Dedicated to the 25th anniversary of the closure of the Semipalatinsk Test Site N.A. NAZARBAYEV, V.S. SHKOLNIK, E.G. BATYRBEKOV, S.A. BEREZIN, S.N. LUKASHENKO, M.K. SKAKOV SCIENTIFIC, TECHNICAL AND ENGINEERING WORK TO ENSURE THE SAFETY OF THE FORMER SEMIPALATINSK TEST SITE VOLUME I London, 2017 UDK 621.039 (035.3) BBK 31.4 P 42 Authors: N.A. Nazarbayev, V.S. Shkolnik, E.G. Batyrbekov, S.A. Berezin, S.N. Lukashenko, M.K. Skakov Scientific, echnicalT and Engineering Work To Ensure the Safety of the Former Semipalatinsk Test Site / N.A. Nazarbayev, V.S. Shkolnik, E.G. Batyrbekov et al. London, 2017 304 p. Ill. 290. ISBN 978-90-827148-0-7 Vol. 1. – 2017. – 304 p. Ill. 290 ISBN 978-90-827148-1-4 The first volume presents the results of scientific, technical and engineering work to ensure the safety of the former Semipalatinsk Test Site, also known as the Polygon, performed between 1994 and the present day by the National Nuclear Centre of the Republic of Kazakhstan, in collaboration with representatives of the United States of America and the Russian Federation. During the course of the work the nuclear testing infrastructure was abandoned and large-scale measures were implemented to mitigate the proliferation risks of weapons of mass destruction and prevent access to nuclear waste within the test site. The results of work on mitigating proliferation risks were given a high rating, as stated in a joint declaration by the presidents of Kazakhstan, Russia and the USA, pertaining to their collaboration at the former Semipalatinsk Test Site, made at the Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul on 27 March 2012. UDK 621.039 (035.3) BBK 31.4 ISBN 978-90-827148-1-4 (Vol. 1) ISBN 978-90-827148-0-7 (general) Translation by Simon Hollingsworth This publication has been prepared and released with the support of the Shuak Zhol Social Charitable Foundation Project Manager and Coordinating Editor – Victor Vyaznikovtsev © Kurchatov, National Nuclear Centre of Kazakhstan, Ministry of Energy of the Republic of Kazakhstan CONTENTS A word from the President 5 Foreword 9 Introduction 11 Chapter 1. Creation, activity and closure 13 1.1 General Information about the Test Site 13 1.1.1 Features of the region’s geological structure 14 1.1.2 Hydrogeology 15 1.2 Main Stages in Construction and Equipment of Test Site Facilities 16 1.3 Main Testing Areas and Facilities 21 1.3.1 Experimental Field Testing Area 21 1.3.2 Degelen Testing Area 24 1.3.3 Balapan Testing Area 25 1.4 Final stage of operations and closure of the test site 26 1.5 The nuclear heritage of the Republic of Kazakhstan: nuclear 27 weapons, Semipalatinsk Test Site and “Atomic Conversion” Chapter 2. Abandonment of nuclear test infrastructure 31 2.1. Start of work on demilitarisation of the Semipalatinsk Test Site 31 2.1.1 Organising abandonment of nuclear weapons 31 test infrastructure 2.2 Closure of tunnels at Degelen Mountain 35 2.2.1 Study of the radiation situation at the former Semipalatinsk Test 35 Site 2.2.2 Program for characterising tunnels at Degelen Mountain 38 2.2.3 Creation of infrastructure for closing tunnels at Degelen Mountain 41 and demo closure of Tunnel No. 192 2.2.4 Closure of tunnels at Degelen Mountain 42 2.3 A series of calibration experiments of the monitoring network for 56 Omega nuclear tests 2.3.1 Preparation and performance of the Omega experimental 56 calibration blast 2.3.2 Preparation and performance of the Omega 2 experimental 57 calibration blast 2.3.3 Preparation and performance of the Omega-3 experimental 59 calibration blast 2.4. Closure of boreholes of the Balapan Testing Area 64 2.4.1 Balapan Area characterisation programme. Identification and 64 examination of unused boreholes, designed for nuclear tests 2.4.2 Radiation situation at the Balapan Area 68 2.4.3 Abandonment of test boreholes 70 2.4.4 Seismological support 76 2.4.5 Abandonment of silo launchers at the Balapan Testing Area 78 2.5 Radiation examination of STS after completion of work 82 Chapter 3. Reducing proliferation risks 89 3.1. Collaborative efforts of Kazakhstan and Russia 89 3.1.1 Abandonment of the last nuclear charge in Tunnel No. 108-K 92 3.1.2 Permanent shutdown of Kolba containment vessels 95 3.1.3 Dismantling and permanent shutdown of process equipment at a 99 number of sites of the former Semipalatinsk Test Site 3.2 Collaborative efforts of Kazakhstan, Russia and the USA 101 3.2.1 Prevention of access to nuclear waste at the Aktan-Berli Area 103 3.2.2 Enhancing the safety and security of two spent Kolba containment 132 vessels, containing nuclear waste (Operation Matchbox) 3.2.3 Enhancing the safety and security of three spent Kolba 141 containment vessels, containing nuclear waste (Operation Nomad) 3.2.4 Extraction and removal of activated, purpose-built process 157 equipment from two tunnels at the Mayak