Not Adding Up The Fading Promise of Europe’s Dublin System EU Asylum: Towards 2020 Project By Susan Fratzke MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE EUROPE EU ASYLUM: TOWARDS 2020 PROJECT NOT ADDING UP The Fading Promise of Europe’s Dublin System By Susan Fratzke March 2015 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The author thanks Madeline Garlick for her invaluable guidance and input during the drafting of this report, Natalia Banulescu-Bogdan for her helpful comments, and Hannes Einsporn and Michael Siebel for their research assistance. This research, part of the Migration Policy Institute Europe and International Migration Initiative/Open Society Foundations research project ‘EU Asylum: Towards 2020’, is supported by the Open Society Foundations. In this project, which is a continuation of the work begun in 2014 as part of the ‘European Asylum Beyond 2014’ initiative, MPI Europe and IMI are working with states, institutions, and other stakeholders in a multi-year initiative aimed at generating practical ideas for the immediate and longer term. The research project aims to contribute to development of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) consistent with the European Union’s interests, values, and obligations, through research on challenges and options on asylum to inform the development of evidence- based policies and laws. The project will involve broad consultations with Member States, EU institutions, civil society, international- or ganisations, and academics, to draw on their expertise and seek to work towards consensus on the many key questions around responses to asylum on which perspectives differ. For more research from MPI Europe, visit www.mpieurope.org. © 2015 Migration Policy Institute Europe. All Rights Reserved. Cover design and typesetting: April Siruno No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission from MPI Europe. A full-text PDF of this document is available for free download from www.mpieurope.org. Information for reproducing excerpts from this report can be found at www.migrationpolicy.org/about/copyright-policy. Inquiries can also be directed to [email protected]. Suggested citation: Fratzke, Susan. 2015. Not Adding Up: The Fading Promise of Europe’s Dublin System. Brussels: Migration Policy Institute Europe. TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ........................................................1 I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................2 II. BACK TO THE BASICS: DUBLIN’S FOUNDING PRINCIPLES ......4 The necessity of the Dublin system ....................................................... 6 III. NOT MEASURING UP: EVALUATING THE EFFICIENCY OF THE DUBLIN SYSTEM ...........................................................7 A. An uneven burden ...................................................................... 8 B. Actual transfer rates are low ........................................................11 C. Member States often exchange similar numbers of requests ......................13 D. Secondary movement and ‘asylum shopping’ remain issues ......................13 E. Costs ...................................................................................15 I V. DUBLIN’S UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES: ACCESS TO PROTECTION AND OTHER IMPACTS ................................ 16 A. Disruption of family unity and risks to vulnerable individuals ................17 B. Delayed access to asylum procedures ...............................................18 C. Detention ..............................................................................19 D. Access to protection after transfer ..................................................19 E. Other risks .............................................................................20 V. WHERE TO FROM HERE? ............................................... 20 A. Evaluating the promise of Dublin III ..............................................20 B. A rocky road ahead ...................................................................23 VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ......................... 24 APPENDIX. DUBLIN REQUESTS AND TRANSFERS, 2012 .............. 26 WORKS CITED ................................................................. 28 ABOUT THE AUTHOR ........................................................ 32 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Europe’s Dublin system has been the subject of intense political debate since its inception. It has, on the one hand, been lauded as the cornerstone of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS), and on the other vilified as a fail- ure of solidarity and burden-sharing among European Union (EU) Member States.1 In truth, the Dublin system was not designed to equalise or share asylum burdens. Rather, its chief purpose is simply to create a mechanism that swiftly assigns responsibility for processing an individual asylum application to a single Member State. By establishing a legal framework for assigning responsibility, the Dublin Regulation (and its prede- cessor, the Dublin Convention) seeks to ensure quick access to protection for those in need, and to discourage abuses of the asylum system by preventing applicants from ‘shopping’ for the Member State with the most favourable proce- dures or reception conditions. Dublin—or a mechanism like it—will remain a necessity as long as separate national asylum systems exist within a European area that lacks internal border controls. As implemented, however, the Dublin Regulation is largely failing to achieve its two primary goals. Low effective transfer rates and a persistently high incidence of secondary movement among asylum seekers (both before and after filing an application) have undermined the efficiency of the Dublin system. In addition, Dublin has been criticised for leading to unnecessary transfers, particularly when cases could be dealt with quickly (as with manifestly unfounded claims) or when Member States exchange similar numbers of cases. Asylum advocates, mean- while, have raised serious concerns about the delays that Dublin procedures cause in the evaluation of protection claims. Such delays may disrupt family unity and put vulnerable individuals at risk. Applicants may be returned to nations (e.g., Greece) whose struggling asylum systems lack the capacity to process their claims or provide them with adequate reception conditions. The criticism most often levelled at the Dublin Regulation is that it has prompted a transfer of asylum-processing responsibilities from Europe’s north to its southern borders—a charge that is not borne out by the evidence. The criticism most often levelled at the Dublin Regulation, however, is that it has prompted a transfer of asylum- processing responsibilities from Europe’s north to its southern borders—a charge that is not borne out by the evidence. While northern European states clearly send more transfer requests than do southern ones, and those in the south are most likely to be on the receiving end of requests, the disparity in numbers of actual transfers is relatively small. In fact, many of those countries perceived to be ‘sending’ states also receive a substantial number of transfers. The 2013 recast of the Dublin Regulation seeks to address some of these concerns by clarifying how Dublin assigns responsibility for asylum claims, by tightening deadlines and by creating an ‘early warning and preparedness mecha- nism’ to support Member States whose asylum systems are under strain. Most significantly, the recast Dublin (known 1 Throughout this report “Member State” refers both to Member States of the European Union and non-EU states that have acceded to the Dublin Regulation: Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, and Liechtenstein. All EU Member States opted to participate in the Dublin II Regulation, including European Union (Council of the European Union, ‘Council Decision of 21 February 2006 on the Conclusion of the Agreement between the European CommunityIreland and theand United the Kingdom Kingdom. of Denmark The participation extending of to Denmark, Denmark which the provisions is not bound of Council by the asylumRegulation acquis, (EC) is No. governed 343/2003 by a establishing specific treaty the with criteria the and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of the member States by a for the effective application of the Dublin Convention Agreement between the European Community and the Kingdom of Denmark on the criteria andthird-country mechanisms national for establishing and Council the Regulation State responsible (EC) No. for2725/2000 examining concerning a request forthe asylumestablishment lodged inof DenmarkEurodac for or theany comparison other Member of fingerprints State of the Official Journal (OJ) 2006 L 66/37, 21 February 2006, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1425413295979&uri=OJ:JOL_2006_066_R_0037_01). Participation byEuropean non-EU Union Members and isEurodac also negotiated for the comparison via bilateral of treaties: fingerprints for Iceland for the andeffective Norway application see Council of the of theDublin European Convention’, Union, ‘Council Decision of 21 February 2006 on the conclusion of a Protocol to the Agreement between the European Community and the Republic of Iceland and the Kingdom of Norway concerning the criteria and mechanisms for establishing the State responsible for examining a request for asylum lodged in a Member State http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=14254