Hume’s Functionalistic Theory of the Self A Dissertation Presented by Sardar Hosseini Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies in partial fulfilment of the requirements for a doctoral degree in Philosophy Department of Philosophy Arts University of Ottawa © Sardar Hosseini, Ottawa, Canada, 2013 To the memory of my father and my first teacher, Asadullah Hosseini i Abstract The main claim of this dissertation is that Hume’s theory of the self can be interpreted in terms of a causal or functional theory of mind. It is a thesis about Hume’s identification of mental particulars―impressions and ideas―in terms of the kind of roles that each plays in the cognitive system that it is a member of. The true Humean idea of the human mind is to understand it as a system of different mental states and processes, which are linked together by the relation of cause and effect. Functionalism as such can be construed as both teleo-functionalism and psycho-functionalism. The former is rooted in his teleological characterization of the mind according to which the bundle of perceptions persists over time by maintaining functional continuity, whereas the main source of Hume’s psycho-functionalism lies in his Representational Theory of Mind. Hume, however, Hume expresses his strong dissatisfaction with his earlier treatment of the topic, and confesses that he now finds an inconsistency in his original account. He does not make clear in his recantation what he finds problematic in his earlier account. And although more than a dozen interpretations have been suggested, no consensus as to what Hume’s worry is has emerged. I claim that Hume’s functionalism, as presented in the main body of the Treatise, stores a problem for him and when he arrives at the Appendix he realises the problem and confesses that he is unable to resolve it. The problem that leads to the inconsistency has two main possible sources: First, the principles of constancy and coherence may successfully account for the arising belief in the idea of the continued and distinct existence of external objects and the idea of personal identity, but they fail to explain our belief in other minds (selves). Second, Hume’s functionalism is circular because it presupposes personal identity. The central idea is that if Hume is right to say that something like functional continuity would suffice for persons to persist through time, then he must show that we can have a complete account of how one’s mental states produce the idea of a persisting self without making assumption about the identity condition of their subject or bearer. And of course, psycho- functionalism, including Hume’s, identifies a mental state in terms of its functional relations to other mental states that are the states of the same person. This is straightforwardly circular. ii ACKNOWLEDGEMTNS In acknowledging those who have made it possible for me to complete this dissertation, I must express deepest gratitude to my supervisor, Professor David Raynor, who first introduced me to David Hume and guided me through this work. He offered continuous encouragement and innumerable stimulating ideas. I also thank the members of my dissertation committee: Professor Andrew Sneddon, Professor Graeme Hunter, and Professor Patrice Philie. Finally, I thank my wife, Zahra, and my son, Erfan, for their patience and encouragements over the years. I am grateful to them both. iii Table of Contents Acknowledgments iii List of Abbreviations v Introduction 1 I. Hume’s Functionalism: A First Approximation 19 I.1: The Lockean Background to Hume’s Functionalism 23 I.2: Hume’s Characterization of the Self as a Fiction 35 I.3: The Mind as a System of Causal Connection 44 I.4: Hume on the Nature of the Mind 55 II. Hume’s Computational Theory of Mind 78 II.1: Hume’s Mechanics of the Mind 80 II.2: The Imagination and Causal Inference 91 II.3: Hume on the Architecture of the Mind 97 II.4: Hume’s Representation Theory of Mind 106 • Hume on Mental Representation 109 • Hume on Computation 113 • Hume on Meaning 120 III. Hume’s Psychology of Identity Ascriptions 124 III.1: The Continued and Distinct Existence of External Objects 131 III.2: The Distinction between Constancy and Coherence 138 III.3: Hume’s Principle of Constancy 163 III.4: Hume’s Principle of Coherence 175 IV. Hume’s Functionalism and Personal Identity 186 IV.1: Hume on Character Traits, Self-Concerns, and Personal Identity 189 IV.2: Functionalism and the Psychological Continuity Criterion of Personal Identity 196 IV.3: Functionalism Tells us Nothing about Personal Identity 204 IV.4: Hume’s Reification of Perceptions and the Impersonal Description of the Self 214 IV.5: Tension in Hume’s Functionalistic Theory of Personal Identity 219 V. Hume’s Second Thoughts about Personal Identity 225 V.1: Interpretations of Hume’s Second Thoughts 230 V.2: Hume’s Criterion of Personal Identity: Constancy and Coherence 244 V.3: The Failure of Coherence and Constancy and the Belief in Other Minds 251 Notes and References 273 