Search: All Documents Docket Files For Search Term: Home | Public Information | Chief Justice's Year-End Reports on the Federal Judiciary Printer-Friendly Version Chief Justice's Year-End Reports on the Federal Judiciary Docket Oral Arguments Merits Briefs 2010 Year-End Report (PDF) 2009 Year-End Report (PDF) Bar Admissions 2008 Year-End Report (PDF) 2007 Year-End Report (PDF) Court Rules 2006 Year-End Report (PDF) Case Handling Guides 2005 Year-End Report (PDF) 2004 Year-End Report (PDF) Opinions 2003 Year-End Report 2002 Year-End Report Orders and Journals 2001 Year-End Report 2000 Year-End Report About the Supreme Court Visiting the Court Public Information Jobs Links March 05, 2011 | Version 2009.0 Home | Help | Site Map | Contact Us | About Us | FAQ | Website Policies and Notices | Privacy Policy | USA.GOV Supreme Court of the United States CJr:i Blank 1995 Annual Report of the Chief Justice Page 1 of 7 1995 Year End Report by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist On the Federal Judiciary Introduction This year marks my tenth occasion as Chief Justice to issue an annual report on the federal judiciary. Since Chief Justice Warren Burger began the tradition, this year-end report has served as a valuable way to speak to Congress, the Executive branch, the Judiciary itself, and the public at large. Over the years I have noticed how some issues reappear while others mark a new direction or watershed. This year we have seen both the return of old issues and the emergence of new ones. The Third Branch has long stood as a powerful example of the way in which a properly functioning legal institution in a democracy can work -- when there are three separate, independent, co-equal, interactive branches of government. It is a separateness that, as James Madison noted, is "essential to the preservation of liberty," and as Montesquieu stressed, is required, because "there is no liberty if the power of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive powers." Last year I highlighted the relationship between the federal judiciary and Congress and this year I return to this theme. The past year's events make this an easy choice for a leitmotif again. Our nation's Founders ensured judicial independence through constitutional provisions that grant federal judges life tenure during good behavior and protect members of the federal judiciary from reductions in compensation. But the drafters of the Constitution also were careful to secure an equally important interdependence and interaction among the branches. The Constitution places the independent judiciary it creates within a democratic government that is ultimately accountable to the people. One of the challenges of American government is to preserve the legitimate independence of the judicial function while recognizing the role Congress must play in determining how the judiciary functions. The Constitution gives Congress authority to determine the size, jurisdiction, and structure of the judicial branch, the level at which it will be funded, and, within limits, the basic procedural rules the courts apply. Congress, though, has historically recognized that close consultation with the judiciary is a vital ingredient to ensure appropriate exercise of these responsibilities. Naturally, Congress and the courts view these matters from different perspectives, but those differences, as often as not, result in a sort of Hegelian synthesis which is better than either perspective standing alone. Over the last twenty years, four statutes exemplify Congress' increasing interest in judicial administration: the Speedy Trial Act (1974); the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act (1980); the Sentencing Reform Act (1984); and the Civil Justice Reform Act (1990). Some have criticized Congress for becoming involved in these areas; others view the legislation as an appropriate exercise in oversight. At present there are two issues of concern to the judiciary which illustrate this often creative tension between Congress and the courts. The first is the current governmental "shutdown" because of the inability of Congress and the President to agree on appropriation bills. It would be a mistake to regard this dispute as some sort of Washington-based turf battle. Important questions of policy are involved, and since Congress and the President are both part of the law-making process it is understandable why each maneuvers to have its own view prevail. But the judiciary is not part of the law-making process, and nothing in the judiciary's budget involves any dispute of principle between Congress and the President. Because of this, I have requested both the House and the Senate to separate the judiciary's budget from the comprehensive appropriation for CJr:1 http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/jan96ttb/1yearend.html 1/23/2009 1995 Annual Report of the Chief Justice Page 2 of 7 Commerce, Justice, State, and the Judiciary, of which it is traditionally a part. There is simply no reason for depriving the public of any part of the function which the judicial branch performs