The National Assembly Election Campaigns 115 DEFEAT IN ADVERSITY FOR THE CONSERVATIVES J. Barry Jones INTRODUCTION The Conservatives entered the first general election to the Welsh Assembly with two severe handicaps.The first was that eighteen years ofConservative government was associated with the virtual closure ofthe coal-mining industry,the draconian rationalization ofsteel production,increased centralization at the expense ofWelsh local authorities,a nd the erosion of democratic accountability through the creation ofa whole range ofquangos composed ofministerial nominees.The second handicap was the product of these experiences.In the 1997 general election the Conservative Party lost all their Welsh seats;in parliamentary terms,Wa les became a Tory-free zone and,although not totally unexpected,the Welsh Conservatives were traumatized by the scale and depth oftheir rejection by the Welsh electorate. The party kept a very low profile during the subsequent referendum cam- paign while still attacking devolution on the grounds ofcosts and constitutional irregularities.Th eir unambiguous,if mu ted,hostility to devo- lution compromised the party’s strategy for the Assembly elections;it is difficult to rubbish a policy and then ask for support to make the policy work.Many Conservative activists shared the party’s long-standing opposition to devolution and fully subscribed to the view that devolution would lead inexorably to the ‘slippery slope ofseparation’.In retrospect, some Conservative AMs now acknowledge that changing these deep-seated perceptions was an impossible task in so short a time. PLANNING The first election to the National Assembly was a unique event requiring the Conservative Party to make unique arrangements.The party in Wales had never enjoyed majority electoral support and had avoided the issue of constructing a coherent and distinctly Welsh organization,contenting itself with a superficial labelling change.T his deficiency had now to be addressed, but time was at a premium and the party eschewed a comprehensive restructuring.In stead,a ‘leader ofthe campaign’was elected by members’ ballot,in which the establishment favourite,N ick Bourne,wa s defeated by 116 Contemporary Wales – 14 Rod Richards,a minister in the Welsh Office in the previous Conservative government.There was no campaign committee as such but a series of ad hoc discussions with regional groups ofcandidates.The planning initiatives lay with Rod Richards who ‘fronted’radio and television appearances and attracted considerable media coverage with his trenchant attacks on the Labour Party.However his authority was significantly qualified;he was not the leader but simply in charge ofthe campaign.Even with this limited role he was afforded only a grudging acceptance,esp ecially on the ‘centre-left’ wing ofthe party.Consequently,the broad-church characteristics ofthe Conservatives came to the fore and considerable discretion was afforded to local candidates to trim the party programme not only to local constituency circumstances but also to candidate preferences. STRATEGY Quite simply,the Conservative strategic objective was to put the anti- devolution line behind them.T he rationale behind this strategy ran as follows:t he people have voted,albeit by a small majority,for devolution;as democrats we accept that decision;now we must ensure that devolution works for the benefit ofWales. This message proved difficult to get across to core Conservative voters. Early canvassing revealed that those who had voted Conservative in the 1997 general election were indicating they would not turn out for the Assembly election.A pattern ofdeliberate abstention was emerging.To a large extent this determined the party’s strategy ofgetting out the core vote rather than appealing to a wider section ofthe electorate.T his would also appear to have been a mistake,bu t for Conservative candidates it appeared to be the only viable option. The early canvass returns indicating deliberate abstention threatened to undermine the party’s fundamental objective,t hat ofrepeating the general election performance when the party had won almost 20 per cent ofthe Welsh vote and come second to Labour. In effect,the Assembly election campaign was planned as a damage-limitation exercise based on the aphorism ‘What we have we hold.’H owever,t his strategy was the product of a British general election analysis.As the Conservatives now realize,it was inappropriate for what was more ofa ‘Welsh general election’th an had been generally expected.The Conservative strategy to portray themselves as the opposition party and to project the electoral campaign as a ‘two-horse’ra ce was consistent with a British analysis.Thus Rod Richards sought to assume The National Assembly Election Campaigns 