University of Calgary PRISM: University of Calgary's Digital Repository Graduate Studies The Vault: Electronic Theses and Dissertations 2014-01-29 The Epistemic Significance of Values in Science Holter, Brandon Holter, B. (2014). The Epistemic Significance of Values in Science (Unpublished doctoral thesis). University of Calgary, Calgary, AB. doi:10.11575/PRISM/28132 http://hdl.handle.net/11023/1317 doctoral thesis University of Calgary graduate students retain copyright ownership and moral rights for their thesis. You may use this material in any way that is permitted by the Copyright Act or through licensing that has been assigned to the document. For uses that are not allowable under copyright legislation or licensing, you are required to seek permission. Downloaded from PRISM: https://prism.ucalgary.ca UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY The Epistemic Significance of Values in Science by Brandon Holter A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY CALGARY, ALBERTA JANURARY, 2014 © Brandon Holter 2014 Abstract The proper role of values in science has been a hotly debated topic for many decades now. The traditional view of epistemic justification holds that scientific objectivity requires suppression of value judgments; theories are only justified by an impartial analysis of the evidence (Haack 1998; Pinnick, Koertge, and Almedar 2003). Traditionalists worry that values bias scientists, leading them to believe what they would like to be true regardless of the evidence. Proponents of value-laden science argue that the justification of scientific theories cannot be isolated from moral and practical judgments (Kuhn 1962; Longino 2002a). The arguments they advance purport to show that values are not merely biases, values can play a positive role in justifying beliefs. Underdetermination arguments claim that evidence alone cannot determine theory choice (Laudan 1990; Longino 1979; Quine 1951).These arguments do not motivate an epistemic role for values in science, however, because values may influence scientists' theoretical beliefs without justifying those beliefs. As a result, philosophers have advanced a number of new arguments for the epistemic necessity of values judgments. This dissertation examines several of these arguments with an eye toward their deficiencies in order to develop an account of values in scientific reasoning that does not legitimate bias or delusion, as the traditionalists fear. Drawing on both old and new arguments, I argue that values help determine when a theory is sufficiently justified by the evidence (Douglas 2000; Kitcher 2011a; Rudner 1953). While evidence alone provides justifying reasons for belief, scientists must decide how much evidence is needed to justify scientific claims. Different scientific inquiries require different epistemic standards and, I argue, traditional value-free epistemologies cannot account for this variation. Philosophers cannot explain why scientists in different contexts adopt different epistemic standards without appealing to value judgments. On the view I adopt, the evidence justifies a claim when we have good reasons to believe we can act on that claim; a theory is sufficiently justified in the epistemic sense when it is sufficiently justified for practical purposes. Allowing values to guide these decisions, I argue, does not allow values to displace rigorous attention to the evidence. ii Table of Contents Abstract..........................................................................................................................................ii Table of Contents...........................................................................................................................iii Introduction...................................................................................................................................1 Chapter 1: Epistemic Holism and Relativism.......................................................................... 11 1.1 Three Problems for Holism.........................................................................................16 1.1.1 The Motivational Problem............................................................................16 1.1.2 Evidential Ignorance and Underdetermination.............................................19 1.1.3 Equal Legitimacy of Values..........................................................................25 1.2 Diversity and Equal Legitimacy...................................................................................29 1.2.1 Social Epistemology......................................................................................29 1.2.2 Longino's Social Epistemology.....................................................................35 1.2.3 From Subjective to Social Relativism: Equal Legitimacy Revisited............41 1.3 Conclusion...................................................................................................................45 Chapter 2: Introducing Goal-Oriented Epistemology.............................................................48 2.1 Kitcher's Epistemic Holism.........................................................................................54 2.1.1 Scientific Significance in Science, Truth, and Democracy..........................54 2.1.2 Kitcher's Goal-Oriented Epistemology.........................................................62 2.2 Goal-Oriented Epistemology and Relativism..............................................................69 2.2.1 Significance and Evidence............................................................................69 2.2.2 Relativism and Equal Legitimacy.................................................................76 2.2.3 Social Epistemology, Equal Legitimacy, and Evidence...............................83 iii 2.3 Conclusion..................................................................................................................92 Chapter 3: Motivating Goal-Oriented Epistemology...............................................................95 3.1 A Question of Sufficiency..........................................................................................102 3.2 The Variation of Epistemic Standards........................................................................108 3.3 Suspension of Belief...................................................................................................113 3.4 Strategic Acceptance and Epistemic Justification......................................................118 3.5 The Limited Availability of evidence.........................................................................127 3.6 Conclusion.................................................................................................................133 Chapter 4: Getting to Know Microbial Species......................................................................136 4.1 Identifying Microbial Species....................................................................................140 4.2 Microbial Species and Lateral Gene Transfer (LGT)................................................146 4.3 Explaining the Sufficiency of Genetic Evidence for Classification...........................154 4.4 Conclusion.................................................................................................................159 Chapter 5: Pluralism, Objectivity, and Values........................................................................162 5.1 Constructivism and Realism......................................................................................169 5.2 Ontological Pluralism and Values..............................................................................172 5.3 Mapping a Complex World: Theoretical Pluralism and Values.................................176 5.4 Carving Nature's Useful Joints: Epistemic Pluralism and Values..............................183 5.5 Conclusion.................................................................................................................191 Bibliography.................................................................................................................................205 iv Introduction It is relatively uncontroversial that values – our aspirations for ourselves, others, and the world in general – influence science. Almost nothing is entirely uncontroversial in philosophy but philosophers of science have generally come to accept that it is impossible to isolate science's systematic attempt to understand the world around us from moral and practical judgments. The history of brutal experimentation on captive victims of the Nazi regime, for example, teaches us the importance of moral values in thinking about what kind of scientific research is permissible. Research methodologies are also constrained by the limited availability of time, helpful collaborators, funding, and technology. Scientific practice, like any other practice with implications for others, must be informed by moral and practical considerations. Philosophers disagree, however, about the epistemic status of moral and practical judgments in science. Values, many argue, should be relegated to the practical sphere of reasoning about how to act and kept out of epistemic judgments about what to believe. On one side of the debate are what I will call 'epistemic holists', those who believe that values inform epistemic assessments of the justification of scientific claims1. Because