Last Flight from Koh Tang The Mayaguez Incident a Generation Later U.S. Air Force (Hans Deffner) U.S. Air Force The SS Mayaguez By D AVID R. MET S before its capture A–7 acquired intelligence on Koh Tang and SS Mayaguez after its capture OV–10 provided air support Richard Nixon resigned in the face of what seemed certain impeachment. President Gerald Ford had assumed the office without being elected. Many thought the rest of the U.S. Navy (Douglas Tesner) world was wallowing in the notion that America, defeated and humiliated by a third- he night was clear and the air us. I knew that we would obliterate it with rate power, had become a helpless giant. stable. We could see the SS May- the first shot from our 105mm Howitzer. Our It was just at that moment, on the after- aguez resting barely a mile to the navigator was desperately begging Cricket1 for noon of May 12, 1975, that the communist T north. We were at 7,500 feet in permission to open fire. Cambodians, exuberant in the wake of their a lazy orbit to the left in an old 573, a trusty recent victory over their U.S.-sponsored AC–130H. She was in fine shape; none of her The Context enemies, grabbed the SS Mayaguez. This complex systems was at less-than-optimum In the spring of 1975, the United States merchant ship was proceeding through interna- condition. The copilot was holding the speed had suffered some of the most humiliating tional waters, carrying exchange merchandise. perfectly, and the autopilot was maintaining experiences in its existence. Only months It was headed northwestward toward a destina- altitude. It was a piece of cake to keep the before, our prisoners had been released in tion in southern Thailand. The Mayaguez was plane on geometry (that is, to keep the aircraft North Vietnam. Our forces had withdrawn, not a big ship, but it was under the American in coordinated flight with the guns pointed and just a couple of weeks before the Maya- flag with a crew of 39 people of various nation- directly at the target). All the guns were ready, guez was captured by the Khmer Rouge, both alities, including American citizens. and our crew was eager to shoot. I gazed Saigon and Phnom Penh had fallen to com- The Mayaguez managed to get off an sideways through my heads-up display and munist forces. Only months earlier, President SOS before being captured, but the Khmers could see the muzzle flashes of the gun below. Located on the northeastern beach at Koh Dr. David R. Mets is a Military Defense Analyst at the Air University College of Air and Space Doctrine, Tang, the gun’s tracers were arcing far beneath Research, and Education. Dr. Mets is a former AC–130 pilot and squadron commander. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 / JFQ 111 The Mayaguez Incident a Generation Later U.S. Air Force AC–130H provided air support during rescue operation for SS Mayaguez from took Okinawa to U-Tapao the ship without via Air Force C–141s, and B–52s at any casualties and brought it to anchor near the boat in the haze. Jets were monitoring the Guam went on alert. The Air Force units in Puolo Wai Island. The SOS was relayed to situation at Koh Tang during the day with the Thailand hurried down to Koh Tang to keep Washington in short order, and that evening a help of tankers, and the 388th TFW AC–130s track of the situation. Helicopters from all over U.S. Navy P–3 Orion located the Mayaguez at with their radars, low-light televisions, and Thailand converged to muster at U-Tapao. the island. On Tuesday, May 13, the ship was infrared sensors continued the work through The USS Coral Sea, an attack carrier, was near reported under way, presumably headed for the night of May 13. Australia. The carrier changed course for the the Cambodian mainland port of Kompong Gulf of Siam and steamed toward the trouble Som about 90 miles to the northeast. This The Planning as fast as possible. The amphibious carrier aggravated fears in Washington because it The work continued after dawn on USS Hancock, in port at Subic Bay in the recalled the experience of the USS Pueblo May 14 while deliberations were going on Philippines, likewise set out with its Marines 7 years earlier. The latter had been brought in Washington, Hawaii, and Thailand. As and helicopters with all possible haste. The into a North Korean port before forces could always, information was in short supply, and surface warships USS Holt and USS Wilson be marshaled to stop it. Once taken to the the planners had to fill gaps in their knowl- were closer to the action and sped on without interior, the