117 the mantle of‘leader ofthe Opposition’a nd the party presented,rather theatrically,its ‘shadow cabinet’to the media,even though it realized that up to halft he ‘shadow secretaries’wo uld not win a seat.However,t he attempt to invest the campaign with British characteristics became counter-produc- tive as the Plaid surge became increasingly apparent in the opinion polls. ORGANIZATIONAL STRATEGY AND THE VOTING SYSTEM The Conservative Party realized it would have to depend heavily on the second/regional votes,bu t found it difficult to break away from the traditional structure ofparliamentary constituency campaigns.F urthermore, the decision to concentrate on core Conservative voters inhibited initiatives to campaign outside traditional Tory areas.T he party took the necessary steps to take advantage ofthe second ballot;the best-placed constituency candidates were placed top ofthe regional lists;clu sters ofConservative voters in Labour constituencies were identified with the intention offocusing the canvass,b ut generally the effort was left to individual candidates.In the two regional constituencies in south Wales the lead candidates organized a ‘one-day’Va lleys campaign,but did not attempt to convert Labour supporters.In the first Assembly election there was a coherent but limited strategy,q uite simply to get out the traditional Tory vote. POLICY The Conservative manifesto, Fair Play for All:Y our Voice in the Assembly , represented the most advanced step in devolution within the Conservative Party.Unlike previous elections the manifesto did not lean heavily on Central Office publications but was genuinely the product ofthe (newly labelled) Welsh Conservative Party.While not perfect,it established a precedent to be followed in future Assembly elections. Manifesto commitments The inherent ambiguity in the Conservative Party’s position was illustrated by the foreword to the manifesto entitled ‘Wales our Nation,Britain our Country’, which talked about Welsh men and women being proud to be British and linked this sentiment with threats to the British identity posed by the transfer ofpower from Westminster to Brussels.T he tone ofthe mani- festo reflected a British orientation with only a limited focus on exclusively Welsh issues. 118 Contemporary Wales – 14 Sustaining themes raised in the manifesto were developed in the Assembly campaign;in particular the question ofcosts and ofAMs ‘junketing’a nd ‘jet-setting’at the people’s expense.On more prosaic policies such as the environment,the economy and social services,t he party line expressed was rather bland and largely non-controversial.H owever,o n education the manifesto argued it was inappropriate,d uring the final two years of preparation for GCSE examinations,th at children should have compulsory Welsh lessons.This turned previous Conservative government policy on its head and caused great anguish and division in the party,with accusations of linguistic apartheid directed at the revisionists.On local government,the manifesto focused on ‘local authorities dominated by one political party’a nd insisted on ‘more rigorous scrutiny,inquiry,a nd accountability to restore confidence in local government’.This was an obvious attack on Welsh Labour’s local government establishment and could well have contributed to a public sense ofunease with Labour-dominated Valley authorities,a nd, ironically,wa s to benefit Plaid Cymru.Elsewhere the manifesto advocated ‘fair play’a ll round:in health for patients,d octors and nurses, and in culture for the Welsh language (described as one ofthe building blocks ofBritain) and for non-Welsh-speakers,wh ich was specifically linked to criticisms of Gwynedd’s employment policies.Overall the manifesto was a somewhat bland document,yet with sharp barbs directed at the Welsh language and Labour local authorities. Campaign commitments Campaigns have a life oftheir own,and frequently the dynamic of‘cut and thrust’debates engenders differing priorities from those expected and intended by party strategists.Two commitments emerged in the course ofthe campaign: (1) The language issue had been dealt with in an equivocal fashion in the manifesto,but in the heat ofthe campaign,and particularly in David Davies’s campaign in the highly Anglicized areas ofMonmouthshire,t he issue emerged in a more extreme form,calling into question the Conservative commitment to Welsh-language teaching made in the mid-1990s.A ‘roll- back’ofthe language policy became an election issue,even though such a policy would never be official Conservative policy.At the height ofthe debate in Monmouthshire many Conservative candidates admitted the issue was ‘not big on the doorstep’. (2) In the course ofthe campaign Conservatives increasingly presented The National Assembly