Rudolf Carnap 9. Fei~I, He!bert. "Confirmability and Confirmation," Revue Internationale de - ----B . .F . SKINNER ----- Ph~Josophie, 5: 2?8-79 ( 19 51 ) . Reprinted in P. P. Wiener (ed.), Readings in Philosophy of Science, pp. 522-30. New York: Scribner's 1953. 10. !"eigl, Herbe~. "Principles and Problems o.f Theory Construction in Psychology," 1~ W. DennJS (ed.), Current Trends in Psychological Theory, pp. 179-213. Pittsburgh: Univ. of Pittsburgh Pr., 1951. 11. Feigl, ~~bert. ''Phys~calism, Unity of Science, and the Foundations of Psy­ Critique ofPsyclwanalytic Concepts and Theories chology, m P. A. Sch1lpp (ed.), The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap. New York: Tudor (forthcoming). 12. FeigJ, H., and M. Brodbeck (eds.). Readings in the Philosophy of Science. New Y~rk: Appleton·Century-Crofts, 1953. 13. Feig!, H., and W. Sellars (eds.). Readings in Pliilosophical Analysis. New York: Appleton-Centmy-Crofts, 1949. 14. Hempel, C. C. "Problems and Changes in the Empiricist Criterio.n of Meaning" FREun's great contribution to Western thought has been described as Revue Internationale de Philosophic, 4:41-63 (1950). Reprinted in L. Linsky (ed.)~ S~mantics and the Philosophy of Language, pp. 163-85. Urbana: Univ. the application of the principle of cause and effect to human behavior. of I1lino1s Pr., 1952. Freud demons.trated that many features of behavior hitherto unex· 15. Hempel~ C. G. "The C~ncept of Cognitive Significance: A Reconsideration," plained-and often dismissed as hopelessly complex or obscure-could Proceedings of the AmeIJcan Academy of Arts and Sciences, 80:61-77 (1951). 16. Hempel, C. G. Fundamentals ~i Concept Form~tion in the EmJ?irical Sciences, be shown to be the product of circumstances in the history of the indi­ Vo~. II, No. 7 of the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science. Chicago: vidual. Many of the causal relationships he so convincingly demon· Unw. of Chicago Pr., 1952. 17. Hempel, C. C . "A Logical Appraisal of Operation ism " Scientific Monthly 79 · strated had been wholly unsuspected-unsuspected, in particular, by the 215-20 (1954). , , . very individuals whose behavior they controlled. Freud greatly reduced 18. ~empel, C. ~· "Implications of Carnap's Work for the Philosophy of Science," m P. A. ~ch1lpp (ed.), The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap. New Yori::: Tudor the sphere of accident and caprice in our considerations of human con­ (forthcommg). duct. His achievement in this respect appears all the more impressive 19. Mac::Corquodale, Kenneth, and ~· E. Meehl. "On a Distinction Between Hypo· thebcal Constructs and Intervening Variables," Psychological Review 55 : 95-107 when we recall that he was never able to appeal to the quantitative (1948). Reprinted in H. Feig) and M. Brodbeck (eds.) Readings' in the Phi­ proofs characteristic of other sciences. He carried the day with sheer losophy of Science, pp. 596-611. New York: Appleton·C~tury-Crofts, 1953. persuasion-with the massing of instances and the delineation of Sur· 20. Margenau, Henry. The Nature of Physical Reality. New York· McGraw-Hill 195Q . , prising parallels and analogies among seemingly diverse materials. 21. Schilpp, P. A. (ed.). The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap. New York: Tudor (forthcoming). This was not, however, Freud's own view of the matter. At the age 22. Schlick, Mori~. "~eaning ~nd Verification," Philosophical Review, 45: 339-69 of seventy he summed up his achievement in this way: "My life has (1936). Repnnted m H. Feig! and W. Sellars (eds.), Readings in Philosophical been aimed at one goal only: to infer or guess how the mental apparatus Analysis, pp. 146-74. New York: Appleton.Century-Crofts, 1949. is constructed and what forces interplay and counteract in it." (2) It is difficult to describe the mental apparatus he refers to in noncontro­ versial terms, partly because Freud's conception changed from time· to time and partly because its very nature encouraged misinterpretation and misunderstanding. But it is perhaps not too wide of the mark to indicate its principal features as follows: Freud conceived of some realm of the mind, not necessarily having physical extent, but nevertheless capable of topographic description and of subdivision into regions of the conscious, co-conscious, and unconscious. Within this space, various mental events-ideas, wishes, memories, emotions, instinctive tenden- NOTE: This paper appeared, in somewhat different form, in The Scientific Monthly, November 1954, and is reprinted by pennission of the editor and the author. 