chances of rescuing a crew with edge with assumptions. Unhappily, perhaps, delay. Twelve Sailors and merchant mariners military force were much diminished. there were more planners than information. also flew out of Subic for U-Tapao in case their Captain Charles Miller, skipper of the The President, National Security Council, and expertise was necessary to sail the Mayaguez Mayaguez, managed to dissuade the Khmers Joint Chiefs of Staff were working in Wash- away after recovery. The State Department from going into Kompong Som with the claim ington. The authority in Thailand was the attempted to contact the Cambodians through that his radar was out and that he could not U.S. Support Activities Group (USSAG/7AF) the Chinese and to make approaches to the safely bring the ship in without it. Thus, the commander, Lieutenant General John J. United Nations for assistance.2 Khmers decided to bring it to anchor off the Burns, USAF, at Nakhon Phanom. He sent During this time, I was the operations north end of Koh Tang, an island closer to the the commander of the subordinate 17th Air officer of the 16th Special Operations Squad- mainland but still well outside 12 miles and Division to the coastal base at U-Tapao to ron (SOS) equipped with the AC–130s. Our under disputed ownership. serve as the on-scene commander there. He job was to be ready to maintain surveillance There were still three U.S. Air Force also tried to get authority to go directly to and halt waterborne traffic through the fighter wings in Thailand, and on May 13, the National Military Command Center in night—with no idea how many nights might they were ordered to monitor the Mayaguez Washington for orders, bypassing the regional be involved. The squadron commander flew and attempt to prevent further movement of commander at U.S. Pacific Command down to Koh Tang through Tuesday night, the ship and the crew. This included direction (USPACOM) in Hawaii. But the USPACOM so I was left in charge of assuring that we to stop waterborne traffic both ways between commander would have none of that. Thus, had enough rested crews on alert and ready the mainland and the island. They managed the USSAG commander had no Army, Navy, airplanes to maintain watch all night, every this well, sinking three Cambodian gunboats or Marine units under his command. Neither night. It took over an hour to fly down to Koh and damaging four others. However, they the C–141s all over the Pacific, nor the B–52s Tang, and each aircraft could remain on the could not stop a captive Thai fishing boat at Guam, nor the KC–135 tankers there or at scene for about 4 hours before coming back. from moving to Kompong Som on that same U-Tapao were under his direction. However, None of our latest airplanes was equipped day. A 388th Tactical Fighter Wing the long distance communications with external tanks. Neither the AC–130A (TFW) A–7 pilot reported seeing then had advanced to the point nor AC–130H was capable of aerial refueling. Caucasians on its deck during once taken to where he could instantly speak with Moreover, the older AC–130A did not have low passes. Many shots were fired the interior, USPACOM or the National Military the endurance of the AC–130H, even when across the bow, and riot control the chances Command Center. configured with external tanks. The gunship agents were dropped. The Thai of rescuing Meanwhile, the Joint Chiefs was, therefore, a limited resource and would crew was in favor of returning to a crew with of Staff under General David Jones, have to be conserved if it was to be the sole Koh Tang, but the Khmer guards USAF, were getting forces rolling source of surveillance and firepower in the persisted. Aircraft followed the military force well before the plan took shape. hours of darkness. boat, but the rules of engagement were much The Navy was ordered to find and On Wednesday, I knew, or thought I prohibited going inside 12 miles of diminished monitor the ship with its patrol knew, from the intelligence brought back by the coast, so the pilots lost track of aircraft. A thousand Marines flew our A–7 pilot that the Mayaguez crew was 112 JFQ / issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 ndupress.ndu.edu METS not on Koh Tang. But this was not so clear and 5 crewmembers, so there were only 11 wave of landings on Koh Tang. The landing back in Washington. There, the thought had operational choppers left. Three of these were force of eight helicopters was not so fortunate. arisen that only a part of the crew was gone to be used for a Mayaguez boarding party.