HYPOTHESIS AND THEORY ARTICLE published: 12 September 2014 doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00986 The body social: an enactive approach to the self Miriam Kyselo* Department of Logic and Philosophy of Science, University of the Basque Country, Donostia-San Sebastián, Spain Edited by: This paper takes a new look at an old question: what is the human self? It offers a proposal Eddy J. Davelaar, Birkbeck College, for theorizing the self from an enactive perspective as an autonomous system that is UK constituted through interpersonal relations. It addresses a prevalent issue in the philosophy Reviewed by: Colwyn Trevarthen, The University of of cognitive science: the body-social problem. Embodied and social approaches to cognitive Edinburgh, UK identity are in mutual tension. On the one hand, embodied cognitive science risks a new Julian Kiverstein, University of form of methodological individualism, implying a dichotomy not between the outside world Amsterdam, Netherlands of objects and the brain-bound individual but rather between body-bound individuals and *Correspondence: the outside social world. On the other hand, approaches that emphasize the constitutive Miriam Kyselo, Department of Logic and Philosophy of Science, University relevance of social interaction processes for cognitive identity run the risk of losing the of the Basque Country, Avenida De individual in the interaction dynamics and of downplaying the role of embodiment. This Tolosa 70, 20018 Donostia-San paper adopts a middle way and outlines an enactive approach to individuation that is Sebastián, Spain neither individualistic nor disembodied but integrates both approaches. Elaborating on e-mail: [email protected] Jonas’ notion of needful freedom it outlines an enactive proposal to understanding the self as co-generated in interactions and relations with others. I argue that the human self is a social existence that is organized in terms of a back and forth between social distinction and participation processes. On this view, the body, rather than being identical with the social self, becomes its mediator. Keywords: enactive self, social self, embodied self, body-social problem, distinction and participation INTRODUCTION experiential, affective, intersubjective, psychological/cognitive, nar- Models and conceptions of the self are diverse. It is considered a rative, extended, and situated.AccordingtoGallagher,adoptinga substance or a thing, a concept, a narrative, a system, a process pattern view of self helps understanding different aspects of the or a function; some even argue that there is no such thing as self non-reductively “as compatible or commensurable instead of the self (Hume, 1739; James, 1890; Dennett, 1992; Hayward, 1998; thinking them in opposition.” He illustrates this for a particu- Tani,1998; Perlis, 1999; Strawson, 1999; Dainton, 2004; Metzinger, lar conceptual tension in cognitive science, namely the question 2004; Zahavi, 2008). This list is not exhaustive but it makes a point: whether self-hood is best explained in terms of cortical midline there is no unifying concept of the self. structures, a particular brain region (Northoff and Bermpohl, The lack of a coherent concept of self is not merely a philosoph- 2004)orwhetherthenecessaryconditionofself-hoodisnotrather ical armchair problem but remains an issue of general theoretical, that all experiences acquire a first-person perspective (Légrand and as well as practical, concern. Here lies the main motivation for Ruby, 2009). On Gallagher’s pattern approach, resolving this con- the present paper: to propose avenues for a philosophy of self that ceptual tension is now pretty simple: do not reside with either eventually aids in facilitating dialog and research on the self across of the positions but allow for the 1st person perspective or par- the disciplines in cognitive science. ticular neuronal activation patterns to each count as one “among One desideratum for a cross-disciplinary approach to the self is other aspects” (Gallagher, 2013)ofanorganizedpatternofself– that it acknowledges the diversity of phenomena associated with which in the present case, is a pattern defined in terms of minimal self and does not make an essentialist claim according to which embodied and experiential aspects. the self is, for example, either neurological or phenomenal while IagreewithGallagher’spledgeforpluralism,butIalsothink other aspects are seen as irrelevant or added on. Shaun Gallagher that his radical openness might prove somewhat too laissez-faire: has recently warned against such reductionism of understanding what makes any of the listed features part of a (meta-)theory of the self as essentially this or that“and nothing more.”Alternatively, self and what is it that makes a pattern of self