production association (Russia) (Operation Golden Eagle) 3.2.5 Strengthening physical barriers to tunnels at Degelen Mountain 207 3.2.6 Patrolling the area 231 3.2.7 Deliverables 235 3.3 Collaborative efforts of Kazakhstan and the USA 243 3.3.1 Reducing proliferation risks at the Experimental Field Testing 243 Area 3.3.2 The research and experimental work performed to strengthen the 257 physical protection of the work locations Conclusion 267 Appendices 271 From National Tragedy to National Pride! Nursultan Nazarbayev The Semipalatinsk Test Site was closed twenty-five years ago. Between 1949 and 1991 the Semipalatinsk Test Site saw 456 tests of all kinds of nuclear weapons, leading to the spread of radiation over a considerable territory. At the moment of its closure, the Polygon covered an area of 18,300 square kilometres, the equivalent of the area of Israel or Slovenia. After the fall of the Soviet Union a significant quantity of nuclear weapons remained within the sovereign Kazakhstan, including strategic multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles, long-range bombers and their corresponding atomic and thermonuclear shells. This all amounted to the world’s fourth most powerful, deadly potential. Recognising its global responsibility to the world, Kazakhstan abandoned its nuclear arsenal. Time has come to show that we took the only correct decision that could be made. This historical choice determined our country’s future strategy in global security. From this moment on, the preservation and reinforcement of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction became a priority direction in Kazakhstan’s domestic and foreign policy. Kazakhstan was one of the first countries in the CIS to accede to the Nuclear Weapons Non-proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. 5 Following our initiative, the United Nations declared 29 August, the date of the test site’s closure, as the International Day Аgainst Nuclear Tests. With the signing of the Treaty of Semipalatinsk by five countries, Central Asia was declared a nuclear-weapon-free zone. This is the first nuclear-free zone to be created in the Northern Hemisphere, in a place where powerful nuclear weapons were once stored and tested. The next step in the formation of the Global Anti-nuclear Movement was the UN’s approval, at the suggestion of Kazakhstan, of the Universal Declaration on the Achievement of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World. This was evidence of the international community’s recognition and support of our country’s contribution to reducing nuclear weapons, enhancing global stability and ensuring equal and total security for all. At the same time, the creation of the IAEA’s Low-enriched Uranium Bank in Kazakhstan further demonstrated the considerable contribution made by Kazakhstan into non-proliferation and its status of a reliable partner with extensive experience in handling nuclear materials. The LEU Bank is a unique mechanism for the guaranteed supply of low-enriched uranium to IAEA member states if they are unable to source it on the international commercial market. The joint declaration we signed at the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit in Washington with leaders of a number of foreign states on the IAEA LEU Bank notes that “Kazakhstan has wonderful credentials when it comes to nuclear non-proliferation and world peace”. These historical enactments have shown the whole world our commitment to a world free from the threat of war. And yet the world is changing and becoming less safe and completely new challenges and threats are coming to the fore. Concern is growing over the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the spread of war and conflict. And now, with the world facing the threat of war, Kazakhstan again confirms that the key tools in politics must be the strengthening of international security, the development of cooperation between nations and the resolution of global problems and conflicts through negotiations. My new MANIFESTO: THE WORLD. THE 21st CENTURY proposes that the world should make “decisive steps towards demilitarisation” and develops a new PROGRAMME: THE 21st CENTURY: A WORLD WITHOUT WAR. We can lift the threat of global war if we activate the process of nuclear disarmament, eradicate war and set out a new development trend, based on fair and equal access for all nations to infrastructure, resources and markets. Only through common efforts may we take this decisive step to building a nuclear-free world. With our extensive experience in non-proliferation it is important like never before to speak today about our collaboration experience and disseminate the practice of using the energy of the atom purely for peaceful ends. Our wide-ranging work on abandoning the infrastructure and eradicating