View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Crossref SOCIOLOGY Vol. 32 No. 3 August 1998 509–522 CONCEPTUALISING CONSTRAINT: MOUZELIS, ARCHER AND THE CONCEPT OF SOCIAL STRUCTURE KIERAN HEALY Abstract This paper outlines and evaluates recent contributions by Nicos Mouzelis and Margaret Archer to the structure–agency debate. Mouzelis offers an internal reconstruction of Giddens’s structuration theory; Archer an external alternative. I show that, although representing an advance on Giddens’s position, Mouzelis’s account fails because he relies on the former’s definition of structure as comprising rules and resources. I then examine Archer’s solution to the problem. I argue that her definition of activity-dependence makes her account of the relationship between agents and structures unclear. I outline an alternative account in terms of super- venience, and argue that it contains the minimum ontological claim necessary for a realist understanding of the structure–agent relationship. Key words: Archer, Mouzelis, social ontology, social structure, supervenience. This paper evaluates two recent attempts to prune the hardy perennial of structure and agency. In their recent writing, both Nicos Mouzelis and Margaret Archer offer alternatives to Anthony Giddens’s structuration theory (Mouzelis 1995, 1996; Archer 1995, 1996b). The renewed attention paid to older writing in this field, and particularly to the work of David Lockwood, has caused McLennan (1995:117) to note ‘a loose but noticeable neo- traditionalist revival’ in sociological theory. The two authors exemplify this trend in different ways. Mouzelis says we should go ‘back to sociological theory,’ whereas Archer sees Lockwood as a forebear but explicitly tries to formulate a new research paradigm. I begin by outlining the problem as inherited from Giddens. I then discuss Mouzelis’s and Archer’s solutions in detail. Mouzelis’s work is a careful internal critique and reconstruction of Giddens’s theory. Archer’s is a distinct, external alternative to it. Both authors try to make a clear distinction between agents and structures in order to make these concepts (and particularly the latter) coherent and useful. In their efforts to give the concept of social structure back its bite, both Archer and Mouzelis draw on Lockwood’s (1956, 1964) distinction between social and system integration. Mouzelis attempts to build the distinction into Giddens’s account. In doing so, he points to a number of important aspects of structure and agency that Giddens cannot grasp. However, Giddens’s key idea that structure should be thought of as rules and resources is left largely untouched. I show that Mouzelis’s refinements run into difficulty because of this. 510 KIERAN HEALY Pursuing a different tack, Archer tries to ground the distinction ontologic- ally, relying on the work of Roy Bhaskar (1989a, 1989b). I contend that her account of the relationship between actors and structures is unclear in vital respects. In particular, the concept of ‘activity dependence’ is poorly defined and potentially misleading. In its place, I offer a more straightforward definition of the conceptual relationship between agents and structures in terms of supervenience. I argue that this better establishes the link Archer wants to make and has the added advantage of leaving us free to examine empirical relationships in a realist fashion without committing ourselves to Bhaskar’s metaphysics. The Problem: Actors and Structures Giddens gives us a theoretical vocabulary that tries to capture the relationship between social systems and the actors who make them up (for a summary account see Giddens 1984:25ff). Structure, Giddens says, is what gives form and shape to social life, without itself being that form and shape (Giddens 1989: 256). By this he means that social structure is a set of rules analogous to the paradigmatic structure of language, the ‘virtual structure of signi- ficance’ which provides the underlying grid from which actual speech is generated.1 The paradigmatic structure gives form and shape to a language but is only partially visible through particular instances of speech or writing. Such instances contribute to the reproduction of the whole structure, but they are never a full picture of it. What we see are syntagmatic instances of the paradigmatic structure. For Giddens, social systems correspond to this syntagmatic dimension. They are actual patterns of interaction and observable social relationships. Agents and structures are joined in a by now well-known duality (Giddens 1979:15): By the duality of structure I mean the essential recursiveness of social life, as constituted in social practices: structure is both the medium and outcome of the reproduction of practices. Structure enters simultaneously into the constitution of the agent and social practices and ‘exists’ in the generating moments of this constitution. The problems with this view are also well known. Arguments presented by Urry (1982) and developed by Thompson (1989) show that, in his efforts