Bibliography 288 iv List of Abbreviations THN David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature. References are given by page number to the edition of L. A. Selby-Bigge revised by P. H. Nidditch (Oxford, 1978). EHU David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. References are given by page number to the edition of L. A. Selby-Bigge revised by P. H. Nidditch (Oxford, 1975). EPM David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals. References are given by page number to the edition of L. A. Selby-Bigge revised by P. H. Nidditch (Oxford, 1975). EST David Hume, Of the Standard of Taste and Other Essays. References are given by page number to the edition of The Library of the Liberal Arts edited by J. W. Lenz (Indianapolis, 1965). Abs David Hume, An Abstract of a Book Lately Published, Entitled, A Treatise Of Human Nature, &c. References are given by paragraph numbers. Cited From the Clarendon Edition of A Treatise of Human Nature, Oxford: Clarendon Press 2007. EMPL David, Hume, Essays: Moral, Political, and Literary, edited by Eugene F. Miller, Library of Classics: Indianapolis, Ind., 1987. References are given by page number. Essay John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. References are given by page number to the edition of P. H. Nidditch (Oxford, 1975). AT C. Adam, P. Tannery (eds.), CEuvres de Descartes, revised ed., 12 vols. (Paris: Vrin/CNRS, 1964-76. CSM J. G. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, and D. Murdoch (eds.), The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, 2 vols., Cambridge University Press 1985. CSMK J. G. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, D. Murdoch, and A. Kenny (eds.), The Philosophical Writings of Descartes: The Correspondence, vol. III, Cambridge University Press 1991. v Introduction The seventeenth century philosophers were still thinking about the self in the mode of the Ancient and Scholastic traditions. They still breathed and thought within the scheme of that tradition according to which the self was conceived as the soul, an immaterial substance. Descartes’ substance dualism is said to be the most vigorous and spirited defence of such a view of the self at the very beginning of modern philosophy. He described the body as sheer mechanical processes which are subject to the laws of physics, whereas the unextended mind is situated completely outside the schema of the body and, thus, is not subject to the laws of physics. However, that view of the self was undergoing a massive transformation. Martin and Barresi (1) have called the seventeenth century “a time of momentous and soul-shattering intellectual transformation.” The natural philosophers of the century had already introduced the experimental method of reasoning into the sciences and had made great advances. Newton played a central role in showing that there could be a natural philosophy of the external world. On the other hand, the moral philosophers turned away from the dogmatic/scholastic conception of the soul as a mysterious immaterial substance and favoured to investigate the mind as a natural phenomenon. By the end of the eighteenth century the immaterial soul was replaced by the self as material mind, a dynamic natural system subject to general laws of natural philosophy. The new natural philosophy turned away from its predecessors’ dogmatic assertions about the essence of the soul, and instead, it started investigating the mind’s activities and states under the light of human experiences. So, the immaterial soul transformed into an empirical self, or mind. This transformation posited new possibilities about the nature of the self and the way we understand it as well as new challenges. Of course, it elevated our understanding of ourselves and deepened our perspective on how to explain our conscious mental activities, but it also caused serious philosophical controversies and existential terror. One major philosophical problem that this new understanding of ourselves caused was whether the self persists from moment to moment, or survives over time. This new emerging imaginary, or “fictitious,” to use Hume’s terminology, notion of the self was powerful enough to cause reaction among philosophers, which in turn, backfired and attracted some important eighteenth century philosophical figures to the idea of the mind as an immaterial substance. The outcome of 1 this soul-shattering transformation was that by the end of the eighteenth century, the mystery of the immaterial soul was replaced by the new mystery of the material self. Hume plays a major role in this soul-shattering intellectual transformation. He describes his own philosophy as an attempt to introduce the Newtonian Experimental Method of Reasoning into moral subjects. This scientific method of reasoning that is founded on experience and observation is said to be “a complete system of the sciences, built on a foundation almost entirely new, and the only one upon which they can stand with any security” (THN, xvi).