doi: 10.17323/1728-192x-2021-2-104-117 Secret Life versus Double Life: Modes of Clandestinity of Italian Terrorist Groups Riccardo Campa Extraordinary Professor, Jagiellonian University Address: Ul. Grodzka 52, Krakow, Poland 31-044 E-mail: [email protected] This article presents two distinct modes of operating in a state of clandestinity adopted by Italian leftist terrorist groups, such as the Red Brigades and First Line, in the second half of the 20th century. The two modes of clandestine life are specified with the terms “invisibility” and “camouflage”. The invisibility mode of clandestinity imposes a regime of “secret life” on the group members, while the camouflage mode of clandestinity imposes a “double life” re- gime on them. The research aims to construct two simplified models, or, to use the Weberian terminology, two “ideal types”. Our primary sources are autobiographies published by former terrorists, official propaganda documents and pamphlets compiled by terrorist groups, and court rulings. Our secondary sources are journalist reports and research published by experts in political violence. From the theoretical point of view, the conclusion is, that for law en- forcement, it is much more difficult to combat terrorist formations imposing the double life regime on their members rather than a secret life regime. Still, the double life regime is more stressful from a psychological point of view, as it requires an artificial split of personality. In the conclusions, the article expands the discussion to non-Italian terrorist organizations, with a different political or religious agenda. Keywords: sociology of terrorism, Red Brigades, First Line, modes of clandestinity, invis- ibility, camouflage Background and Aim of the Research As it has often been remarked, there is no generally accepted definition of the term “terrorism” (Malik, 2000; Schmid, 2011; Richards, 2014), even if attempts at determin- ing a consensus definition are not lacking (Weinberg, Pedahzur, Hirsh-Hoefler, 2004; Senechal de la Roche, 2004; Ramsay, 2015). Since the polysemic nature of this term-and- concept is a constant source of misunderstandings and controversies both inside and outside the scientific community, it is advisable to make the meaning one attaches to this word explicit before starting any research on terrorism. Here, we will start from the much-quoted and sometimes disputed definition pro- posed by the United States Department of State (2000: viii): “The term ‘terrorism’ means: premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents usually intended to influence an audience”. This definition was slightly expanded and better specified by Rex Hudson in research carried out for the United States Congress in 1999, and republished in 2018. Following Hudson (2018), we stipulate that a terrorist act “is the calculated use of unexpected, 104 СОЦИОЛОГИЧЕСКОЕ ОБОЗРЕНИЕ. 2021. Т. 20. № 2 RUSSIAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW. 2021. VOL. 20. NO 2 105 shocking, and unlawful violence against non combatants (including, in addition to civil- ians, off-duty military and security personnel in peaceful situations) and other symbolic targets perpetrated by a clandestine member(s) of a subnational group or a clandestine agent(s) for the psychological purpose of publicizing a political or religious cause and/or intimidating or coercing a government(s) or civilian population into accepting demands on behalf of the cause”. The keyword on which we will focus is “clandestine”. The terrorist act is not perpetrat- ed by soldiers of a national army or by a group of revolutionary guerrillas. These are both military organizations whose combatants wear uniforms and show the enemy their faces. On the contrary, a terrorist act is by definition perpetrated by agents acting in a state of clandestinity. They may be civilian members of a subnational antagonist group, or even military or police officers sent on a mission by a foreign state, but the fact remains that they operate in a state of clandestinity. In this research, we intend to show that there are at least two distinct modes of op- erating in such a state of clandestinity. Both methods develop from a primordial state of semi-clandestinity, which generally occurs when the terrorist group is in the process of being gestated. We define the two modes of clandestine life with the terms “invisibility” and “camouflage”. The first mode imposes a regime of “secret life”, while the second im- poses a “double life” regime. To illustrate these two ways of existence, we will proceed by comparing the activities of two Italian terrorist organizations active in the second half of the last century: the Brigate Rosse (the Red Brigades) and Prima Linea (First Line). These are two extreme-left organizations, that is, groups with a very similar Marxist-Leninist political agenda, operating in the same period, and in the same territory. Therefore, the comparison of their modes of organizing clandestinely is particularly instructive. In the conclusions, we will expand the discussion to non-Italian