IRAQ THREAT ASSESSMENT THE DANGERS TO THE UNITED STATES, IRAQ, AND MIDEAST STABILITY OF ABANDONING IRAQ AT THE END OF 2011 FREDERICK W. KAGAN A REPORT BY THE CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT OF THE AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE IRAQ THREAT ASSESSMENT THE DANGERS TO THE UNITED STATES, IRAQ, AND MIDEAST STABILITY OF ABANDONING IRAQ AT THE END OF 2011 FREDERICK W. KAGAN May 2011 A REPORT BY THE CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT OF THE AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE Contents Key Findings . .1 Introduction . .3 The Iranian Threat . .4 Iranian Ground Forces Capabilities . .5 Iranian Naval Capabilities . .6 Iranian Air and Missile Capabilities . .6 Iraq Alone . .8 Iraq with a US Strategic Partnership and Military Presence . .11 Map of Iraq and Iran . .14 Notes . 15 About the Author . 16 About the Critical Threats Project . .16 Cover image US Navy Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class James E. Foeh. Iraqi soldiers assigned to 2nd Company, Iraqi 6th Emergency Response Battalion move to a simulated target as part of an air assault exercise with US Special Operations Forces during Foreign Internal Defense training on November 19, 2010. US Special Operations Forces are currently assisting and advising Iraqi Security Forces in support of Operation New Dawn. iii Key Findings • The Iraqi Security Forces will not be able to • To counterbalance Iran’s military domi- defend Iraq’s sovereignty, maintain its inde- nance, Iraqi military planners would need pendence from Iran, or ensure Iraq’s inter- to design and field a military capable of nal stability without American assistance, protecting the Iraqi state with or without including some ground forces in Iraq, for a US assistance. An Iraqi military designed to number of years. The negotiation of a secu- deter, repel, and retaliate against the range rity agreement extending the presence of of Iranian military options would therefore US forces in Iraq beyond the end of 2011 is be an imposing force in the region. Such an thus an urgent national security priority for Iraqi military would rival that of Saudi Ara- the United States and Iraq. bia, Kuwait, Jordan, and even Syria, unset- tling the current military balance and • The absence of a US strategic partnership possibly sparking a regional arms race. with and military presence in Iraq will weaken the Iraqi military and could lead • The presence of US air power and ground to the breakdown of internal security and troops in Iraq would assure Baghdad of its political gains, which in turn could cause survival, and at less cost to Iraqi and renewed communal conflict and the regional security. The US military can pro- reemergence of militant Islamist groups. vide Iraq with the ability to hold its own Conversely, Iraqi response to the sense of against Iranian proxy groups, to deter and being abandoned by the United States defeat an Iranian conventional military could lead Baghdad to launch a rapid attack or air attack, and to deter or retali- buildup of Iraq’s military to respond to ate against an Iranian missile campaign. regional threats, which would further Internally, the United States could con- destabilize an already unstable Middle tinue to play an irreplaceable role in keep- East and badly damage essential efforts by ing the peace along the Arab-Kurd fault the Iraqi government to meet the desires line in northern Iraq. of its people for domestic progress. • A long-term strategic military partner- • Iran’s use of proxy military groups poses ship also benefits the United States. It the most immediate and serious threat to would deter serious Iranian adventurism Iraqi security. Combined with Iran’s con- in Iraq and help Baghdad resist Iranian ventional, particularly missile, threat, the pressure to conform to Tehran’s policies current military balance pitting Iraq by aimed at excluding the United States and itself against Iran gives Tehran military its allies from a region of vital interest to dominance at every level of escalation. the West. 1 IRAQ THREAT ASSESSMENT • The United States must demonstrate that it sovereign state beholden to no one, or a is a reliable ally by negotiating the extension weak state, riven with internal tensions, of some US military presence after 2011, subject to the constant manipulation and maintaining its commitment to the long- domination of its Persian neighbors. The term survivability of the unitary Iraqi state. decision will mark a fundamental bifur- cation in Iraq’s future and must not be • Iraqi leaders must choose what kind of taken lightly. Iraq they want—an independent, fully 2 Introduction raqis live in a tough region. Although none of Iraq’s military weakness will threaten American Itheir neighbors have been designing military interests in one of two