Cruelty and Callousness in Virtue Ethics: Why the Virtuous Agent Acts Well Towards Animals By Michael Furac A Thesis presented to The University of Guelph In partial fulfillment of requirements For the degree of Master of Arts in Philosophy Guelph, Ontario, Canada © Michael Furac, April, 2019 ABSTRACT CRUELTY AND CALLOUSNESS IN VIRTUE ETHICS: WHY THE VIRTUOUS AGENT ACTS WELL TOWARDS ANIMALS Michael Furac Advisor: University of Guelph, 2019 John Hacker-Wright The purpose of this thesis is to answer the question: “Do the virtues prevent the virtuous agent from acting badly towards animals?” I conclude that an agent who is truly virtuous will not act viciously towards animals due to the agent’s virtue. In chapter one I show that a neo-Aristotelian virtue ethic does not have any aspect internal to the theory that would prevent care or concern for animals. In chapter two I defend the theory from outside critiques, each of which challenges the viability of virtue ethics as an approach to animal ethics. Finally, chapter three is a study of two vices: cruelty and callousness. I define both vices and show why each is necessary for discussing virtue and animal ethics. iii DEDICATION For: MCY MSY PF MY iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I could not have produced this work without the great care and patience of my advisory committee, Dr. John Hacker-Wight and Dr. Karen Houle. Their help was indispensable to me as I slowly came to realize the scope and content of this project. I owe them great thanks. I would also like to thank my friends and family for the support they provided me throughout my time working on this project. To my mother, Mary-Catherine, and my aunt Mary-Susan, who always supported me with an unwavering sureness in my abilities and a comforting ear. v TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract ii Dedication iii Acknowledgements iv Table of Contents v List of Abbreviations vii Chapter 1 1 1. Eudaimonism 1 1.1 Defining eudaimonism 1 1.2 How happiness is the end of human action 4 1.3 Objective structure- major goods and naturalism 6 1.2 The structure of a moral virtue 9 1.2.1 The mean and its object 10 1.2.2 Desire 13 1.2.3 The will - rational choice and voluntary action 17 1.2.4 Choice 19 1.3 Cardinal Virtues 21 1.3.1 Temperance 22 1.3.2 Courage 24 1.3.3 Justice 27 1.3.4 Practical wisdom 29 1.4 The self and other: why virtue is concerned with other people 32 1.5 Why virtue does not exclude concern with animals 39 Chapter 2 42 2.1) Intrinsic vs instrumental value 43 2.2) Moral status debate 49 2.3) Egoism 56 2.4) Anthropocentrism 62 Chapter 3 68 3.1. Cruelty 68 3.1.1 - Aquinas on cruelty 69 vi 3.1.2 - Hursthouse on a cruel character 71 3.1.3 - The need for the vice of callousness in virtue terminology 75 3.2. Callousness 77 3.2.1 - Defining callousness 77 3.2.2 - Callousness’ relationship to practical reason 79 3.3. Why the vices are bad on an excellence account 82 3.4. Why the vices are bad on a welfarist account 83 Conclusion 88 Bibliography 92 vii LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS NE - Nicomachean Ethics ST - Summa Theologica CHAPTER 1 Intro: The goal of this section is to clearly explicate the concept of neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics in order to argue that there is no aspect internal to the structure of the theory that would preclude its application to animal ethics, broadly construed. I go about this proof by looking at the works of modern virtue theorists who generally fit into the category of “neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics.” While there are unique, and contradicting sentiments within the specific works of these theorists, they do share many, key concepts amongst their writings, which puts them in agreement with one another in relation to the components that I will herein discuss. Differences and arguments that arise between these theorists tend to be at a level of specificity that I will not reach in this section, and which does not change the general claims that I will be dealing with. The topic of virtue’s relation to animals is under represented in this survey, because there is very little writing that exists today towards this end. I hope to begin laying a framework that can bridge this gap. I will first discuss a fundamental quality of neo-Aristotelian virtues, eudaimonism, before moving on to a description of a virtue, how it relates to certain human powers and what it is, and then discussing the four cardinal virtues’ logical structure in order to show how they do not deny animals as the proper objects of their concern. Further, I aim to show how the virtuous person operates; what they are concerned with, and which “parts” of their reasoning and humanity constitute their virtue. The framework of a virtue and the actions of a virtuous person, which is to say the actual being virtuous, are both necessary to see how it is one goes wrong when they act cruelly or callously towards animals, and why a virtuous agent would avoid such actions (ch. 3). 