THE POLITICS OF REFORM: HOW ELITE AND DOMESTIC PREFERENCES SHAPE MILITARY MANPOWER SYSTEMS A Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of Georgetown University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Government By Ryan Layman Boeka, M.A. Washington DC May 29, 2018 Copyright 2018 by Ryan L. Boeka All Rights Reserved ii THE POLITICS OF REFORM: HOW ELITE AND DOMESTIC PREFERENCES SHAPE MILITARY MANPOWER SYSTEMS Ryan Layman Boeka, M.A. Thesis Advisor: Elizabeth A. Stanley, Ph.D. ABSTRACT Why do states reform their military manpower policies? Changing military manpower systems (MMS) entails economic, social, and political costs that often prevent states from adopting reforms even when doing so would better serve the interests of the state. Nevertheless, fundamental changes to states’ military manpower policies such as the U.S. decision to replace its cadre/conscript system with an all-volunteer force in 1973 occur relatively frequently, challenging the idea of institutions as enduring, or “sticky,” entities that are difficult to transform or destroy. This dissertation examines the connecting logic in the relationship between domestic politics and changes in states’ military manpower policies. Previous studies have explored the links between MMS changes and factors such as demographics, socio- cultural and economic changes, and security considerations; however, they have not fully examined how, or under what conditions, these policy changes are likely to occur nor demonstrated that these factors influence states’ military manpower policies directly rather than through their effects on domestic political processes. This study improves upon existing literature by offering a theoretical model that connects changes in elite and domestic policy preferences with MMS changes and identifies the political pathways to MMS reform. While acknowledging the influence of security, economic, and socio- cultural factors in shaping the domestic political landscapes in which MMS changes iii occur, this research suggests that MMS reforms are best explained by changes in government leaders’ policy preferences or in the preferences of the members of their winning coalitions. Using process tracing and structured analysis guided by explicit research questions, I examine four MMS reforms in three states over various time periods in the post-World War II era: Argentina (1983-1995); Qatar (1971-2018), and Sweden (1994- 2018). Each of these cases strongly support the model’s predictions and suggest that changes in domestic political environments, rather than economic, demographic, or security considerations, best explain why MMS changes occur. As an important component of states’ security policies, understanding why and under what conditions states reform their military manpower systems helps inform our understanding of how states design and implement national security strategy and may provide insights to explain changes in domestic and foreign policy more broadly. iv Writing is largely a personal endeavor, but completing a dissertation requires tremendous support from others. I am somewhat hesitant to try to acknowledge those whose support made this project possible for I know that I will inevitably neglect to mention individuals who greatly impacted my research and writing. Nevertheless, I would be remiss if I did not attempt to identify and thank those whose support allowed me to complete this project. First, I wish to thank the members of my committee—David Edelstein, Tom McNaugher, Dan Hopkins, and especially my committee chair, Liz Stanley, who provided detailed feedback on every draft that I ever produced. This dissertation, at best, loosely resembles the project that I first proposed to my committee in 2014, and it would not exist in its current form without her guidance at every step along the way. I also want to thank Brigadier General Cindy Jebb, Colonel Suzanne Nielsen, Colonel Tania Chacho and my colleagues in the Department of Social Sciences at West Point and Georgetown. I am greatly indebted to Lukas Berg, Brandon Colas, Keith Hughes, and Jan Kallberg for helping me locate research materials and connecting me with interview subjects and to Jeff Bonheim, Adam Keller, Paul Tanghe, and Devlin Winkelstein for providing insightful comments on my draft chapters. Without feedback from Jeff and Devlin in the early stages of my writing, this project would never have gotten off the ground. But most of all, I wish to thank my wife, Pam, and son, Charlie, for their inspiration and incredible patience. In addition to editing every draft that I produced and helping me to compile and format the final dissertation, Pam encouraged me to finish when I felt that I could not and allowed me to spend countless guilt-free hours in the basement conducting research and composing drafts. She deserves far more acknowledgement than I could ever hope to convey here. And finally, I thank my mother, Debbie, who could not be here to see the completion of this project. My mom instilled in me a life-long love for learning and taught me to devote myself completely to every endeavor that I pursue. I know that she would burst with pride to read the pages that follow and that she would offer far more praise than this project deserves. I dedicate the research and writing of this dissertation in memory of her. Ryan L. Boeka v TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter 1: Introduction ........................................................................................................1 Chapter 2: Changing Preferences and Changing Military Manpower Policies: The Politics of Military Manpower Reform...........................................................................................32 Chapter 3: The Death of Conscript and an Institution: The End of Argentina’s Compulsory Military Service .............................................................................................78 Chapter 4: National Service in the Welfare State: Military Manpower Reform in Qatar.............................................................................................................................124 Chapter 5: An All-Volunteer Force for Sweden: Overturning 109 Years of Military Manpower Policy .............................................................................................................176 Chapter 6: Reinstating Conscription: The End of Sweden’s Brief Experiment with an All-Volunteer Force ............................................................................................230 Chapter 7: Conclusion......................................................................................................280 Appendix A: Qatar Interview Protocol ............................................................................301 Appendix B: Sweden Interview Protocol ........................................................................304 Bibliography ....................................................................................................................309 vi LIST OF FIGURES Figure 2.1 Pathways to MMS Reform ...............................................................................54 Figure 2.2 Empirical Predictions .......................................................................................61 Figure 3.1 Size of Las Fuerzas Armadas from 1983 to 1995 ............................................98 Figure 3.2 Size and Composition of Las Fuerzas Armadas .............................................118 Figure 3.3 Pathway to Argentina’s MMS Reform ...........................................................120 Figure 4.1 Map of Qatar and the Gulf States ...................................................................129 Figure 4.2 Doha’s Skyline in 2005, 2010, and 2012 .......................................................134 Figure 4.3 Arms Exports to Qatar ....................................................................................163 Figure 4.4 Pathway to Qatar’s MMS Reform ..................................................................171 Figure 5.1 Number of Swedes Conscripted by Year .......................................................184 Figure 5.2 Pathway to Sweden’s 2010 MMS Reform .....................................................226 Figure 6.1 Pathway to Sweden’s 2017 MMS Reform .....................................................277 Figure 7.1 Pathways to MMS Reform .............................................................................282 vii LIST OF TABLES Table 1.1 Types of Military Manpower Systems.............................................................................7 Table 3.1 Military Spending, 1983-1995 .......................................................................................97 Table 3.2 Support for Empirical Predictions ...............................................................................121 Table 4.1 Support for Empirical Predictions ...............................................................................172 Table 5.1 Military Spending and Personnel, 1990-2010 .............................................................183 Table 5.2 Public MMS Preferences, 2003-2009 ..........................................................................210 Table 5.3 Support for Empirical Predictions ...............................................................................228 Table 6.1 Public MMS Preferences, 2003-2017 ..........................................................................258 Table 6.2