76 77 B. F. Skinner CRITIQUE OF PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY cies, and so on-interacted and combined in many complex ways. Sys­ Freud was aware of the problems of scientific methodology and even tems of these mental events came to be conceived of almost as sub­ of the metaphorical nature of some of his own constructs. W hen this sidiary personalities and were given proper names: the id, the ego, and was the case, he justified. the constructs as necessary or at least highly the superego. TI1ese systems divided among themselves a limited store convenient. But awareness of the nature of the metaphor is no defense of psychic energy. There were, of course, many other details. of it, and if modern science is still occasionally metaphorical, we must No matter what logicians may eventually make of this mental appa­ remember that, theorywise, it is also still in trouble. The point is not ratus, there is little doubt that Freud accepted it as real rather than that metaphor or construct is objectionable but that particular meta­ as a scientific construct or theory. One docs not at the age of seventy phors and constructs have caused trouble and are continuing to do so. define the goal of one's life as the exploration of an explanatory fiction. Freud recognized the damage worked by his own metaphorical think­ Freud did not use his "mental apparatus" as a postulate system from ing, but he felt that it could not be avoided and that the damage must which he deduced theorems to be submitted to empirical check. If there be put up with. TI1ere is reasou to disagree with him on this point. was any interaction between the mental apparatus and empirical observa­ Freud's explanatory scheme followed a traditional pattern of looking tions, such interaction took the form of modifying the apparatus to for a cause of human behavior inside the organism. His medical train­ account for newly discovered facts. To many followers of Freud the ing supplied him with powerful supporting analogies. The parallel be­ mental apparatus appears to be equally as real as the newly discovered tween the excision of a tumor, for example, and the release of a re· facts, and the exploration of such an apparatus is similarly accepted as pressed wish from tJ1e unconscious is quite compelling and must have the goal of a science of behavior. There is an alternative view, how­ affected Freud's thinking. Now, the pattern of an inner explanation of ever, which holds that Freud did not discover the mental apparatus but behavior is best exemplified hy doctrines of animism, which are pri· rather invented it, borrowing part of its structure from a traditional marily concerned with explaining the spontaneity and evident capri­ philosophy of human conduct but adding many novel features of his ciousness of behavior. The living organism is an extremely complicated own devising. system behaving in an extremely complicated way. Much of its behavior There are those who will concede that Freud's mental apparatus was appears at first blush to be absolutely unpredictable. The traditional a scientific construct rather than an observable empirical system but procedure has been to invent an inner determiner, a "demon," "spirit," who, nevertheless, attempt to justify it in the light of scientific method. "homunculus," or "personality" capable of spontaneous change of course One may take the line that metaphorical devices arc inevitable in the or of origination of action. Such an inner detennincr offers only a early stages of any science and that although we may look with amuse· momentary explanation of the behavior of the outer organism, because ment today upon the "essences," "forces," "phlogistons," and "ethers," it must, of course, be accounted for also, l)Ut it is commonly used to of the science of yesterday, these nevertheless were essential to the his­ put the matter beyond further inquiry and to bring the study of a torical process. It would be difficult to prove or disprove this. However, causal series of events to a dead end. if we have learned anything about the nature of scientific thinking, if Freud, himself, however, did not appeal to the inner apparatus to mathematical and logical researches have improved our capacity to rep­ account for spontaneity or caprice because he was a thoroughgoing de­ resent and analyze empirical data, it is possible that we can avoid some terminist. He accepted the responsibility of explaining, in tum, the of the mistakes of adolescence. vVhether Freud could have done so is behavior of the inner determiner. He did this by pointing to hitherto past demonstrating, but whether we need similar constructs in the unnoticed external causes in the environmental and genetic history of fntnre prosecution of a science of behavior is a question worth con­ the individual. Ile did not, therefore, need the traditional explanatory siclcring. system for traditional purposes; but he was unable to eliminate the CouslT11<.:l s arc convenient and perhaps even necessary in dc:1li11g wit·h pattern from his thinking. It led him to represent each of the causal ccrlai11 <·0111plical·cd whjcct mal"l'crs. As Frc11kcl·Brn11swik shows ( l ), relationships he had discovered as a series of three events. Some environ- 78 79 B. F. Skinner CRITIQUE OF PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY mental condition, very often in the early life of the individual, leaves A second classical problem is how the mental life can be manipu­ an effect upon the inner mental apparatus, and this in turn produces lated.