because of disputes between the executive and legislative branches with respect to other agencies included in the larger appropriation bill. The second issue arises because of the plan of Senator Charles Grassley, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight and the Courts, to send questionnaires to all judges asking about the amount of time they devote to judicial and related tasks. There can be no doubt that answers to some form of such questions could aid Congress in making decisions about judicial salaries, permitted outside income from teaching, creating new judgeships, and filling existing vacancies. There can also be no doubt that the subject matter of the questions and the detail required for answering them could amount to an unwarranted and ill-considered effort to micro-manage the work of the federal judiciary. We must hope that the Committee's inquiries are designed to obtain information which is the legitimate prerogative of Congress without trenching on judicial independence. During my ten-year tenure as Chief Justice, I have seen the continuing cultivation of a positive relationship. Congress has consistently balanced economic, practical, political, and constitutional considerations. Since its inception, Congress has cooperated with the Judicial Conference of the United States, the judiciary's policy-making body, and the Administrative Office of the United States Courts. Congress has also benefitted from the research of the Federal Judicial Center in a variety of policy areas. The forging of an effective working relationship with Congress has occurred when the federal bench simultaneously has maintained its independence and impartiality while participating in a suitable manner. As an example, from 1985 to 1995, the total judiciary budget has grown by 180 percent due to the support of Congress. Examples of accountability include the recent General Accounting Office Report on the federal judiciary. The Report, among other things, reviews the relationship between the Administrative Office and the Federal Judicial Center. It reaches positive conclusions about the continued independence of the Administrative Office and the Federal Judicial Center, concluding that there is little or no duplication of work between the two agencies, and thus no cost savings to be had in merging them. This type of inquiry is entirely legitimate, appropriate, and I hope it will continue to be used in a responsible fashion. I am confident that such examination will not only reveal the value of the work of agencies such as the Federal Judicial Center and the Administrative Office, but will reinforce the continued need for independence and strong financial support from Congress. Other old pressures have resurfaced. In one of Chief Justice Burger's last year-end reports he drew attention to the critical problem posed by inflation shrinking judges' compensation. Although a Quadrennial Commission on Executive, Legislative and Judicial Salaries had been established to address the problem of compensation, its recommendations have fallen victim to political pressures. The problem then, continues to be a problem now; unless a solution is found to deal adequately with the issue of judicial salary erosion, it will be difficult to attract outstanding lawyers to the bench and retain them. To resolve this type of financial strain in the face of dwindling resources requires cooperation. Similarly, I think it is important that appropriate representatives of the Congress and the judiciary sit down together to discuss and evaluate other current challenges facing the legal system. Renewed cooperation such as the upcoming Three Branch Conference, where we can gather in small groups to focus on specific issues, is a welcome forum. A recent example of how the process of cooperation should work involved the discussion of courthouse construction. Over the last few decades, the judiciary began to outgrow the courthouses built primarily CJr:2 http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/jan96ttb/1yearend.html 1/23/2009 1995 Annual Report of the Chief Justice Page 3 of 7 in the 1930's. This is a complicated process, involving the judiciary, which has a need for space, the General Services Administration, which has a large and complicated building program to manage, and Congress, whose members are interested in ensuring that the courts in their home states are properly served and that their constituents share in the economic benefits of construction. In response to criticisms, the judiciary prioritized its needs using objective criteria such as the amount previously expended, the need for courtrooms, security risks, leasing pressures and the number of years of occupancy strain. Such examples of cooperative relations whereby the judiciary sets its own priorities in order to aid the Congress in dispensing scarce resources is why I have supported the process of long-range planning. I am hopeful that Congress will give serious study and consideration to the Long Range Plan for the Federal Courts, which the Judicial Conference is currently in the process of approving.