The Pennsylvania State University The Graduate School College of the Liberal Arts “THE PARTY OF HUMANKIND”: SOCIALITY AND MORAL REVISION IN DAVID HUME A Dissertation in Philosophy by Ryan Pollock © Ryan Pollock Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy May 2015 The dissertation of Ryan Pollock was reviewed and approved* by the following: Emily Grosholz Liberal Arts Research Professor of Philosophy, African American Studies & English Dissertation Advisor Chair of the Committee John Christman Professor of Philosophy, Political Science, and Women's Studies Philosophy Interim Head Chris Long Professor of Philosophy and Classics Associate Dean for Graduate and Undergraduate Education, College of the Liberal Arts Jonathan H. Marks Associate Professor of Bioethics, Humanities and Law Affiliate Law Faculty *Signatures on file in the Graduate School ii ABSTRACT David Hume is one of the classic proponents of moral sentimentalism. According to this school of thought, our understanding of virtue and vice springs primarily from our capacity for feeling as opposed to reason. A standard worry about Hume’s account is that it produces an overly conservative theory of morality which blindly supports the status quo. This is because, for Hume, what makes some trait a virtue (or vice) is simply that it commonly garners sentiments of approval (or disapproval). If this is the case, then even traits that are only disapproved of due to prejudice, intolerance, and misunderstanding, must be counted as genuine vices. For example, if homosexuality produces widespread discomfort or distaste in society, then homosexuality must be seen as a vice. Thus, it seems that Hume’s moral theory, instead of providing a method for critiquing and revising prevailing discriminatory attitudes, would actually lend support to them. My dissertation argues, however, that Hume’s distinctive understanding of sentimentalism provides a more robust method for revising existing moral views than the above sketch would suggest. Hume is not just concerned with providing a theoretically accurate explanation of how human beings distinguish virtue from vice. He also hopes that his work will strengthen our commitment to being a virtuous person by showing that our moral sentiments arise from the aspects of our nature we are most proud of. If we are in doubt about whether or not developing a praiseworthy moral character is worth the effort, Hume thinks we can renew our dedication by reflecting on the origin of our moral sentiments. Such reflection should reveal that our moral sentiments are the product, not of self-interest or the social conditioning of an oppressive political regime (for instance), but of what is best about human nature. Most important for the present purpose are those cases where we find our approval of some trait does not have an agreeable foundation. Although Hume suggests in some places that we will not find iii anything negative lurking in the psychological foundation of our moral sentiments, at important points he expresses an ambivalent or even disapproving attitude about traits that are commonly praised. If our commitment to virtue depends upon seeing that our moral sentiments arise from an agreeable origin, then finding that our appraisal of some trait lacked that foundation should give us a reason to revise our feelings. Pursuing this line of thought first requires getting clear on why Hume believes we will be pleased with the origin of our moral sense. I argue that, for Hume, the reason our moral sentiments garner such approval is that they represent the social nature of human beings. This can be seen in Hume’s explanation of what motivates us to make moral judgments. Hume notes that the sentiments particular to morality are only felt when we adopt a general point of view that allows us to recognize even the virtue qualities of our enemies. From this vantage point we set aside considerations of self-interest, and other aspects of our personal perspective that would render our moral evaluations idiosyncratic, and survey others in an impartial manner. One puzzling question regarding the general point of view is what motivates us to look at our peers in this specific sort of way. Hume is clear that, in general, we adopt this general perspective because it allows our sentiments to agree with the feelings of others. Yet this still leaves open the question of why agreement is sought in the first place. It is common to point out that Hume thinks we seek agreement because disagreement is inconvenient and uncomfortable. I contend, by contrast, that the inherent desirability of agreement is even more fundamental. By setting aside the particularity of our personal vantage point, we are able to preserve our identity as the species which is united by a common set of moral sentiments. This identity, which Hume states that we “cherish,” forms what he terms the “party of humankind.” iv Thus, from the outset the process of feeling moral sentiments is imbued with our desire to unite with our fellow human beings. Given that we find it most satisfying to consider the social aspects of our nature, Hume believes we will be pleased with the origin of our moral sentiments. Thus, we should have a reason to modify our approval of some trait when we find that approval does not represent human sociality. I support attributing this claim to Hume by looking at a specific instance where he is uneasy about the fact that some trait garners widespread approval: our approval of military heroism. He notes that our propensity to be awestruck, or “dazzled,” by those who appear greater than common humanity makes us approve of military glory even though this trait has caused a great deal of destruction and harm. Since this quality meets general approval, Hume must classify it as a virtue. However, he is uneasy about doing so and does not seem content to allow our unreflective appraisal of this trait to stand. Particularly in his later work, Hume seeks to reform our sentiments by painting a less appealing picture of military glory that emphasizes to his readers its more ruthless and inhumane aspects. Significantly, Hume does not do something similar to counteract our tendency to praise those whose excessive benevolence ultimately leads to harm. He points out that their selfless display of concern for others is so engaging that we cannot help but praise it. In each case, then, a trait garners general approval despite the fact that it causes harm. Yet, it is only in the case of our approval of the military hero, where our sentiments lack a foundation in human sociability, that Hume attempts to reform our sentiments. Having shown that Hume aims to modify moral approvals that do not arise from the social tendencies of human nature, I turn to considering how this account could be applied to Hume’s theory of justice. A number of commentators have criticized Hume’s account of justice for excluding the weakest members of society. For Hume, justice is comprised of a set of v property-regulating artificial conventions that are established in order to quell societal conflict. This implies (as Hume states in one important passage) that there would be no reason to include those who are too weak to pose a threat to the stability of society in these conventions. Consequently, it seems that small children, the elderly, those with disabilities, and distant future generations would all not deserve to be treated justly. Hume does point out that even those who lack coercive power have the ability to destabilize society by expressing resentment. Yet, this is problematic because genuine resentment must be expressed toward some wrongdoing. Hume is clear that moral disapproval of injustice only occurs when people fail to follow the relevant rules and he never discusses moral evaluation of the structures of justice themselves. This is a strictly prudential question about how to stabilize society. Thus, if including some powerless group is not necessary to preserve society, then it does not seem Hume’s theory would see their resentment as legitimate. I argue that the account outlined here can provide Hume with a response. Hume displays some ambivalence about the virtue of justice, in one place calling it a “cautious, jealous virtue.” This is because when we delve into the origin of justice we see it is essentially a remedy for the divisive effects of our tendency to partiality and selfishness. The powerless’ resentment, then, brings to our attention what is also revealed by delving into the origin of our moral sentiments: justice is largely representative of the unsociable aspects of our nature. Consequently, we have a reason to make the conventions of justice more inclusive and less representative of human egoism. If these arguments are correct, then we are forced to reconsider the nature of Hume’s conservatism. I engage this question by considering Hume’s theory alongside another form of sentimentalism: Leon Kass’ conservative appeal to the “wisdom of repugnance.” Kass uses this idea to justify the moral wrongness of a variety of emerging biotechnologies (such as human vi cloning) based upon the immediate disgust that “we” supposedly feel toward them. I argue that Hume would see Kass’ particular form of sentimentalism, where our immediate feelings can be seen as arising from the teleological structure of the universe, as a form of philosophical enthusiasm. Philosophical enthusiasm, like religious enthusiasm, is driven by the tendency to focus upon one’s own particular sentiments and, consequently, is not a product of the social aspects of human nature. The conservative element of Hume’s thought, which encourage us to be wary of the intrusion of speculative metaphysics into morality and politics, do not necessarily require support for the status quo.