chapter 2 Intention, belief, and instrumental rationality* Michael E. Bratman 1 two approaches to instrumental rationality Suppose I intend end E, believe that a necessary means to E is M, and believe that M requires that I intend M. My attitudes concerning E and M engage a basic requirement of practical rationality, a requirement that, barring a change in my cited beliefs, I either intend M or give up 1 intending E. Call this the Instrumental Rationality requirement – for 2 short, the IR requirement. * This essay is a sequel to my “Intention, Belief, Practical, Theoretical,” in Simon Robertson, ed., Spheres of Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming). Some of the ideas developed here are also in that earlier essay, but I hope in this present chapter to go somewhat beyond that earlier work. I do, however, see my overall argument in favor of (to use terminology to be introduced in the main text) the practical commitment view, in contrast with cognitivism, as drawing on both of these essays (as well as on the basic account presented in my Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987; reissued by CSLI Publications, 1999]). The present essay was motivated in part by Kieran Setiya’s “Cognitivism about Instrumental Reason: Response to Bratman” (2005), which constituted his very thoughtful and helpful comments on “Intention, Belief, Practical, Theoretical,” at the Conference on Practical Reason, University of Maryland, April 2005. My present chapter has also benefited from conversation with John Perry, Jennifer Morton, and Sarah Paul, detailed comments from Gideon Yaffe and John Broome on earlier drafts, and very helpful comments from George Wilson and from the editors of this volume. 1 Concerning the need for the belief that M requires that I intend M, see Robert Binkley, “A Theory of Practical Reason,” The Philosophical Review, 74 (1965): 423–448,at443. The language of “requirement” comes from John Broome; see “Normative Requirements,” Ratio, 12 (1999): 398–419. 2 In other work I have focused on what I have called a requirement of means-end coherence of one’s intentions and plans. I see IR as a central aspect of that requirement, though the requirement of means-end coherence goes beyond IR, strictly speaking, in requiring that an agent fill in her plans with one or another sufficient means when what is needed is that the agent settle on some such means or other. And the requirement of means-end coherence allows for delay in filling in plans with means when there remains sufficient time. (For some of these complexities see Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason: 31–35.) But IR is at the heart of the requirement of means-end coherence, and it will simplify my discussion here to focus on it. Note that both IR and the requirement of means- end coherence specifically concern means-end rationality with respect to intended ends; there remain further issues about means-end rationality concerning things one wants, prefers, or values. 13 14 michael e. bratman Suppose now that I believe that E, and I also believe that E will only occur if M. My beliefs engage a basic demand of theoretical rationality, a demand that, roughly, either there be a change in at least one of these two beliefs or I believe M. Call this the Belief-Closure requirement – for short, the BC requirement. BC, note, is not a consistency demand on my beliefs: failure to add the further belief that M need not involve inconsistency in the way that adding a belief that not-M would. Nevertheless, something 3 like BC seems a basic rationality constraint on belief. Both IR and BC express constraints on the coherence of the agent’s relevant attitudes; and these constraints are aspects of the normal rational functioning, in the psychic economy of believing-and-intending agents, of the cited attitudes. The intentions and beliefs of such agents will tend to be responsive to these constraints. But the requirements differ in impor- tant ways. IR is engaged only if I intend E; whereas BC is engaged if I believe E, whether or not I intend E. And a central way of meeting the demands of IR involves intending M; whereas a corresponding way of meeting the demands of BC involves, rather, believing M. Further, if we ask why these principles – IR and BC – are, indeed, aspects of the rational functioning of the cited attitudes, we arrive, I believe, at importantly different answers. Roughly: In the case of BC we will appeal, I think, to something like a general need for coherence of one’s beliefs if one is to understand the world. In the case of IR we will appeal, I think, to something like a general need to intend necessary means if one is to be an effective agent and if one is to have a practical standpoint that has the kind 4 of efficacy characteristic of self-government. These last claims about what lies behind IR, on the one hand, and BC, on the other, are, of