terrorist organizations with a different political or religious agenda. It goes without saying that here we are just presenting two simplified models, or, to say it in Weberian language, two ideal types (1949: 42). These ideal types should help us to grasp aspects of a social reality that is far more protean and complex than any of its possible representations. Our primary sources are autobiographies written by former ter- rorists, official propaganda documents and pamphlets compiled by terrorist groups, and court rulings. Our secondary sources are works published by experts in terrorist studies and police reporters. The Historical Context At the end of the 1960s, Italy found itself in a situation of political turbulence. As in other nations of the Western bloc, a student protest broke out in 1968 (Brambilla, 1994; Gia- chetti, 1998). To this was added, in 1969, a large mobilization of the working class, known as “the warm autumn” (Giachetti, 2013). Millions of workers went on strike and demon- strated to get wage increases and better working conditions. The influence of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) was also growing in the country. Its electoral consensus began to 106 СОЦИОЛОГИЧЕСКОЕ ОБОЗРЕНИЕ. 2021. Т. 20. № 2 approach that of the Christian Democrats (DC), the main government force. The United States showed concern because, amid the Cold War, they could not accept losing control over a crucial outpost in the Mediterranean Sea. The geopolitical role of Italy was crucial because of its proximity to communist Yugoslavia, the Arab-Israeli wars, and countries subjected to the process of decolonization, such as those located in Northern Africa and the Mid-East, which are among the main oil producers in the world. In the same years, fascist terrorist attacks also took place. Bombs exploded on trains, in buildings, and in squares crowded by protesting students and workers on strike. In particular, the so-called “Piazza Fontana Massacre” took place on December 12th, 1969, in Milan. A bomb exploded inside the Banca Nazionale dell’Agricoltura (National Agrar- ian Bank), killing 17 people and injuring 88. At the beginning, anarchists were blamed for the horrendous massacre. Afterward, the extreme right-wing militants of a group called Nuovo Ordine (New Order) were indicted, but they would eventually be acquitted. We still do not know with certainty what happened in those dark years, but the socio- logically-relevant fact is that many leftist students, workers, and intellectuals of the time were convinced that the bombing attacks were directed by Italian and American govern- ment officers. In their narrative, the neo-fascist groups only supplied the laborers to the subversive conspiracy of the deep state (Soccorso Rosso, 1976; Sanguinetti, 1980; Curcio, 1993; Flamigni, 2004: 17, 41). Subsequent investigations by the Italian judiciary explored this hypothesis, but no conclusive evidence was found. In 1998, the suspicions of the judiciary had indeed fallen on US officers who supposedly helped the fascists to blow up bombs in order to throw the country into chaos and favor a military coup. The new investigation attracted the at- tention of the Italian and foreign press (Bellu, 1998; Mastrogiacomo, 2001; Willan, 2000, 2001). According to the judges, the so-called “strategy of tension”, based on false flag attacks, was intended to prevent Italy from leaving NATO and the Western bloc. Agents of the Italian secret services were also investigated for “depistaggio” (the misdirection of the judiciary). However, the trial did not lead to any clear conclusion, leaving the per- petrators of the massacre unpunished, with a single exception. As judge Guido Salvini, who was in charge of the investigation, points out, “all the sentences on the Piazza Fon- tana bombing, even those ended with acquittals, lead to the conclusion that it was an extreme right formation, New Order, to organize the attacks of December 12th”. Fur- thermore, “at least one culprit was found in the final Cassation Court sentence of 2005. He is Carlo Digilio, the expert in weapons and explosives of the Veneto group of New Order, self-confessed guilty, who provided the explosives for the massacre and who also admitted having been linked to the American secret service” (2013). Quite instructive in this respect is Chapter 56 of the court ruling by the Tribunale Civile e Penale di Milano, entitled “The Involvement of the American Informative Structure in the Strategy of Ten- sion”. Here, judge Salvini specifies that US officers were informed about the extreme right terrorist attacks before and after they happened. However, “according to the intentions of the American structure, the attacks in preparation had only to have a demonstrative scope and not to cause victims” (1998). In other words, false flag attacks were actually on RUSSIAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW. 2021. VOL. 20. NO 2 107 the agenda of the US intelligence, but fascist perpetrators went too far by creating many innocent victims and generating an embarrassing situation.