CHAPTER 1 2 GREECE 28th October 1940 the Italians attacked Greece without provoca- ONtion. Immediately General Metaxas, the Greek dictator, appealed t o Britain for naval help, air defence for Athens and supplies, and said tha t he would welcome British troops in Crete . MILITARY AID FOR GREEC E On 1st November a British battalion landed in Crete, and on the 3rd , eight fighter-bombers arrived at Eleusis near Athens . On 15th November a force of 4,247, including three air squadrons and some military unit s that were to form a small British base, left Alexandria for Piraeus, th e port of Athens . It included the 26th British General Hospital, the 189t h Field Ambulance and the 48th Field Hygiene Section . The Greek s courageously resisted the Italian forces and drove them back into Albania . In January Mr Winston Churchill decided that if the Germans als o attacked Greece, as they seemed likely to do in the spring, all other operations in the Middle East would have to be subordinated to giving support to the British Commonwealth 's only surviving European ally. Consequently, on 13th January 1941 General Wavell and Air Chief Marshal Longmore went to Athens to discuss what help could be given . Wavell could only offer comparatively few units, and Metaxas, on the grounds that such a force would be inadequate and would only provid e a pretext for a German attack, declined the proposal. However, on 18th January Metaxas asked Britain to begin disembarking such troop s as could be spared for Greece as soon as the German army entered Bulgaria. On this basis discussions were held between the British an d Greek staffs. It was agreed that Salonika could not be held, but that a defence line was practicable running from the coast along the Aliakmon River through Veria and north to Edessa and so to the border of Yugo- slavia. ANTI-MALARIAL PLAN S Thus, by the middle of January, though only a small force had bee n landed, planning of large-scale military operations in Greece was unde r way. A major problem that faced the medical staffs was the fact tha t large areas of Greece were malarious, and on 22nd January a medical appreciation of the danger of malaria in South-East Europe and Asi a Minor was drawn up for General Wavell by Colonels N . Hamilton Fairley and J. S. K. Boyd. These officers spoke with great authority, based on per- sonal experience and research and intimate knowledge of the conditions i n these areas . They pointed out that malaria was endemic through South - East Europe and Asia Minor, and in certain localities were hyper-endemic . Such localities were the plains of Macedonia and the basins of the Varda r (Axios) and Struma Rivers . In these valleys extremely heavy casualties GREECE 23 1 from malaria had been suffered by British troops in 1916-1918, an d conditions had since been made more dangerous by the immigration o f refugees from Asia Minor . Fairley and Boyd emphasised the risk o f using unseasoned troops in these areas, and pointed out that the Germans , who had intimate knowledge of this part of the world and of the researc h work of which it had been a post-war centre, might attempt to entic e an enemy there during a summer campaign in the Balkans . Drawing the moral from previous military operations in Macedonia, and in the light of recent knowledge, they felt sure that, while military operations in thes e regions would be safe from October to May, great risks existed during the remainder of the year . Wavell, while admitting the dangers of malaria , asked if the anti-malarial work carried out by the Greeks in these valleys would not lessen these risks, and thought the report was "typical of a very non-medical and non-military spirit". In a personal interview with him Fairley and Boyd stressed the risk of malarial casualties despite all tha t had been done, in view of the difficulties of carrying out anti-larval an d other measures in these areas, which were still highly malarious, and ha d an unparalleled incidence of blackwater fever. Wavell then withdrew any suggestion that their attitude was non-cooperative and promised assistanc e in carrying out measures that would mitigate the hazards of a malarial season. Meanwhile, on 29th January, General Metaxas had died, and the new Prime Minister, M. Koryzis, had renewed the Greek request that Britain should send help to Greece when the German force entere d Bulgaria. "LUSTRE" FORC E On 7th February Benghazi was captured, and assistance to Greec e became a more practical possibility. The British War Cabinet then directe d that no further advance should be