course, sketchy; and I cannot pursue these matters in detail here. I do think, though, that there is here a general and plausible idea. This is the idea that these stories will differ, and that one will cite 3 There are important issues, in understanding BC, about what Gilbert Harman calls “clutter avoidance”: as Harman emphasizes, we do not suppose one must add all beliefs entailed by other beliefs one already has. See Gilbert Harman, Change in View (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986): 12. These issues do not arise in the same way for IR. Given that the agent believes that intending M is itself necessary for E, forming that intention will not be mere “clutter.” I return to this matter briefly below in n. 21. 4 That is, the concerns and commitments that constitute the practical standpoint with which one identifies need to be ones that are effectively in control of one’s intentional conduct, if one is to be self-governing. One aspect of such effective control will be conforming, in general, to IR when one’s beliefs about what is required are accurate and when the intended ends are elements in, or in other ways endorsed by, the practical standpoint with which one identifies. I try to deepen this connection between central norms on intention and self-government in “Intention, Belief, Practical, Theoretical.” Intention, belief, instrumental rationality 15 basic theoretical concerns – with understanding, for example – and the other will cite basic practical concerns – with effective agency and self- governance, for example. When we put this very general idea together with our initial observations about the differences between IR and BC – the focus on intention, in the one case, and belief in the other – we are led to the view that these are importantly different demands of rationality – in one case practical, in the other case theoretical – though these demands will, of course, significantly interact in many cases. There are, however, philosophical pressures that have led a number of philosophers to draw principles along the lines of IR and BC much more closely together. Their idea, roughly, is to see IR, or something close to it, as, at bottom, a special case of the theoretical requirement expressed in BC, or something close to it, together perhaps with some further principle of theoretical rationality. There are different versions of this idea, as we shall see. But what they share is the idea that IR is, at bottom, a theoretical 5 demand on beliefs. This is cognitivism about instrumental rationality. Cognitivism about instrumental rationality identifies what had seemed to be a basic element of practical rationality with theoretical rationality. It need not, however, say that all demands of practical reason are, at bottom, 6 demands of theoretical reason. So, for example, I see John Broome, Wayne Davis, Gilbert Harman, Kieran Setiya, J. David Velleman, and R. Jay Wallace as, in different ways, cognitivists about instrumental 7 rationality; but whereas Velleman is, quite broadly, a cognitivist about practical reason – he sees practical reason as grounded in a theoretical 5 More precisely, this is cognitivism about that aspect of instrumental rationality that IR, and closely related principles, aims to capture. For this use of the term “cognitivism” (in contrast with its standard use in meta-ethics) see my “Cognitivism about Practical Reason,” as reprinted in my Faces of Intention (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), and my “Intention, Belief, Practical, Theoretical.” Kieran Setiya also uses this term in this way in “Cognitivism about Instrumental Reason,” Ethics, 117 (2007): 649–673. 6 Setiya makes this point in “Cognitivism about Instrumental Reason: Response to Bratman.” 7 See John Broome, “The Unity of Reasoning?,” in Jens Timmerman, John Skorupski, and Simon Robertson, eds., Spheres of Reason (Oxford : Oxford University Press, forthcoming); Wayne Davis, “A Causal Theory of Intending,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 21 (1984): 43–54; Gilbert Harman, “Practical Reasoning,” reprinted in Gilbert Harman, Reasoning, Meaning, and Mind (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999 ): 46 –74; Setiya, “Cognitivism about Instrumental Reason”; J. David Velleman, Practical Reflection (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), The Possibility of Practical Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), and “What Good is a Will?,” in Anton Leist and Holger Baumann, eds., Action in Context (Berlin and New York: de Gruyter and Mouton, 2007); R. Jay Wallace, “Normativity, Commitment, and Instrumental Reason,” Philosophers’ Imprint, 1 (3)(2001). Setiya’s cognitivism about instrumental rationality goes directly by way of his version of BC. My strategy in this essay of focusing on the role of BC in such cognitivism follows Setiya in this respect. 16 michael e.