SECTION 12.2 CONCLUSIONS: SECURITY SECTOR REFORM Contents Introduction and key findings ....................................................................................... 414 Pre‑invasion planning and preparation ........................................................................ 415 Occupation ................................................................................................................... 417 Iraqiisation ............................................................................................................. 422 The US military take the lead on police reform ............................................... 426 Security declines ............................................................................................. 427 Transition ..................................................................................................................... 430 The MOD takes the lead for policing ..................................................................... 434 Preparation for withdrawal ........................................................................................... 435 “Good enough” ....................................................................................................... 435 Better Basra .................................................................................................... 436 Security Sector Reform strategy .................................................................................. 440 Measuring success ................................................................................................ 441 Lessons ........................................................................................................................ 442 413 The Report of the Iraq Inquiry Introduction and key findings 1. This Section addresses conclusions in relation to the evidence set out in Section 12.1. 2. This Section does not address conclusions in relation to: • broader planning and preparation for the conflict in Iraq and its aftermath, which are described in Section 6.5; • the decision to remove some members of the Ba’ath Party from public office, a process known as “de‑Ba’athification”, which are described in Section 1.2;1 • the UK contribution to the reconstruction of Iraq, which are described in Section 10.4; or • the deployment of civilians to Iraq, which are described in Section 15.2. Key findings • Between 2003 and 2009, there was no coherent US/UK strategy for Security Sector Reform (SSR). • The UK began work on SSR in Iraq without a proper understanding of what it entailed and hugely underestimated the magnitude of the task. • The UK was unable to influence the US or engage it in a way that produced an Iraq‑wide approach. • There was no qualitative way for the UK to measure progress. The focus on the quantity of officers trained for the Iraqi Security Forces, rather than the quality of officers, was simplistic and gave a misleading sense of comfort. • After 2006, the UK’s determination to withdraw from Iraq meant that aspirations for the Iraqi Security Forces were lowered to what would be “good enough” for Iraq. It was never clear what that meant in practice. • The development of the Iraqi Army was considerably more successful than that of the Iraqi Police Service. But the UK was still aware before it withdrew from Iraq that the Iraqi Army had not been sufficiently tested. The UK was not confident that the Iraqi Army could maintain security without support. 414 12.2 | Conclusions: Security Sector Reform Pre‑invasion planning and preparation What is SSR? The Organisation for Economic Co‑operation and Development (OECD) defines SSR as development work that helps societies to “escape from a downward spiral wherein insecurity, crime and underdevelopment are mutually reinforcing”.1 In considering the SSR effort in Iraq, the Inquiry’s task was complicated by a lack of clear terminology. That is indicative of the lack of clarity which hampered SSR activities from the start. The term Security Sector Reform was not used in a consistent way, and was sometimes used interchangeably with phrases such as “security system reform” and “Rule of Law”. It was sometimes used to refer solely to police reform or to work to reform the army. The term “Rule of Law” was often used to refer specifically to the justice sector. The term “Security Sector Reform” (SSR) is used in this Report to refer to work to rebuild and reform Iraq’s security and justice institutions. The evidence available to the Inquiry reflects the UK’s overwhelming focus on the Iraqi Army (IA) and Iraqi Police Service (IPS). Low‑budget projects were undertaken in relation to the Iraqi judiciary and prison system (see Box, ‘The justice sector’, later in this Section) but their scale was very small by comparison. 3. Before the invasion, UK Government departments recognised that Security Sector Reform (SSR) would be an important component in reconstructing Iraq. 4. The FCO acknowledged that SSR should be “at the centre of post‑conflict work, rather than outside it as happened in Afghanistan”,2 and understood that the issues raised by SSR would be complex and should be planned for as soon as possible. 5. Papers on SSR written by the FCO between October and December 2002 demonstrated the range of fundamental questions on SSR in Iraq for which the UK did not yet have answers. They included: • “What security structures would be appropriate for a post S[addam] H[ussein] Iraqi Government? How do we arrive at an answer? What are the threats, internal and external? Should we undertake a comprehensive review of the armed forces?”3 • “How do we replace an excessively large security apparatus with something ‘right sized’? Reform or abolition? Which parts of the security apparatus might be loyal to a new government and which not?” 1 OECD DAC, Handbook on Security System Reform, 2007. 2 Paper FCO Middle East Department, 10 December 2002, ‘Iraq: Security Sector Reform’. 3 Letter Gray to Drummond, 18 October 2002, ‘Papers for the AHGI’ attaching Paper, [unattributed], 17 October 2002, ‘Iraq: Security Sector Reform’. 415 The Report of the Iraq Inquiry • How to reform the working culture of the security sector, “particularly the police and the courts, so that it operates on the basis of humanitarian values in support of a legitimate government”?4 6. Between December 2002 and March 2003, very little progress was made in answering those questions. SSR was not always referred to in consideration of post‑conflict operations. Specific plans were not developed for what would be done on the ground. 7. The UK saw a need to understand the US strategy before developing its own. That was consistent with the broad UK approach to post‑conflict planning, on which the UK assumed that the US would lead, as addressed in Section 6.5. 8. The UK’s short and medium term objectives for SSR were articulated by the MOD in February 2003. They were defined in very broad terms, with the desired end state: “to include the restructuring of the intelligence agencies, armed forces, police and criminal justice system. All elements of the Security Sector to be affordable and accountable”.5 9. From 7 February onwards, responsibility for the UK’s policy on SSR sat with the FCO under the leadership of Mr Jack Straw, the Foreign Secretary, and Sir Michael Jay, the Permanent Under Secretary. From 10 April, Mr Straw also chaired the Ad Hoc Ministerial Group on Iraq Rehabilitation (AHMGIR). 10. Two teams in the FCO had a key role in relation to SSR: • the Iraq Planning Unit (IPU), established to improve Whitehall co‑ordination on post‑conflict issues and provide policy guidance on the practical questions that UK civilian officials and military commanders would face in Iraq; and • the United Nations Department (UND), which would help to identify, train and deploy civilian police to Iraq. 11. The US‑led Coalition Military Assistance and Training Team (CMATT) was responsible for the training of the New Iraqi Army. The UK provided nine military officers in June 2003 to assist with that task, one of which was to act as the Deputy Commander of CMATT. It appears from the evidence that, in practice, the MOD led on this aspect of SSR. 12. On the eve of the invasion, there was no coherent SSR strategy in place between Coalition partners. That was described as a “high‑level risk”6 by the MOD’s Defence Advisory Team. 4 Paper FCO Middle East Department, 10 December 2002, ‘Iraq: Security Sector Reform’. 5 Paper MOD [unattributed], 5 February 2003, ‘Iraq – Phase IV Subjects’. 6 Minute IPU [junior official] to IPU, 18 March 2003, ‘Security Sector Reform: Future Iraqi Armed Forces’ attaching Paper Defence Advisory Team, March 2003, ‘Security Sector Reform: Future Iraqi Armed Forces’. 416 12.2 | Conclusions: Security Sector Reform 13. Even though officials had warned that knowledge of conditions within Iraq was incomplete, it was assumed that Iraq would have a functioning criminal justice system and security forces which, after the removal of Ba’athist leadership, would have the capacity to play their part in its reconstruction. 14. It was unclear how the international SSR effort would be co‑ordinated and therefore what contribution the UK would make. Occupation 15. Immediately after the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime there was widespread looting by the Iraqi population, including in Baghdad and Basra. As described in Section 9.8, UK forces in Basra were not given instructions by their commanders in the UK on how to deal with it. 16. Brigadier Graham Binns, commanding the