to make them enabling as well as constraining, Giddens makes structures so vaporous that it is next to impossible to get a grip on them. In his discussions of rules (Giddens 1979:65–9, 1984:16–25), important distinctions between structure (as rules and resources), systems (as products of structures) and agents (as mediating producers) all seem to collapse into one another. Giddens will not allow a fixed and discursively available body of rules, a properly external system or a genuinely independent individual. The result is CONCEPTUALISING CONSTRAINT 511 analytic paralysis: he ends up being unable to separate out these elements at all. He cannot talk about differing degrees of constraint within or between systems (Archer 1982). His theory allows little room for definite statements about cause and effect. Everything is left floating around in the vicinity of the actor, and the various elements are impossible to separate. These problems have further consequences for other parts of Giddens’s theory. In particular, the idea that unintended consequences are an important source of order is threatened. As Craib (1992:159–61) points out, there is an assumption in Giddens’s work that the unintended consequences of action will tend to have a patterned quality about them. His examples, despite usually being ironic or perverse in their effects, contribute to the maintenance of the system as a whole. But Giddens gives no general reason why this should be so. If we reject normative-functionalist explanations, as Giddens says we must, then clear cut, discursively available rules and norms with definite sanctions can no longer be an actor’s guiding light. In Giddens’s world, actors are generally unable to talk about the specific techniques they use to improvise everyday encounters with such consummate skill. If structure is produced through action in the way Giddens says it is (and that structure has no ulterior motives of its own), then it is not clear why, in general, unintended con- sequences tend to contribute to the maintenance of systems. Without functionalism, the patterned character of unintended consequences is a problem, not a solution. An Internal Rescue Attempt: Mouzelis Mouzelis (1989, 1995) attempts to salvage the valuable elements of Giddens’s account by placing them within a more comprehensive framework. He argues that ‘the type of subject–object relationship that the duality-of-structure scheme implies does not exhaust the types of relationship subjects have vis-á- vis rules and resources, or towards social ‘‘objects’’ in general’ (Mouzelis 1995:119). The paradigm–syntagm distinction separates general rules from their specific instances. Mouzelis claims that, in both of these cases, actors may also be oriented to social objects in terms of a duality or dualism, depending on their situation. The result is a fourfold analytic table: actors may unthinkingly enact rules (paradigmatic duality) or contemplate them (paradigmatic dualism); actors may also be vital to an interaction-setting or game (syntagmatic duality) or be powerless to affect it (syntagmatic dualism).2 Where does this typology take us? I think Mouzelis shows quite con- vincingly that the reduction by Giddens of the structure–agency dualism into a duality is incomplete. Take, for example, an assembly-line worker in a car factory. It makes no analytic sense to think about such a person as having a genuine, mutually constitutive relationship with the company she works for. She has no influence over this huge structure, and relates to it in terms of a 512 KIERAN HEALY subject–object dualism, not a duality. In general, according to Mouzelis (1995:120–1): Occupants of subordinate positions tend to relate to games played at higher organisational levels in terms of syntagmatic dualism (since as single individuals they cannot affect them significantly); whereas they relate to rules initiated from above predominantly in terms of paradigmatic duality (since they are supposed to, and often do, follow them in a taken-for-granted manner). The opposite com- bination (syntagmatic duality and paradigmatic dualism) obtains if one looks at how occupants of superordinate positions relate to games and rules respectively on lower organisational levels. Mouzelis certainly seems to be on solid ground here. Although we can readily concede the point that actors and structures are bound very closely together, when the time comes to do some research we will inevitably need to make the kind of distinctions that Giddens wants us not to make. Mouzelis gives us a way to talk about degrees of constraint, rather than just making the general point that structures always constrain and enable actors. Our general under- standing of structure now gives us – or at least does not outlaw – concepts we know we need. This is a significant advance on Giddens. Yet it fails. In Mouzelis’s work, ‘dualism’ implies that there is some sort of distance between actor and structure. He knows this gap varies empirically, and that, as a result, Giddens’s partial view will not do.