made in Cyrenaica, which was to be hel d by a minimum force, thereby setting army and air forces free to hel p the Greeks to resist a German advance through Bulgaria . On 11th February plans were begun for sending "Lustre " Force to Greece. The Order of Battle included one armoured division and three infantr y divisions . The only troops available were part of the 2nd British Armoure d Division, the 2nd New Zealand Division, the 6th and 7th Australian Divisions and a Polish brigade . General Blamey was in military principl e opposed to the sending of Australian troops to Greece, but in yielding t o political necessity he insisted that his 6th Division should be sent first, a s it was equipped, trained and already experienced in action, whereas th e 7th Division was not fully equipped or trained at that time . Anxious to accelerate plans for building up a front against German y in the Balkans, the British War Cabinet sent the Foreign Minister, Mr Eden, and the Chief of the General Staff, General Dill, to the Middl e East to confer with General Wavell and the Greek leaders . Mr Eden succeeded in persuading the Greek Government to allow the British forc e of three divisions and two brigades to land as soon as possible . However, the delegation failed to reach agreement with General Papagos, the Greek commander, on a plan to withdraw the Greek forces in Eastern Macedonia 232 MIDDLE EAST AND FAR EAS T and Thrace behind the Aliakmon line, and consequently, early in March , when the German army began to advance into Bulgaria (and conse- quently there was no longer need to urge the Greeks to accept the Britis h contingent) four Greek divisions were deployed precariously east of th e Vardar. Papagos decided that he could safely withdraw only one divisio n from Thrace to join the British and the two Greek divisions that forme d his reserve on the Aliakmon line . The Australian and New Zealand Governments, whose divisions wer e to form three-quarters of the fighting part of the force, agreed that assistance to Greece must be given as freely and promptly as possible . On 3rd March mines were dropped in the Suez Canal from the air, cutting off the ships carrying motor transport from the troop-carrying ships sout h of the block. MEDICAL PREPARATION S On 5th March the first elements of "Lustre " Force sailed from Alexandria to Greece . At that date the plan was for the formations t o proceed in the order : 1st Armoured Brigade, the New Zealand Division , 6th Australian Division, Polish Independent Brigade Group, and 7t h Australian Division . The fulfilment of this programme was expected to occupy some two months . The British medical units in Lustre Forc e included the 26th General Hospital, part of the 189th Field Ambulance and the 48th Field Hygiene Section which had previously gone to Greec e with the original force, and to this were added the 24th Casualty Clearin g Station, the 4th and 168th Light Field Ambulances attached to th e armoured brigade, 7th Advanced Depot Medical Stores and part of a n ambulance car company . With the main contingent of the Australian forces, which included corps headquarters, 6th Australian Division an d some corps troops, were listed the 2/5th and 2/6th Australian Genera l Hospitals, of 1,200 and 600 beds respectively, the 2/3rd Casualty Clear- ing Station, the 2/1st, 2/2nd and 2/7th Field Ambulances, the 2/1st an d 2/3rd Field Hygiene Sections and part of the 2/1st Motor Ambulanc e Convoy. With the New Zealand Division were the 1st New Zealand Hospital and 4th, 5th and 6th Field Ambulances, the 4th Field Hygien e Section, and later the mobile dental unit . A convalescent depot for 2,00 0 men was to be sent as soon as possible, the headquarters of the unit t o be supplied by Australia, and the staff to be drawn from the Royal Army Medical Corps . Further planning included more medical units ; among these were the 2/7th and 2/9th Australian General Hospitals which were not as yet fully equipped, and an Australian Advanced Depot Medica l Stores and the 2/ 1st Australian Casualty Clearing Station . When these orders arrived the 2/5th General Hospital was settlin g into a site at Kafr Balu, near Rehovot in Palestine and was fully equipped. The 2/6th was not yet working as a unit, but its equipment was fairl y complete ; deficiencies of such items as autoclaves were made up b y drawing on the 2/1st Hospital at Gaza. The 2/1st, 2/2nd and 2/7th Field Ambulances had gained campaign experience in the desert an d their equipment was fairly complete . GREECE 23 3 It was agreed that Colonels Fairley and W .