Policing Power Essays on Coercion, Corruption, and the State Jasper Cooper Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 2018 c 2018 Jasper Cooper All rights reserved ABSTRACT Policing Power Essays on Coercion, Corruption, and the State Jasper Cooper This dissertation is about how the state influences individuals’ behavior by giving certain citizens the legal and physical means to coerce other citizens. Using field experimentation, participatory observation, and time-series analysis of two large sets of micro-data on crime to study policing in West Africa and Melanesia, the findings challenge conventional wisdom about the relationship between coercion, corruption, and the state. Empowering women by sending police officers to assist them in disputes with men may not necessarily reduce gender-based coercion, because men can pre- serve their privileges by drawing on alternative authorities. Conferring police officers powers to coerce other people does not necessarily induce corrupt behavior, because conferral of power may cause them to care more about their reputation than the rents they can extract. Competitive elections may not reduce petty police corruption even if they make principals accountable; instead, elections may incentivize corruption by increasing agents’ uncertainty about how principals will act in the future. These findings contribute new insights to the theory of state-building, accountability, and bureaucratic politics. Contents List of Tables iii List of Figures vi Acknowledgments viii Introduction 1 1 How access to state justice might not provide protection 8 1.1 Theory .................................. 17 1.2 Research Design ............................. 35 1.3 Main Results ............................... 40 1.4 Alternative Mechanisms ......................... 62 1.5 Discussion ................................ 64 1.6 Conclusion ................................. 74 2 How access to coercive power might not induce corruption 75 2.1 Theory ................................... 79 2.2 Research Design ............................. 85 2.3 Main Results ............................... 95 2.4 Alternative Mechanisms ......................... 100 2.5 Discussion ................................ 109 2.6 Conclusion ................................. 112 i 3 How competitive elections might worsen corruption 113 3.1 Theory .................................. 118 3.2 Research Design .............................. 125 3.3 Main Results ............................... 134 3.4 Alternative Mechanisms ......................... 139 3.5 Discussion ................................ 144 3.6 Conclusion ................................. 148 Conclusion 149 Bibliography 152 A Appendices to Chapter 1 1 A.1 Supplementary Information ....................... 2 A.2 Identification and Robustness ...................... 12 A.3 Supplementary Analyses ......................... 21 A.4 A Theory of Dispute Resolution .................... 30 B Appendices to Chapter 2 40 B.1 Supplementary Information ....................... 41 B.2 Identification and Robustness ...................... 46 B.3 Supplementary Analyses ......................... 49 C Appendices to Chapter 3 53 C.1 Supplementary Information ....................... 54 C.2 Identification and Robustness ...................... 63 C.3 Supplementary Analyses ......................... 74 ii List of Tables 1.1 Police Presence Increases Reporting of Conflict with Men by Women .. 50 1.2 Predictions from Multinomial Model .................... 50 1.3 Null E↵ects on Violence and Property Crime ................ 57 1.4 Training and Literacy Among Male and Female Police .......... 64 2.1 Conceptual Definition of Corruption .................... 81 2.2 Being Hired as Police Officer Induces Prosociality ............. 97 2.3 Prosocial E↵ect of Power Conferral Stronger in Presence of Windfalls .. 99 2.4 Becoming Police Officer Increases Reputational Concerns ......... 102 2.5 No Evidence of Improved Livelihood from Recruitment into Police .... 105 2.6 Community Police and Not Regular Police Respond Prosocially to Windfalls108 2.7 Attitudes and Behavior of Community Police and Regular Police ..... 109 3.1 Presidential Elections Analyzed ....................... 128 3.2 Electoral Cycles in Extortion ........................ 135 3.3 Leader Turnover and Extortion ....................... 138 3.4 Evidence for Alternative Mechanisms .................... 141 3.5 Electoral Cycles in the Number of Checkpoints .............. 142 3.6 Non-Electoral Leader Turnover and Extortion ............... 144 A.1 No Evidence of Di↵erential Response Rates ................ 4 A.2 Random Assignment of Households to Policing ............... 8 A.3 Characteristics of CAP Candidates Compared to Community ...... 