Psychological Review 1967, Vol. 74, No. 3, 183-200 SELF-PERCEPTION: AN ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATION OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE PHENOMENA1 DARYL J. BEM Carnegie Institute of Technology A theory of self-perception is proposed to provide an alternative in- terpretation for several of the major phenomena embraced by Fest- inger's theory of cognitive dissonance and to explicate some of the secondary patterns of data that have appeared in dissonance experi- ments. It is suggested that the attitude statements which comprise the major dependent variables in dissonance experiments may be regarded as interpersonal judgments in which the observer and the observed happen to be the same individual and that it is unnecessary to postu- late an aversive motivational drive toward consistency to account for the attitude change phenomena observed. Supporting experiments are presented, and metatheoretical contrasts between the "radical" be- havioral approach utilized and the phenomenological approach typi- fied by dissonance theory are discussed. If a person holds two cognitions that ducted within the framework of dis- are inconsistent with one another, he sonance theory; and, in the 5 years will experience the pressure of an since the appearance of their book, aversive motivational state called cog- every major social-psychological jour- nitive dissonance, a pressure which he nal has averaged at least one article will seek to remove, among other ways, per issue probing some prediction "de- by altering one of the two "dissonant" rived" from the basic propositions of cognitions. This proposition is the dissonance theory. In popularity, even heart of Festinger's (1957) theory of the empirical law of effect now appears cognitive dissonance, a theory which to be running a poor second. has received more widespread attention The theory has also had its critics. from personality and social psycholo- Reservations about various aspects of gists in the past 10 years than any other the theory have ranged from mild contemporary statement about human (e.g., Asch, 1958; Bruner, 1957; Kelly, behavior. Only 5 years after its in- 1962; Osgood, 1960; Zajonc, 1960) to troduction, Brehm and Cohen (1962) severe (Chapanis & Chapanis, 1964), could review over 50 studies con- and alternative interpretations have been offered to account for the results research was supported in part by of particular studies (e.g., Chapanis & Ford Foundation Grant 1400SS to Carnegie Chapanis, 1964; Janis & Gilmore, 1965 ; Institute of Technology and in part by the Center for Research on Language and Lan- Lott, 1963; Rosenberg, 1965). No guage Behavior, University of Michigan, theoretical alternative to dissonance with funds from the Bureau of Higher Edu- theory has been proposed, however, cation Research, United States Office of Edu- which attempts both to embrace its cation. The author is grateful to George major phenomena and to account for R. Madaras and Kenneth M. Peterson for aid in conducting the research and to Sandra some of the secondary patterns of re- L. Bern for critical comments on the manu- sults which have appeared in the sup- script. porting experiments but which were 183 184 DARYL J. BEM not predicted by the theory. This ar- ies is, with very few exceptions, a sub- ticle proposes such an alternative. ject's (S's) self-descriptive statement Like many theories in psychology, of an attitude or belief. Indeed, this the theory of cognitive dissonance at- is the dependent variable in nearly all tempts to account for observed func- of contemporary social psychology. tional relations between current stim- But how are such self-descriptive be- uli and responses by postulating some haviors acquired ? What are their con- hypothetical process within the organ- trolling variables? It is to these ques- ism, in this case, an inferred process of tions that the analysis turns first. the arousal and reduction of disso- nance. Like many other contemporary SELF-PERCEPTION : A SPECIAL CASE personality and social psychological OF INTERPERSONAL PERCEPTION theories, dissonance theory is further characterized by an emphasis on the Self-perception, an individual's abil- individual's current phenomenology; ity to respond differentially to his own the explanatory account in the theory behavior and its controlling variables, itself is ahistorical. is a product of social interaction In contrast, the alternative formu- (Mead, 1934; Ryle, 1949; Skinner, lation to be presented here eschews any 1957). Verbal statements that are reference to hypothetical internal pro- self-descriptive are among the most cesses and seeks, rather, to account for common responses comprising self-per- observed functional relations between ception, and the techniques employed current stimuli and responses in terms by the community to teach its members of the individual's past training history. to make such statements would not Such an approach has been called "rad- seem to differ fundamentally from the ical" behaviorism (see Scriven, 1956), methods used to teach interpersonal a position most often associated with perception in general. The community, the name of B. F. Skinner. In ana- however, does face severe limitations lyzing a complex behavioral phenome- in training the individual to make non, the radical behaviorist attempts to statements describing internal events establish it as a special case of some to which only he has direct access. previously substantiated functional re- Skinner (1953, 1957) has analyzed lation discovered in the experimental the limited resources available to the analysis of simpler behaviors. His community for training its members functional analysis is thus based on em- thus to "know themselves," and he has pirical generalization and, accordingly, described the inescapable inadequacies is frankly inductive not only in its ex- of the resulting knowledge. perimental execution, but in its formal Skinner suggests that some self-de- presentation. scriptions of internal stimuli can be A functional analysis characteristi- learned through metaphor or stimulus cally begins by inquiring into the onto- generalization. The child, for example, genetic origins of the observed depend- can easily learn to describe "butterflies ent variable and attempts to ascertain in the stomach" without explicit dis- the controlling or independent vari- crimination training. More often, how- ables of which that behavior is a func- ever, a socializing community must tion. The present analysis of disso- teach the descriptive responses more nance phenomena proceeds in the same directly. In training a child to de- way by noting first that the dependent scribe pain, for example, the com- variable in cognitive dissonance stud- munity, at some point, must teach him SELF-PERCEPTION 185 the correct response at the critical time extensive cross-cultural generality as when the appropriate private stimuli well (Osgood et al., 1957). These are impinging upon him. But the findings, too, are consistent with the community itself must necessarily view that an individual is unable to identify the "critical time" on the basis make more than a small number of in- of observable stimuli or responses and dependent discriminations among stim- implicitly assume that the private stim- uli that have never been publicly avail- uli are, in fact, accompanying these able to a socializing community, and it public events. is suggested that the many subtle dis- This analysis suggests that many of criminations which individuals do make the self-descriptive statements that ap- when describing their attitudes are pear to be exclusively under the dis- based, rather, on the kinds of cues that criminative control of private stimuli are potentially available to an outside may, in fact, still be partially controlled observer. In particular, it is sug- by the same accompanying public gested that self-descriptive attitude events used by the training community statements can be based on the indi- to infer the individual's inner states. vidual's observations of his own overt Private stimuli may play a smaller role behavior and the external stimulus con- than the individual himself suspects. ditions under which it occurs. A num- For example, by manipulating the ex- ber of recent experimental studies ternal cues of the situation, Schachter provide support for this proposition. and Singer (1962) were able to evoke Several studies have shown that an self-descriptions of emotional states as individual's belief and attitude state- disparate as euphoria and anger from ments can be manipulated by inducing 5s in whom operationally identical him to role-play, deliver a persuasive states of physiological arousal had been communication, or engage in any be- induced. It appears that these 5s util- havior that would characteristically ized internal stimuli only to make the imply his endorsement of a particular gross discrimination that they were set of beliefs (Brehm & Cohen, 1962; emotional, but that the more subtle King & Janis, 1956; Scott, 1957, discrimination of which emotion they 1959). A recent experimental analysis were experiencing was under the con- of these phenomena of "self-persuasion" trol of external cues. demonstrates that an individual bases A similar division of control be- his subsequent beliefs and attitudes on tween internal and external stimuli ap- such self-observed behaviors to the pears to operate in the domain of atti- extent that these behaviors are emitted tude statements. Osgood, Suci, and under circumstances that have in the Tannenbaum (1957) theorize