1. Eudaimonism 1.1 Defining eudaimonism The account I aim to provide of virtues’ concern with animals fits into the eudaimonistic account of virtue favoured by neo-Aristotelian theorists. I now explicate eudaimonia, showing its importance to an account of the virtues, before providing justification for the meaningfulness of our concern for animals in the eudaimonistic life. Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, the basis for the neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics tradition, considers the study of ethics to be the study of final ends of human action, and the states of character that are necessary and sufficient to attain those final ends. The final end is happiness. So to say, the reason for all human action is to be happy. The study of ethics is thus a study of how to live so that we can be happy. Aristotle is like his ancient contemporaries in his belief that, 1 “ethical theory is designed to enable us to reflect on this implicit overall goal and to make it determinate,” but though there is agreement in this general structure, “this is trivial, for substantial disagreement remains as to what happiness consists in.”1 The very purpose of ethical theorizing is different for the ancients than it has been in modern times. Recognizing the importance of this difference is integral to recognizing the role of concern for animals in the virtuous life. To begin with, it is important to properly understand the meaning of the term ‘eudaimonia. The Greek word “eudaimonia” has been translated into modern English as “happiness.” This term can be ambiguous. For example, the subjectivist argues that happiness is related to an individual life and how that person wants to live.2 In this sense the idea of happiness has no regulatory role in guiding action or in considering the kinds of constraints on action that moral philosophy theorizes about; or, at least, the sense in which happiness does have a regulatory role does not match with the sense of moral philosophizing. If someone is made happy by stealing and lying then the subjective view that Cahn advocates is comfortable saying that they are genuinely happy, although they may be acting immorally. Because happiness can be ambiguous, it is reasonable to translate eudaimonia as “flourishing” rather than “happiness” in order to indicate the sense in which the ancients used the term. The term flourishing points to an objective standard. Someone can be mistaken about whether or not they are genuinely flourishing, because their sense of value is out of sync with reality in some way. I adopt this terminological norm, and below I employ the terms happiness, flourishing, and eudaimonia interchangeably, as textual reference and grammar demand each of their uses at various points. The role of eudaimonia in the Aristotelian text is as a unifying principle for which, or end towards which, all of our acts aim. The role of moral philosophy in this view is to better understand how we may flourish. One may flourish without the practice of moral philosophy, simply by acting well for the right reasons, but the practice of moral philosophy is a work to discover the kinds of reasons we ought to act for i.e. when we begin this study knowing that we are aiming at the science of human flourishing, we will have a better understanding of how we should act to achieve this end. The role of moral philosophy in the human life is not one of absolute law, but rather one of “things that are good and rules that hold for the most part (NE 1094b15-27)3. Moral matters are always practical matters, dealing with action and specific acts, but they cannot be held under some ultimate law that says to always do this particular kind of action (e.g. always wash your hands); rather, our actions can at best be guided in a more general “do this category of action” (e.g. be sanitary), where a variety of acts can fill in the category, the specificity of which will be determined by context and circumstance. By unifying all acts under one principle, though, Aristotle, and his modern followers, are producing a system of moral 1 Annas, Julia. The Morality of Happiness: .New York: Oxford University Press, 1995. p. 12 2 Cahn, Steven M., and Christine Vitrano. Happiness and Goodness: Philosophical Reflections on Living Well.