9 iii A.4 ICVS Data .................................. 11 A.5 Balance on Covariates among Household Respondents ........... 13 A.6 Power, Bias, Coverage, and RMSE of Experimental Design ........ 14 A.7 Regression Results Underlying Figure 1.2 .................. 22 A.8 Regression Results Underlying Figure 1.3 .................. 23 A.9 Regression Results Underlying Figure 1.4 .................. 24 A.10 Regression Results Underlying Figure 1.5 .................. 25 A.11 Regression Results Underlying Figure 1.8 .................. 25 A.12 Table A.10 Using a Generalized Di↵erence-in-Di↵erence Estimator .... 26 A.13 Long-Run E↵ects of Policing ......................... 27 A.14 Broader E↵ects of Policing .......................... 28 A.15 Normal Form Representation of First Stage ................ 30 A.16 Normal Form Representation of Second Stage ............... 31 A.17 Expected Payo↵s at Stage 1 Given Best Response in Stage 2 ....... 35 A.18 Payo↵s From Mutual Defection under Mixed Strategies .......... 38 B.1 Balance on Covariates among Candidates .................. 46 B.2 Main Results with Imbalanced Covariates ................. 47 B.3 Main Results from Two-by-Two with Imbalanced Covariates ....... 48 B.4 Models Behind Two-by-Two ......................... 50 B.5 Time-Series Analysis of Random Allocation Game ............. 51 B.6 Autoregression in Random Allocation Game ................ 52 B.7 Experimenter Demand E↵ects ........................ 52 C.1 Diagnosis of Standard Errors when Residualizing and Aggregating .... 62 C.2 Electoral Cycles in Extortion Using Simple Specification ......... 64 C.3 Leader Turnover and Extortion Using Simple Specification ........ 65 C.4 Electoral Cycles in Extortion Accounting for Lags ............. 66 iv C.5 Leader Turnover and Extortion Accounting for Lags ............ 67 C.6 Electoral Cycles in Extortion at the Month-Level ............. 68 C.7 Leader Turnover and Extortion at the Month-Level ............ 69 C.8 Electoral Cycles in Extortion Excluding Senegal .............. 70 C.9 Leader Turnover and Extortion Excluding Senegal ............. 71 C.10 Electoral Cycles in Extortion Using Alternative Residuals ......... 72 C.11 Leader Turnover and Extortion Using Alternative Residuals ....... 73 C.12 Country-Specific Electoral Cycles in Extortion ............... 75 v List of Figures 1.1 Bougainville and Papua New Guinea. .................... 26 1.2 Gender Divergence in the Experience of State Expansion ......... 43 1.3 Women Police Produce Larger Gender Divergence in the Experience of State Expansion ................................ 46 1.4 Police Presence Increases Men’s Preference for Chief’s Autonomy in Dis- pute Resolution ................................ 48 1.5 Observational Evidence Female Police Presence Increases Reporting ... 52 1.6 Per-Capita Crime Parallel in Treatment and Control ........... 54 1.7 Ruling Out Hypothesized Constant E↵ects on Crime Rate ........ 54 1.8 Policing More E↵ective in Matrilocal Communities ............ 60 1.9 Perceptions of Dispute Resolution Bias in Africa .............. 67 2.1 Recruitment Lottery Design ......................... 90 2.2 Example of Behavioral Game Data ..................... 94 3.1 Trade Highways in West Africa. ....................... 127 A.1 Random Assignment of Households to Policing ............... 7 A.2 Incidents Dealt with By CAP 2005-2009 .................. 10 A.3 Power of Experimental Design ........................ 14 A.4 Diagnosis of Multinomial Approach to Reporting Estimand ........ 17 A.5 Temporal Variation in Female Officer Presence ............... 20 A.6 Policing Reduces Support for Mob Vigilantism ............... 29 vi B.1 Example of Random Allocation Game in the Field ............. 41 B.2 Density of Evens Called by Treatment Status and Game ......... 42 B.3 Cumulative Density of Evens Called by Treatment Status and Game .. 43 B.4 Number of Evens Called by Treatment Status and Round ......... 44 B.5 Cumulative Density of Evens Called by Treatment Status and Round .. 45 B.6 Windfall E↵ects ................................ 49 C.1 Time-Series Aggregated to Week-level .................... 55 C.2 Time-Series Aggregated to Month-level ................... 56 C.3 Autocorrelation in Burkina Faso ....................... 57 C.4 Autocorrelation in Ghana .......................... 58 C.5 Autocorrelation in Mali ........................... 59 C.6 Autocorrelation in Senegal .......................... 60 C.7 Autocorrelation in Togo ........................... 61 vii Acknowledgments It took a village to write this dissertation. Well, actually, it took thirty-nine villages, and then several hamlets’ worth of supporters and believers. I have a small army of people to thank in Papua