The 21st Century Japanese Prime Minister: An Unusually Precarious Perch Benjamin Nyblade Abstract ThenatureandrapidityofturnoverofprimeministersinJapaninrecentyears(2006~2010)is nearly unprecedented both historically in Japan and in comparison to other developed parliamentarydemocracies. Thispapercontextualizestherecenthighdegreeofturnoverin thepostofprimeministerbothinhistoricalandcomparativeperspective. Thecentralargument ofthepaperisthattherecentrapidturnoverinthepostoftheprimeministerisaperverse consequenceoftheincreasedprominenceandinfluenceofthepostandthegreaterelectoral importanceofthepartylabelinatimeofgreatelectoralvolatilityandvoterdissatisfaction. Key words:JapanesePrimeMinister,CabinetSupport,ElectoralIncentives,PoliticalLeadership, Intra-PartyPolitics 1. Introduction ThenatureandrapidityofturnoverofprimeministersinJapaninrecentyears(2006~2010) is nearly unprecedented both historically in Japan and in comparison to other developed parliamentarydemocracies.WhileolderscholarshiponJapanesepoliticshasfocusedonthe collegialand/or‘bottom-up’natureofpartypoliticsandpolicymakinginJapan,thecurrent instabilityatthetopfollowsaseriesofreformsinthelate1990sthataimedatincreasingthe administrativecapacityandstrengtheningtheleadershiproleoftheprimeministerandcabinet inpolicymaking. Thispapercontextualizestherecenthighdegreeofturnoverinthepostofprimeminister bothinhistoricalandcomparativeperspective.Thecentralargumentofthepaperisthatthe recent rapid turnover in the post of the prime minister is a perverse consequence of the increasedprominenceandinfluenceofthepostandthegreaterelectoralimportanceofthe party label in a time of great electoral volatility and voter dissatisfaction. As a greater proportionofrank-and-fileDietMembersofthegoverningpartyaredependentontheprime minister’scoattailsandoverallvoterevaluationoftheparty’sperformanceforre-election,the incentivestoreplaceunpopularPMswithafreshface(andanewhoneymoonperiod)isstrong. Inatimeofstronglydividedgovernmentandweakeconomicperformanceleadersmayfindit particularlydifficulttomaintainthesupportofswingvotersandtheperchatthetopmaybe 195 SpecialIssue:Onstructuraldevelopments,Koizumireforms,andthecollapseofLDPrule particularlyprecarious. Theconsequencesofthesepoliticaldynamicsforpolicymakingaremostlynegative,and moresothantheywouldhavebeentwentyorthirtyyearsago.Withgreatercapacityforand greaterexpectationsoftop-downpoliticalleadership,thegreaterinstabilityatthetopmaylead politicalleaderstohaveshortertimehorizonsandthusagreaterfocusonmaintainingtheir pollingnumbersratherthanenactingreformsthatmayrequireinflictingshort-termpainfor long-termgain. 2. The 21st Century Japanese Prime Minister Through the 1970s and into the 1980s scholars of Japanese politics could reasonably characterizethepositionoftheJapanesePrimeMinisterinthe1955systemofLDPdominance asa‘missingleader’(e.g.Massey1976).TotheextentthatthecharacterizationoftheJapanese politicalsystemwasa‘pyramidwithoutapeak’(vanWolferen1989)wascriticized,itwas generallynotbecausescholarsfeltthattheprimeministerorcabinettrulyexercisedpowerat thetop.Traditionally,theJapaneseprimeminister’srolewastomanagefactionalbalancing andoverseeabottom-uppolicymakingprocess—totheextentthatprimeministerswereseen asleaders,theyweremostlyseenasengagingin‘reactiveleadership’(Hayao1993). In the 1990s, however, in the wake of scandal and popular dissatisfaction with lack of leadershipandreform,variouspoliticalreformswereimplementedthatscholars,punditsand thepublicexpectedtoincreasethecapacityforpoliticalleadership.Electoralreformforthe House of Representatives, enacted in 1994, involved abandoning the medium sized district systemwithasinglenon-transferablevote(SNTV),andamixedmembersysteminwhich60% ofMPswouldbeelectedfromsinglememberdistricts,and40%fromPR.Thereformwas expectedtoeliminateintra-partyelectoralcompetitionandincreasethedependenceofMPson thepartylabel.Asthehighlyfactionalizedanddecentralizednatureofpartypoliticswasa majorconstraintonexecutiveleadershipinJapan,somesuggestedthatremovingthisconstraint hadthepotentialtoincreaseexecutiveleadership. ThepartisanconstraintsontheprimeministerinJapanwerenottheonlymajorweak- nessesscholarsnoted.Theadministrativecapacityoftheprimeminister’sofficewasquite limitedandthelegalauthorityoftheprimeministertodirecttheexecutivewasunclearina rangeofareas.However,withadministrativereformsthatwereadoptedin1999andgradually implementedthrough2001,notonlywastheexplicitauthorityofthecabinetoffice(formerly thePMoffice)toinitiatelegislationandco-ordinateamongstbureaucraciesenhanced,butthe staffingoftheofficemorethantripled. WiththepoliticalreformscameincreasedexpectationsofpoliticalleadersinJapan.For manyvoters,enhancedexecutiveleadershipwaspersonifiedinthetenureofPrimeMinister