ways. Either Iraq will remain forces specifically to target them, general tensions so weak that the internal security and, ultimately, in the region and among Iran, Israel, and Western political gains made since 2006 will be jeopardized, powers have led to the maintenance of regional leading to the prospect of renewed communal conventional militaries that pose a significant conflict and the reemergence of militant Islamist threat to Iraq with its current armed forces, config- groups, or Iraq will engage in a military buildup that ured as they are exclusively for internal security in itself will be destabilizing in an already unstable missions. Those missions are made much more region. The Iraqi Security Forces will not be able to daunting by Iran’s continued support for—and use defend Iraq’s sovereignty, independence from Iran, of—armed proxy groups to influence Iraqi deci- and internal stability without American assistance, sion making and pursue Iranian interests. Even including some ground forces in Iraq, for a number the task of keeping sufficient pressure on al Qaeda of years. The negotiation of a security agreement in Iraq and other Sunni revanchist groups will extending the presence of US forces in Iraq beyond strain the Iraqi military if it has little or no exter- the end of 2011 is thus an urgent national security nal support. priority for the United States and Iraq. 3 The Iranian Threat ran poses the most immediate and serious threat leaders, facilitators, and operators that compose these Ito Iraqi security. It has been using a mix of mili- attack cells. Iraqi Special Operations Forces have tary force—weighted toward unconventional forces, some of these capabilities, but not all of them. They to be sure, but including naval forces, riverine certainly do not have them in sufficient quantity to forces, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)— manage threats of this type without continued US inside Iraq since 2003. Iranian-directed military assistance, and they will not have such independent groups such as Kitaib Hezbollah, Asaib Ahl al Haq, capabilities by 2012. Nor have they developed neces- and the Promised Day Brigades have maintained sary command-and-control structures or the cadre of and even expanded their abilities to conduct very leadership capable of planning and conducting com- significant attacks in Iraq, including rocket and mor- plex counterterrorism and counter–irregular warfare tar attacks in Baghdad. Attacks at current or even operations on their own. somewhat higher levels do not pose an existential Iranian-directed groups have demonstrated the threat to the Iraqi state, but they will become capability to emplace extremely sophisticated increasingly intolerable as Iraqis continue to try to armor-piercing improvised explosive devices (IEDs), reestablish normalcy. They badly undermine the including the most deadly explosively formed pen- ability of Iraq’s political leaders to make decisions etrators (EFPs), which can cut through tank armor freely even about internal matters, let alone foreign when properly constructed and emplaced. They also policy. Left unchecked, this Iranian proxy warfare have small arsenals of antitank rifles and rocket- could reduce Iraq to a state of effective vassalage propelled grenades that can destroy lightly armored despite the clear desires of the Iraqi people—Sunni, vehicles. US forces facing these threats developed Shia, and Kurds—to be masters of their own fate. both technological and tactical solutions, of which Defending against such groups requires both the Iraqis now have only some. Our mine resistant defensive and high-end offensive capabilities, as well ambush protected vehicles (MRAPs) have allowed as effective police and border police (which Iraq does American soldiers to survive many IED hits. Iraqi not have now). Key facilities will continue to have to forces now are mainly equipped with up-armored be hardened. Iraqis will also require the capability to humvees, which are far more vulnerable to such strike quickly against these cells, using radar systems attacks. Even our MRAPs are not a reliable defense to detect the point of origin of the attacks, quick- against EFPs, however. The most reliable response response forces, and, ideally, air weapons teams to them has been combined aggressive operations (reconnaissance and attack helicopters, as well as against the EFP cells transporting and emplacing UAVs) to strike back against rocket and mortar those weapons—again, a capability the Iraqi Secu- teams. Even these capabilities will not suffice against rity Forces will not have in sufficient quantity or experienced mortar and rocket teams, which have quality on its own if US forces leave after 2011. developed techniques to survive against the capabil- Current American combat capabilities in Iraq are ities of US