POETICS TODAY International Journal for Theory and Analysis of Literature and Communication Volume 11, number 1 (1990) Itamar Even-Zohar POLYSYSTEM STUDIES © Itamar EVEN-ZOHAR 1990, 1997 Table of Contents Introduction 1 POLYSYSTEM THEORY Polysystem Theory 9 The "Literary System" 27 The Position of Translated Literature within the Literary Polysystem 45 Laws of Literary Interference 53 Translation and Transfer 73 Interference in Dependent Literary Polysystems 79 System, Dynamics, and Interference in Culture: A Synoptic View 85 POLYSYSTEM STUDIES Russian and Hebrew: The Case of a Dependent Polysystem 97 The Role of Russian and Yiddish in the Making of Modern Hebrew 111 Aspects of the Hebrew-Yiddish Polysystem: A Case of a Multilingual Polysystem 121 Gnessin's Dialogue and Its Russian Models 131 Authentic Language and Authentic Reported Speech: Hebrew vs. Yiddish 155 Israeli Hebrew Literature 165 The Emergence of a Native Hebrew Culture in Palestine: 1882-1948 175 SYSTEM AND REPERTOIRE IN CULTURE Depletion and Shift 195 "Reality" and Realemes in Narrative 207 Void Pragmatic Connectives 219 The Textemic Status of Signs in Translation 247 BIBLIOGRAPHY 253 Even-Zohar, Itamar 1990. "Introduction [to Polysystem Studies]" Polysystem Studies [=Poetics Today 11:1 (1990)], pp 1-6. INTRODUCTION Polysystem theory was suggested in my works in 1969 and 1970, sub- sequently reformulated and developed in a number of my later studies and (I hope) improved, then shared, advanced, enlarged, and experi- mented with by a number of scholars in various countries. Although, as Segal (1982) has correctly observed, polysystem theory emerged in my own work out of the need to solve certain very specific prob- lems (having to do with translation theory [Even-Zohar 1971] as well as the intricate historical structure of Hebrew literature [Even-Zohar 1970, 1972, etc.]), its foundations had already been solidly laid by Russian Formalism in the 1920s. Unfortunately, misconceptions still prevail about Russian Formalism, which is why the fallacious equation of"Formalism" with a-historicity and static Structuralism is still the normal attitude in professional circles. But anybody familiar with the second and most decisively advanced stage of its scientific activity in the 1920s can no longer accept the current stereotypes about Russian Formalism. The theoretical work and research done by Russian Formalism, where what I consider to be the foundations of Polysystem theory emerged, is diverse. It was mostly designed to deal with problems of literature, but since on the one hand the very conception of "litera- ture" had undergone a series of modifications (most importantly in conceiving of it within the larger framework of culture), and since on the other hand linguists and cultural anthropologists in Russia never really separated their respective fields from that of "literature" (a separation which is still current in the West), certain hypotheses were conceived almost simultaneously in both literary studies and the latter Poetics Today 11:1 (Spring 1990). Copyright © 1990 by The Porter Institute for Poetics and Semiotics. ccc 0333-5372/90/$2.50. [p. 2] disciplines by various "formalists." As a theory, it was thus never con- fined to the field of literature, whatever its premises may have been. It now seems to me, after some twenty years of work in the theory, that much the same process has taken place with my own work, and that of other colleagues. There, too, Polysystem theory could not remain con- fined to the case of literature alone. The reasons for this development perhaps have not been the same as for the Russian Formalists. Yet I believe that they cannot be altogether different. For it does not seem plausible to disconnect what I believe to be the changing conceptions of the subject matter, that is "literature," from the theoretical possi- bilities offered by Polysystem theory, whatever its borders or shape might have been for the Russian Formalists or any other predecessors. A chain of conceptual developments (which cannot be discussed here) gradually pushed the Formalists to develop the framework of what I have proposed to label Dynamic Functionalism. Once the general atti- tudes of the latter were adopted in principle, conceptions could not stay the same as before. Boris Ejxenbaum, in his famous assessment of the work of Russian Formalism up to 1924 (Ejxenbaum 1927e [English 1971a]), gives a very powerful expression to this decisive step. Indeed, one could say that the changing concept(ion)s have given rise to the new theory, but the latter also made it both possible and imperative to change previous concept(ion)s. As a consequence, Polysystem theory--under whatever formulation --eventually strives to account for larger complexes than literature. However, "literature" is neither "deserted" nor"liquidated" by such a procedure. On the contrary, it is given the opportunity to break out of the corner into which it had been pushed (sometimes with all good intentions) by our relatively recent tradition. Literature is thus conceived of