Koizumi.Koizumitookofficein2001shortlyafteradministrativereformwasenacted,andlead 196 The21stCenturyJapanesePrimeMinister:AnUnusuallyPrecariousPerch thecountryandthegoverningLiberalDemocraticPartythroughatumultuousfiveandahalf years.Hebeganhistermimmenselypopular,andalthoughhispopularityebbedandflowed,he left his post ‘on top’, serving out the final year his term as LDP party leader following a dramaticsnapelectionvictoryin2005duringwhichheusedtheleveragethatelectoralvictory gainedhimtoenactmajorpostalreform(e.g.MacLachlan). OnSeptember26th,2006,AbeShinz.succeededKoizumiJunichirōasPrimeMinisterof Japan.Koizumiendedhistenurethethird-longestservingpostwarprimeminister,havinglead theLiberalDemocraticPartythrough.InmanywaysAbewasseenasthenaturalsuccessor toKoizumi.At52yearsold,hewastheyoungesttoachievethepositionofthePrimeMinister in nearly 70 years, and was widely seen as being telegenic and his initial popularity was unusuallyhighforaJapaneseprimeminister.1)However,hopesthatAbewouldbeasdurable andpopularaPrimeMinisterasKoizumiwerenotmet.Followingapoorperformanceinthe 2007HouseofCouncillorselectionandpollingnumbersthatreachedthelowtwentiesbythe endofthatsummer,AbeannouncedhisresignationinearlySeptember2007andwassucceeded oneyeartothedaybyFukudaYasuo.2) FukudaYasuo,thefirstJapanesePMwhosefatherwasalsoPM,beganhistermwith twentypercentagepointsmoresupportthanAbehadattheendofhisterm(althoughnotas muchasAbebeganwith),butFukuda’ssupportdissipatedevenmorerapidlythanAbe’sdid, andafternearlyfivemonthsofhispopularsupporthoveringaround20%,Fukudaannounced hisresignationinSeptember2008.FukudawassucceededbyAsōTarō,grandsonofformer PMYoshida,whosepollingnumbersprovedtobeevenlowerthanFukuda’s.AsōledtheLDP intothe2009HouseofRepresentativesandtothemostcrushingelectoraldefeatintheparty’s history. ThevictoryoftheDemocraticPartyofJapan(DPJ)inthe2009electionmarkedthefirst timeapartyotherthantheLDPwasthelargestintheHouseofRepresentativessincethe formationoftheLDPin1955.The2009electionresultsrepresentedanalmostperfectreversal oftheresultsofthe2005landslidevictoryfortheLDPunderKoizumi,withtheDPJgarnering morethan60%oftheseats.PartyleaderHatoyamaYukiobecamethefirstnon-LDPPMsince PrimeMinisterMurayamaTomiichi,facinggreatexpectationsandstrongpopularsupport, withmostpollsshowinghisinitialsupportratingasbeinginthelowsixties—anextraordinarily high number in the Japanese context. However, like his three immediate predecessors, Hatoyama’sinitialpopularityplummeted—itwascutinhalfinsixmonths,andfellbelow20% byMay2010.InearlyJune2010,withtheJuly2010HouseofCouncillorselectionlooming, 1）MostpollsshowedthattheinitialsupportforAbeinSeptember2006wasjustabove50%,markinghim asonlythefourthoftwentypostwarprimeministers(alongwithTanaka,HosokawaandKoizumi)to haveinitialsupportatthatlevelorhighersinceconsistentnewspaperpollingofthequestionbeganin 1960. 2）OntherelationshipbetweenUpperHouseelectoralperformance,popularityandprimeministerdurability, seeMasuyama2008. 197 SpecialIssue:Onstructuraldevelopments,Koizumireforms,andthecollapseofLDPrule Figure 1. Cabinet Support for Japanese Prime Ministers, Abe to Hatoyama Notes:DatafromJiJiPressMonthlyPollingSeptember2006toMay2010 Hatoyamaannouncedhisresignation,becomingthefourthconsecutiveJapaneseprimeminister toholdofficeforlessthanayear.Whiletheinitialsupportnumbersforhissuccessor,Kan Naoto,wereabove40%,thisreplacementdidnotsalvagetheDPJ’sperformanceintheJuly HouseofCouncillorselection,astheDPJgarneredonly44seats,(whereastheLDPgarnered 51),andtheDPJ’srulingcoalitionlostitsworkingmajorityintheupperhouse. Figure 1 shows the popularity dynamics for the four prime ministers from 2006-2010 acrosstheirtimeinofficeusingJijiPressdata.Theclearhoneymooneffectinprimeminister popularityfollowedbydramaticcollapseofpopularsupportinlessthanayearisstrikingand fairly consistent across PMs, although the level of initial support has varied. As discussed below,therecentvolatilityinthesupportforprimeministersandtherapidturnoverinthe postisunusualinacomparativecontextandcontrastssharplywiththeexperienceofthefirst fortyyearsofpostwarJapanesepolitics. 3. Comparative and Historical Perspective Incomparativeperspective,boththenatureandtherapidityofthechangesofJapanese PrimeMinisterisquiteunusual.Inthepostwarperiod,70%ofchangesinPMsindeveloped parliamentarydemocraciesaretiedtochangesinthepartycompositionofcabinet—lessthan one-thirdofchangesaresolelyintra-partymatters.Thereisnostretchoffourprimeministers eachlastingoneyearorlessinanestablishedparliamentarydemocracysincethelate1950s (Finland). PrimeMinisterialturnoveracrossdevelopedparliamentarydemocraciesisillustratedin Figure2.Countriesareorderedfromtoptobottombythedurabilityofthefivemostrecent primeministers.SeveralthingsstandoutfromevenaquickglanceatFigure2.First,while 198 The21stCenturyJapanesePrimeMinister:AnUnusuallyPrecariousPerch