Page 1 DePaul Law Review Winter 2003 Comments A LEGAL WAR ON TERRORISM: EXTENDING NEW YORK V. QUARLES AND THE DEPARTURE FROM ENEMY COMBATANT DESIGNATIONS Copyright (c) 2003 DePaul University; Jeffrey S. Becker Introduction During turbulent times, the United States government has difficulty balancing rights fundamental to all Ameri- cans--the rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. [FN1] This Comment examines our government's inve- terate struggle to preserve its citizens' right to “liberty” while simultaneously protecting their right to “life.” Ade- quately balancing these considerations has proved difficult time and time again. “When conditions are especially turbulent and the general populace perceives a threat to its way of life, the chances of a miscarriage of justice are substantially increased.” [FN2] The storybook of American history is blotched with several instances of governmental overreaction during un- certain times. Hindsight bias incessantly leads the legal community to utter the same sorrowful words: “If we knew then what we know now.” By that point, however, it is usually too late. Evidence of our government's chronic inability to provide its citizens with concurrent protection of life and liberty during unstable times begins at our nation's founding. While America's naissance was assumedly motivated by principles of sovereignty and equality, [FN3] our forefathers allowed for the continued importation of individuals for the purpose of slavery. [FN4] The prohibition placed on Congress against banning slavery, [FN5] conduct defined by its restriction on individual liberty, was di- rectly in conflict with the values of the newly established American republic. [FN6] This contradiction between American ideology and behavior can be attributed to the instability of the newly formed American government. [FN7] America gained freedom from England only fourteen years earlier. Several states south of the Potomac threatened not to ratify the Constitution if it prohibited slavery. [FN8] When later faced with a request to interpret the Constitution as allowing for the prohibition of slavery, Congress chose silence, setting the issue aside for later assessment. [FN9] The government found it beneficial for America's future not to immediately abolish the institution of slavery. [FN10] This lack of decisive action at our nation's founding resulted in several decades of continued oppression that ultimately ended in a gruesome civil war. [FN11] A second unfortunate government overreaction in the wake of an unstable domestic environment occurred on December 18, 1944, when the United States Supreme Court upheld a military order permitting discrimination against individuals of Japanese descent. [FN12] In reaction to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and America's subsequent declaration of war on Japan, the executive branch implemented several military orders and proclamations that limited the rights of Japanese-American citizens. [FN13] The government defended the exclusionary order, claiming it was necessary due to “the presence of an unascertained number of disloyal members of the [Japanese population], most of whom . no doubt were loyal to this country.” [FN14] Military authorities found it impossible to segregate only the disloyal members from the group, which the Supreme Court subsequently determined was an acceptable rationale for the segregation of all Japanese individuals from the rest of the population. [FN15] The Court, while “not unmindful of the hardships imposed . upon a large group of American citizens,” [FN16] found that conditions of modern warfare sufficiently justified the security measures taken by the American military. [FN17] In distinguishing between general © 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. Page 2 unequal treatment of one race and the current endorsement of racial segregation by the military, the Court said, “[p]ressing public necessity may sometimes justify the existence of such restrictions; racial antagonism never can.” [FN18] The wartime internment of Japanese-Americans has been described as “one of America's grossest violations of civil liberties, forcing an entire race to labor under a collective presumption of guilt.” [FN19] Arguably, no recent chapter in our nation's history caused more turbulence to the American status quo than the attacks of September 11, 2001. [FN20] These acts of international terrorism took place on America's soil, causing a level of insecurity among our countrymen not felt since the duck and cover days of the Cold War. As a result, our government is taking several steps to re-establish our national “security.” [FN21] One feature of this governmental action is the labeling of suspected terrorists as “enemy combatants.” [FN22] The enemy combatant designation is a tool used by the federal government in times of war [FN23] to circumvent limitations placed upon it by the Consti- tution when interrogating suspected terrorists. [FN24] This Comment explores the enemy combatant designation and attempts to determine what rights an American citizen [FN25] suspected of terrorism should be afforded, as compared to rights traditionally given an accused criminal or prisoner of war. [FN26] The recent use of enemy combatant designations by the administration of President George Walker Bush is quite unusual, primarily because the label has lain dormant for over five decades. [FN27] This sudden revival of an only partially developed government instrument might potentially damage the legitimacy of the Bush Administration by arbitrarily eliminating several predetermined American principles. At the crux of the matter resides Fifth Amendment protections, separation of powers, and judicial review. [FN28] This Comment analyzes the enemy combatant designation placed on American citizens by the American gov- ernment, both past and present. Part II briefly reviews Supreme Court case law attempting to establish the boundaries of enemy combatant jurisprudence. [FN29] It further discusses the Bush Administration's current use of enemy combatant designations against individuals suspected of terrorism. [FN30] Part III presents consequences of the current enemy combatant designations. [FN31] It highlights the effects of President Bush's orders on individuals suspected of terrorism, [FN32] evaluates the actions taken by the Bush Administration, [FN33] and sets forth a feasible alternative to the use of enemy combatant designations when dealing with America's “war on terrorism.” [FN34] Specifically, subpart D of Part III suggests an expansion of the public safety exception set forth in New York v. Quarles. [FN35] Part IV suggests how the government's decisions in dealing with terrorist threats will impact the legitimacy of the Bush Administration. [FN36] In conclusion, Part V stresses the immediate need for the Bush Ad- ministration to reassess its current methods. II. Background Several consequences emerge when the United States government labels a criminal suspect an “enemy comba- tant.” For instance, the label requires a trial before a military commission, which denies several individual rights typically afforded to prisoners of war and criminals tried in civilian courts. [FN37] Consequently, a comprehensive understanding of the method used to determine who falls under this label is critical. Over the past two and a half centuries of American juris- prudence, courts have provided nominal assistance in defining conduct worthy of res- cinding a wartime enemy's constitutional rights. [FN38] This section presents the constitutional analysis undertaken by the judiciary in determining the legality of the enemy combatant designation and its consequences. [FN39] Addi- tionally, this section describes the current use of enemy combatant designations by the United States government. [FN40] A. Enemy Combatant Jurisprudence: A “Short” Walk Through Time Well rooted in our nation's history is the notion that an individual can act so defiantly that he loses certain civil rights. [FN41] This restriction on individual rights occurs most often during times of war. [FN42] The government gave individuals in violation of the law of war [FN43] fewer rights prior to the adoption of the Constitution and during Page 3 the Civil War. [FN44] Nonetheless, actual cases dealing with enemy combatants are few in number. This section summarizes case law relevant to determining the definition of an enemy combatant and the constitutional implications behind the label. 1. Lincoln Responds to a Confederate Uprising: The Military Tribunal The Civil War is perhaps the most gruesome illustration of a nation torn apart by its incompatible beliefs only to grow stronger subsequent to the bloodshed. During the war, however, the threat of permanent succession appeared more probable than the eventual evolution of America into an international superpower. As the battles dragged on, civilian war protesters plagued Union territories, recruiting men for the Confederate army. [FN45] On April 27, 1861, President Abraham Lincoln declared that any individual who discouraged enlistment in the Union army or “engaged in disloyal practices would be subject to trial in a military commission, regardless of whether they were civilians or military.” [FN46] In addition to prosecuting these individuals before a military commission, Lincoln suspended each individual's right to remove his case to a civilian court or file a writ of habeas corpus. [FN47] While the following two cases do not directly discuss the issue of enemy combatant