not as an isolated activity in society, regulated by laws exclusively (and inherently) different from all the rest of the human activities, but as an integral--often central and very powerful--factor among the latter. That such a development is "natural" for Dynamic Functionalism can be corroborated by the fact that different people have come to very similar conclusions not only during the 1920s and 1930s (like Tynjanov in Russia on the one hand and Bogatyrëv in Prague on the other), but in recent years as well. It is no wonder that my own Polysystem theory should overlap parts of Lotman's liter- ary as well as semiotic theories, although most of his writings became known in my part of the world only in the mid-seventies. After all, they emerge out of very similar premises and almost the same tradition.1 1. This has challenged some of my former students (and current colleagues), such as Shelly Yahalom (1980, 1984) and Zohar Shavit (1980, 1986), who attempted back in the late 1970s to integrate Lotmanian ideas with my older versions of Poly- system theory, which I believe has greatly enhanced its flexibility. A more recent, and highly interesting, attempt has been made by Rakefet Sela-Sheffy (1985). [p. 3] But a far more convincing and striking case is the fascinating work of Pierre Bourdieu and several of his collaborators, who, without any real connection to Dynamic Structuralism (Functionalism) or Formal- ism, have arrived at many similar conclusions, in some areas superior, to my mind, to both the Russian Formalism and later developments (including my own). Nevertheless, the matter of the rise and fall of theories, methods, and methodologies is not--as we very well know from the history of science and ideas--the outcome of some abstract program, sys- tematically followed by some group(s) of diligent scholars. It is, like anything else we know in culture, a negotiation, however intellectual, between certain abstract conceptions and concretely local situations, not to speak of fashions and other "irrelevant" factors. This is why the bulk of the work produced by Dynamic Functionalism (notably by such scholars as Tynjanov, Ejxenbaum, or Jakobson and particularly Bogatyrëv) has hardly ever succeeded in touching even the surface of the academic study of "literature" in most Western countries. Not that the "ideas" of Dynamic Functionalism are in any sense complicated. It is rather the whole conceptual framework--the program, as it were-- as well as its individual components that have been, and still are, alien to what most literary scholars consider their activity to consist of. It is in the very relationship between research and subject matter that Dynamic Functionalism is incompatible with all the other approaches. This relationship is particularly manifest on the level of metatheory (or methodology), where science is conceived of in terms of the hy- potheses that (1) no subject matter is independent of that science ("theory") of which it is considered the subject matter, (2) the only ade- quate (or feasible) way to observe a subject matter is by hypothesizing that it is governed by detectable, and relatively few, laws, and (3) the goal of any science (at least since the 1700s) is the discovery of such laws. The science of literature, a conception without which Dynamic Functionalism is unthinkable, is therefore not an activity whose goal is to observe what certain dominant views (ideologies/set of norms) in society consider to be "literature." Nor do the different views held by this science necessarily have any effect on any way the norms or views related to the question of what "literature" should be. In short, it is not the task of the science of literature to interfere with whatever anybody in society believes "literature" to be. As in any other discipline, its only interest is to operate in accordance with certain controllable proce- dures that are currently accepted and acknowledged as "the rules of the game" of this intellectual activity. The main task of the science of literature is therefore not necessarily to interpret texts, or writers, or anything else that is at one period or another considered to be the core of the matter discussed. It is, in other words, neither literary criticism nor philosophy of either literature or life. [p. 4] This is not the proper place to delve into matters concerning the science of literature--especially since many of those interested in lit- erature abhor the very idea of such a science;--suffice it to say here that many notions about "science" still prevailing in "humanistic" cir- cles often have little to do with science as it is conceived of and prac- ticed today. What they abhor is not "science," but some imaginary entity, often deduced from simplified and popularized versions of sci- ence. When we hear that science "has failed" in the field of literature, what is referred to as "science" is often some activity which either has nothing to do with science or merely pretends to be a science without the least understanding of the fundamental rules of the game.