View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Apollo An Anscombean Approach to Animal Agency Luke Keanu Cash St. John’s College This dissertation is submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy September, 2018 An Anscombean Approach to Animal Agency Luke Keanu Cash Abstract: The ultimate aim of this thesis is to explain how the theory of action found in Anscombe’s Intention can be modified to deliver a plausible account of non-human animal agency (henceforth, animal agency). More specifically, it is an attempt to develop her account in a way that respects the Aristotelian insight that animals act in ways that differ, in certain fundamental respects, from the processes of growth and self-maintenance found in plants, on the one hand, and the self-conscious actions characteristic of mature human beings, on the other. The negative aim is to show that the theory of action that constitutes the received backdrop in the study of animal minds is ill-suited for the task. This is what I call the Standard Approach to Animal Agency and, despite its widespread acceptance in comparative psychology, cognitive ethology, and the philosophy of animal minds, I argue that it faces serious problems. This thesis divides roughly into two halves corresponding to these respective aims. In the first half I argue against the Standard Approach. Amongst other things, I suggest that the theory suffers from a tendency to take the notion of action for granted. The result is an oversimplified metaphysics that is ill- prepared to account for the fact that the activities characteristic of animal life are instrumentally structured processes. In the constructive half of the thesis I develop an Anscombean alternative that takes the structure of action as its starting point. On this view, expressions of animal agency are understood as a distinctive kind of material process. After explaining Anscombe’s account of intentional action, I adapt and develop these ideas into a theory of animal agency. Preface Declaration This dissertation is the result of my own work and includes nothing which is the outcome of work done in collaboration except as declared in the Preface and specified in the text. It is not substantially the same as any that I have submitted, or, is being concurrently submitted for a degree or diploma or other qualification at the University of Cambridge or any other University or similar institution except as declared in the Preface and specified in the text. I further state that no substantial part of my dissertation has already been submitted, or, is being concurrently submitted for any such degree, diploma or other qualification at the University of Cambridge or any other University or similar institution except as declared in the Preface and specified in the text. It does not exceed the prescribed word limit for the relevant Degree Committee. Acknowledgements I would not have been able to complete this thesis without the help of my supervisor, Michael Potter. His willingness to take my ideas seriously enough to eviscerate them has forced me to face philosophical problems with the sense of perplexity that they deserve. And his depth of knowledge, patience, and good humour has set an example that I will always remember. I am also indebted to my three shadow supervisors, Tim Button, Tim Crane, and Arif Ahmed. All have supported me throughout different stages in my thesis and I count myself privileged to have been taught by each of them. Arif in particular kickstarted an otherwise stagnant writing process and provided much needed direction. For financial support, I am grateful to the Cambridge Faculty of Philosophy, The Royal Institute of Philosophy, and especially the benefactors of St John’s College Cambridge. I could never have hoped to complete my work without their support. I have been lucky to know some brilliant philosophers whose willingness to read, comment, and listen to my work has — I am sure — improved it. Thanks in this regard to Cathy Mason, Charlie Temperley, Thomas Schindler, Dan Williams, Raphael Woolf, Jane Heal, Danièle Moyal-Sharrock, Nadav Matalon, Alexander Greenberg, and Lucy Campbell. Thanks also to the amazing graduate secretaries, Zoe Walker-Fagg and Charlie Evans, as well as the legendary Heather Sanderson. A special debt of gratitude is due to Matt Dougherty and Fredrik Nyseth. Both read and commented on my work, but, more importantly, became two of my best friends over the course of this process. This reminds me of the other wonderful friends that I have made in the UK: all of the above are included, but also Becca, Lucy, German Stefan #1, German Stefan #2, Adam, Luke, Helen, Stephen, Robin, Ming, Frazier, Robert, Claudia, and coffee-bug Julian and Anne. The UK is a foreign country for me, but they have made it feel like home. Finally, to my family I feel as though I owe everything. To Jordan: even though I don’t always answer your calls, I hope you know how loved they make me feel. To Marty: the support and encouragement that you give me fills me with confidence and pride. To Adam: I am so happy that I picked up the phone and called you 10 years ago. To Patricia: I miss you so much. To mom and tutu: I don’t know how to express in words how much you mean to me; this thesis is dedicated to you both. To Alice: I love you more than anything; writing this thesis sucked, but I met you and I wouldn’t trade that for the world. Table of Contents 1 Introduction 1.0 Forms of agency ................................................................................................................ 1 1.1 Recent work ...................................................................................................................... 5 1.2 The Causal Theory of Action ........................................................................................... 8 1.3 The Standard Approach to animal agency ..................................................................... 12 1.4 An Anscombean alternative ............................................................................................ 17 2 Objective Representation and Propositional Content 2.0 Preliminaries ................................................................................................................... 22 2.1 The problem of stimulus determination ......................................................................... 24 2.2 Ways to triangulate ......................................................................................................... 27 2.3 Propositional content ...................................................................................................... 33 2.4 Practical inference ........................................................................................................... 37 2.5 Summary ......................................................................................................................... 40 3 Taking Action For Granted 3.0 Preliminaries ................................................................................................................... 41 3.1 Intention, deflated .............................................................................................................. 43 3.2 The objects of desire ....................................................................................................... 47 3.3 On the significance of the foregoing argument ............................................................... 51 3.4 The consequences of taking action for granted ............................................................... 54 3.5 Summary ......................................................................................................................... 60 Appendix: The argument of Intention §19 ........................................................................ 60 4 Action and Structure 4.0 Preliminaries ................................................................................................................... 66 4.1 The temporal unity of events .......................................................................................... 70 4.2 Process and law ............................................................................................................... 73 4.3 Anscombe on practical knowledge .................................................................................. 76 4.4 The material influence of practical knowledge ............................................................... 82 4.5 Solving the problem of temporal unity ........................................................................... 85 4.6 Summary ......................................................................................................................... 92 5 Animal Activity 5.0 Preliminaries ................................................................................................................... 93 5.1 Facts, reasons, and painful experiences ........................................................................... 95 5.2 Emotions, incentives, and spatially significant auditory information ............................ 100 5.3 Instinct and skill ............................................................................................................. 105 5.4 Some applications .......................................................................................................... 108 5.5 A theory of animal activity ...........................................................................................