acquire its particu- Gallagher proposes a pluralistic, so-called “pattern theory of self:” lar organization? Once the diversity of self related phenomena is [W]hat we call a “self” is a cluster concept which includes a sufficient acknowledged, we also need to understand how the elements of a number of characteristic features. Taken together, a certain pattern of collection of relevant self features interrelate. characteristic features constitute an individual self. (...)Iproposethat Apatternapproachtotheselfacknowledgesdiversitybutlacks we think of these aspects as organized in certain patterns, and that a integration, offering no account of the individual as explanatory particular variation of such a patternconstituteswhatwecallaself. whole. This poses more than a philosophical armchair problem (Gallagher, 2013, p. 2) because what researchers in cognitive science believe the self to Examples of aspects that could serve as constituents of be impacts very practically the way they conduct research, from aself-constitutivepatternareminimal embodied, minimal the choice of methodology in setting up experiments and forming www.frontiersin.org September 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 986 | 1 Kyselo An enactive approach to the self hypothesizes, to the interpretation of results. It affects how a medi- into which these newly embodied, yet essentially isolated selves cal doctor assesses a person’s state of consciousness and well-being parachute1. or how a psychologist conceives of pathologies of the self and thus The following elaborations of the enactive concept of auton- whether she choses to treat with pharmaceuticals, body therapy or omy are thus at the same time concerned with what I call (in social and dialogical intervention. reminiscence of the body-mind problem or as a successor to the Understanding the self should therefore not consist only in body-body problem) the body-social problem, i.e., the question composing lists of aspects according to standards of a given con- for philosophy of cognitive science about how bodily and social textual convenience; we still need a notion of the self as a whole, aspects figure in the individuation of the human individual self as something that can count as a distinguishable unit of explanation a whole (Kyselo and Di Paolo, 2013)2. and eventually help to interrelatedifferentaspectsoftheself.As The strategy for this paper is as follows: I begin by laying Olson had argued almost two decades ago: out the body-social problem. This is followed by an introduc- Simply extending the list will only make matters worse. What we need tion to the enactive approach to cognition, focusing particularly is not just an account of self that would command wider assent than on the notion of autonomy. In the next section I show that a any of these, but one that would synthesize them and show them all to version of the body-social problem also applies to recent work reflect a part of some larger, common idea (Olson, 1998, p. 651). in enactive approaches to social cognition, in particular to par- What I suggest in this paper is that such a larger, common idea ticipatory sense-making. Coming back to the logic of some early exists and that we do not have to chose between either a pluralistic enactive philosophy by Hans Jonas, I then elaborate the notion of and laissez-faire or an essentialist and reductive approach to the autonomy in terms of sociality and outline an enactive approach self. A middle way, that acknowledges diversity, while also offering to the self that acknowledges diversity without being essentialist an integrative perspective on the self as a whole could be found and reductive. Support for this proposal is provided consider- in considering the self from the perspective of enactive cognitive ing empirical evidence from research on social pain, quality of life science. reports in global paralysis, as well as some examples from everyday The enactive approach holds that biological and mental phe- life. nomena are continuous, which means that it characterizes the identity of cognitive beings by similar principles and concepts as THE BODY-SOCIAL PROBLEM IN COGNITIVE SCIENCE the identity of living beings (Clark, 2001; Thompson and Varela, There is a conceptual problem arising for recent philosophy of 2001; Di Paolo et al., 2010). It proposes the biologically based cognitive science. It has to do with two important advances in the concept of autonomy to capture cognitive identity in terms of development of cognitive science and how they relate to the human self-generated, self-determined precarious networks (Thompson, self- firstly, the realization that cognition is not brain-bound, but 2007; Di Paolo et al., 2010). The concept of autonomy has a fruitful embodied (the “embodied turn”) and secondly,