptivist then to show how the latter’s position can escape the facts how can they be justified? As we saw earlier, even if we say that they are neither true nor false but are rather appropriate or inappropriate, we may still ask, what makes them appropriate? What for instance makes “God talk”; in general, appropriate and atheist talk inappropriate. Now, we will see how descriptive theories can be successful in answering this and the other questions mentioned earlier. We begin with the discussing of ‘religious experience’ in terms of which some philosophers have attempted to solve the difficulties of religious language. (1) Religious Experience 1-1. Introduction We have seen that logical positivists tried to refute metaphysical and religious beliefs as insignificant and nonsense on the basis of a criterion of meaningfulness propounded in the form of verifiability theory. The theory demanded that any belief to be meaningful must be capable of verification by some sense-experience. Flaw’s use of the parable about the invisible 118 gardener, also, and much of the discussion which follows it, assumes that so far as this present life goes there are no tests or observations which establish the truth of religious assertions. But a great majority of religious believers past and present would argue that certain tests and observations are relevant to religious belief, and if carried out properly can produce evidence in support of religion's supernatural claims. Religious language claims to be factual; and theologians who favour such claims of this language have not been unresponsive to the relevant force of the verifiability demand. They have really faced the challenge from the verifiability demand head on and have tried to show in face of that that religious language also, like ordinary factual or scientific language, has got some empirical basis, some empirical evidences behind it so that its truth or falsity can be ascertained with reference to them. Some have taken the challenge from the verifiability criterion so directly that they have really made attempts to show that just as in the case of scientific language there are sense-empirical evidences, similarly in the case of religious language also there are such evidences. The presence of causal law through the world, the existence of system and order everywhere are some of the clear sense- empirical evidences which speak of the existence of God behind the world. Belief in God is amply justified with reference to sense-empirical data present in the world. F.R. Tennant has been an important contemporary thinker to preach such a view.^ But such pleas to defend the factual or empirical nature of religious language can hardly be supported. Such empirical justifications of religious language made by Tennant and others are really nothing different from showing the validity of the causal and teleological arguments for the existence of God which, it is well established now, do not constitute valid proofs for the existence of God. Religious language, by its very nature, purports to be beliefs about a fact (or facts) which transcends (or transcend) sense-experience; and hence 119 it is absurd to seek a verification of it by sense-experience. Sense- experience is not the only experience that man has and therefore to confine the use of the word 'experience' in such a way exhibits nothing but a sense of dogmatism, narrowness, arbitrariness and a pre-possessed bias on the part of the positivists. By this act of narrowness the positivists leave a vast track of human experience untrodden, exclude from consideration great tracts of reality and confine them within a constricted and impoverished world.^ The experience to which religious statements are said to refer for their empirical verification is known as 'religious experience.' A religious experience, is one that is believed to provide us with a clue to the ultimate nature of things, with access to ultimate being, goodness, and truth, with insight into the ultimate "meaning of life. With certain minor differences, there are many types of experiences that are commonly called religious experiences and that are commonly believed to have religious significance. William James, however, in his famous work The Varieties of Religious Experience, offers fourfold characterisation of religious experience: 'Ineffability', 'Noetic quality', 'Transiency', and 'Passivity'.^ A partial list of these kinds of experiences would include mystical experience, intuitive experience, personal encounters with the ultimate, revelatory experiences, experiences of holy, experiences of deep prayer or contemplation, experiences that make us acutely aware of our own finitude, sinfulness, and contingency, and experiences in which we are deeply conscious of the impingement of an ultimate moral demand on our wills. 1-2. Theories of Religious Experience Now, we shall note the family of theories, which sees a method of justifying certain knowledge-claims in religious or mystical experiences. It 120 would take too much space to summarise here all the arguments concerning religious experience that have been offered in the modem debate. Asking if there is some kind of knowledge given through religious experiences, we are also to consider whether certain assertions about reality can be based exclusively upon religious experiences. In this case, religious experiences are questioned as verifying processes. Among contemporary thinkers, those who have tried to save the factual and cognitive status of religious language or statements by connecting them to religious experience, the names of H.D. Lewis, John Wilson, A.C. Ewing, etc., are leading. It is not a fact that all of these thinkers make an appeal to religious experience exactly in the same way to defend the factual status of religious statements, nevertheless, all of them somehow try to establish that religious language is not merely emotive, psychological or something like that. They try to establish by reference to religious experience that they have some objective content and they refer to some objective, real situation. Such objective facts or situations (about which the truth or falsity of the religious statements is to be verified) are somehow revealed to us in some unique kind of experience known as 'religious experience.' These experiences, although occurring to only a few, are still genuine experiences of something perfectly real and objective. They are not mere subjective fancies or certain subjective states of feelings or emotions, as some contemporary empirical thinkers take them to be. Religious language, therefore, is not merely emotive or expressive in character, it refers to objective facts and therefore it is factual cognitive and informative. Although many problems arise about religious experience, the basic problem is the bearing of such experiences on the issue of the existence or non-existence of God. The above view that religious language has an objective referent clearly means that God exists as an objective reality. Here 121 again, all the above thinkers agree on the point that although God exists objectively, his existence is in no way comparable to the existence of ordinary physical objects. He does not exist in the fashion of a table or chair's existence. God exists in his own unique way and his existence and nature, although revealed to us to some extent in religious experiences, remain, for the most part, a 'mystery.' They emphasise that on that account, i.e., because of the fact that God's being is a mystery, we cannot say that there is nothing like true or false about the religious language, that it does not refer to any objective situation. Because God is a mystery, religious language is naturally metaphorical (or symbolical) but its metaphorical nature does not prevent it from being factual and cognitive. The logic of religious language is not different from that of ordinary factual languages. Now, as we have said, although the various thinkers named above agree on these essential points, they differ as to their detailed app'roaches and treatments of the matter. To see the point of each, let us have a brief consideration of their views separately. 1-2-1. Lewis' Theory Among all the thinkers, Lewis seems to be the most enthusiastic to save the factual and cognitive status of religious language. He insists more than once that religious language has an objective content, it refers to a 'beyond' and that the question of truth and falsity must somehow be applicable to it in the literal sense.^ "A religious must stand the test of truth and falsity in the normal sense..