A VIRTUE-THEORETIC APPROACH TO RELIGIOUS EPISTEMOLOGY: FAITH AS AN ACT OF EPISTEMIC VIRTUE by BENJAMIN WILLIAM McCRAW (Under the Direction of Sarah Wright) ABSTRACT This work lies at the juncture between religious epistemology and virtue epistemology. Currently, both fields in epistemology are burgeoning with interest and novel theories, arguments, and applications. However, there is no systematic or sustained overlap between the two. I aim to provide such a systematic connection. Virtue epistemology holds that epistemology should turn away from analyzing person-neutral concepts like evidence, reliability, etc. as the primary locus of analysis in favor of person-based properties like intellectual character traits. I develop and defend a virtue-theoretic approach to religious epistemology; arguing that, in certain circumstances, faith can be an act of epistemic virtue. After developing my own account of epistemic virtue, I turn to an analysis of epistemic trust and argue that such trust is an epistemic virtue. To place epistemic trust in someone is to be disposed to see him/her as a kind of intellectual authority and depend on that authority—a kind relying confidence or confidence reliance. Next, I analyze the conceptual connections between faith and epistemic trust—arguing that robust religious faith is a species of epistemic trust. We should see faith as an expression of epistemic trust in certain ways; namely, for religious matters and for beliefs that matter deeply to one‘s overall intellectual, moral, pragmatic, etc. worldview. Given my argument(s) that epistemic trust is a virtue, it follows that faith is a particular expression of that virtue. Therefore, faith (when expressed properly) is epistemically virtuous qua act of epistemic virtue. We have an epistemological analysis of faith rooted systemically and deeply in virtue epistemology. The overall upshot is that genuine faith expresses a epistemically virtuous character via trust and, as such, can confer positive epistemic status on religious beliefs. Moreover, genuine faith must fit the same framework as other virtues: it must admit of a mean between excess and deficiency, it must come under the direction of practical wisdom, it must be consistent with other virtues, and other key criteria. I end by discussing how my approach addresses serious issues in religious epistemology and I locate it in the landscape of major theories of proper religious belief. INDEX WORDS: Virtue epistemology, Religious epistemology, Faith, Epistemic Trust, Epistemic virtue, Testimony, Zagzebksi, Universalism, Reliabilism, Assurantism, Divine hiddenness, Religious diversity, Evidentialism, Reformed epistemology, Fideism A VIRTUE-THEORETIC APPROACH TO RELIGIOUS EPISTEMOLOGY: FAITH AS AN ACT OF EPISTEMIC VIRTUE by BENJAMIN WILLIAM McCRAW BA, Wofford College, 2006 A Dissertation Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of The University of Georgia in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY ATHENS, GEORGIA 2012 © 2012 Benjamin William McCraw All Rights Reserved A VIRTUE-THEORETIC APPROACH TO RELIGIOUS EPISTEMOLOGY: FAITH AS AN ACT OF EPISTEMIC VIRTUE by BENJAMIN WILLIAM McCRAW Major Professor: Sarah Wright Committee: Frank R. Harrison, III Charles Cross William L. Power Electronic Version Approved: Maureen Grasso Dean of the Graduate School The University of Georgia December 2012 iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This dissertation could not have come about without the help, support, and criticism of many people over many years. Special thanks and gratitude go to the entire philosophy department of the University of Georgia. But, in particular, I must thank my committee members: Frank R. Harrison, Charles Cross, William L. Power and especially my director, Sarah Wright. Without their guidance, this task would have been impossible and fruitless. And my wife, Melia Brannon McCraw, has given me the encouragement, love, and enthusiasm necessary to keep me and my thoughts on the path necessary to complete this work. All of these people have my heartfelt thanks and gratitude. v TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................... iv CHAPTER 1 EPISTEMIC VIRTUE .......................................................................................1 Virtue Epistemology in General ..................................................................2 Varieties of Epistemic Virtue .......................................................................5 Zagzebski‘s Responsibilism.......................................................................17 Modified Zagzebskian Responsibilism ......................................................26 Objections ..................................................................................................28 Conclusion .................................................................................................36 2 EPISTEMIC TRUST .......................................................................................38 General Comments about Epistemic Trust ................................................39 General Features of Trust...........................................................................41 Definition of Epistemic Trust ....................................................................47 Alternative Accounts of Epistemic Trust ...................................................56 Why Epistemic Trust is Epistemically Vital ..............................................61 The Transmission Argument......................................................................61 The Epistemic Circularity Argument .........................................................64 The Cognitive Function Argument ............................................................68 Conclusion .................................................................................................72 vi 3 THE VIRTUE OF TRUST ..............................................................................74 Trust as an Epistemic Virtue ......................................................................75 Epistemic Trust and the Definition of ‗Virtue‘ ..........................................75 Epistemic Trust and the Metaepistemology of Virtues..............................81 Implications................................................................................................85 Epistemic Trust and Epistemological Issues..............................................89 Epistemic Trust and the Problem of Low-Grade Knowledge ....................89 Epistemic Trust and Testimony .................................................................91 Epistemic Trust and Disagreement ............................................................95 Conclusion ...............................................................................................101 4 POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE ACCOUNTS OF PROPER EPISTEMIC TRUST .................................................................................................................102 Reliabilism ...............................................................................................103 Evidentialism ...........................................................................................105 Universalism ............................................................................................114 Assurantism..............................................................................................123 Conclusion ...............................................................................................129 5 FAITH AS A SPECIES OF EPISTEMIC TRUST ........................................131 Need for a Virtue-Theoretic Account of Faith .........................................132 General Comments about Faith ...............................................................133 Faith and Epistemic Trust ........................................................................136 What Kind of Epistemic Trust is Faith? ...................................................145 The Adequacy of Virtue-Theoretic Faith .................................................149 vii Faith Desiderata .......................................................................................152 Alternative Accounts of Faith-In .............................................................157 Non-Fiducial Faith ...................................................................................157 Non-Doxastic Faith ..................................................................................161 Non-Fiducial and Non-Doxastic Faith .....................................................172 Conclusion ...............................................................................................179 6 FAITH AS AN ACT OF EPISTEMIC VIRTUE ..........................................180 The Genus-Species Argument .................................................................180 The Parity Argument................................................................................186 The Act of Virtue Argument ....................................................................190 Implications..............................................................................................200 Faith and the Doctrine of the Mean .........................................................200 Faith and Context-Sensitivity ..................................................................203 Faith and the Reciprocity of the Virtues ..................................................205