No. 2016-1 In the Supreme Court of the Principality of Verona LORD AND LADY MONTAGUE AND LORD AND LADY CAPULET, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES v. FRIAR LAURENCE, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE VERONESE TRIAL COURT BRIEF FOR FRIAR LAURENCE ELIZABETH B. PRELOGAR Counsel of Record ICHAEL REEBEN M R. D Department of Justice for Friars Washington, D.C. 20530 [email protected] (202) 514-1763 QUESTIONS PRESENTED 1. Was Friar Laurence negligent? 2. If so, was the jury’s assessment of comparative fault supported by the evidence in the case? (I) In the Supreme Court of the Principality of Verona No. 2016-1 LORD AND LADY CAPULET AND LORD AND LADY MONTAGUE, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES v. FRIAR LAURENCE, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE VERONESE TRIAL COURT BRIEF FOR FRIAR LAURENCE STATEMENT AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT For generations, an “ancient grudge” between two feuding families—the Montagues and the Capulets— ravaged the streets of Verona. The Most Excellent and Lamentable Tragedy of Romeo and Juliet Prologue.3 (Creede, T., publisher) (2d Quarto 1599) (“R.-”). Impassioned by the feud, individuals at every level of society were incited to violence at whim. See, e.g., id. at I.i.55-73; III.i.69-86; III.i.117-129; V.iii.70- 73. Riots repeatedly broke out on the streets. See id. at I.i.82-84 (“Three civil brawls, bred of an airy word / By thee, old Capulet, and Montague / Have thrice disturbed the quiet of our streets.”). Public discourse became coarser still. See id. at 1.1.37-38 (“I will bite my thumb at them, which is a / disgrace to them, if they bear it. (bites his thumb)”). And passion (1) 2 repeatedly trumped reason as emotions flared. See, e.g., id. at III.i.129 (“[F]ire-eyed fury be my conduct now.”); id. at II.vi.9 (“These violent delights have violent ends”). Caught in the crosshairs of their families’ long- standing war, “[a] pair of star-crossed lovers t[ook] their life.” R.-Prologue.5. Romeo, a Montague, and Juliet, a Capulet, shared a love “as boundless as the sea * * * for both are infinite.” Id. at II.ii.133-135. But because they were born to feuding families who would never accept that love, Romeo and Juliet were driven to desperate measures, culminating in their double suicide. With their death, they “bur[ied] their parents’ strife,” id. at Prologue.7, bringing “[a] gloom- ing peace” to Verona. Id. at V.iii.305. But that recon- ciliation came too late for the couple, who served, by Lord Capulet’s own admission, as “[p]oor sacrifices of [their families’] enmity.” Id. at V.iii.304. Now that the feud is over, the Montagues and Cap- ulets have joined together to wage a legal war against a blameless clergyman who tried to help Romeo and Juliet at every turn but was thwarted by the dire circumstances produced by the families’ mutual ani- mosity. Defendant-appellant Friar Laurence repeat- edly provided emotional support to the couple as they alternated between varying states of euphoria (at their love) and despair (at their families’ foreseeable disapproval of their union). When the going really got tough, and Romeo and Juliet each independently threatened suicide, Friar Laurence devised a plan intended to give the young lovers the will to live, with the overarching hope that their “alliance may so hap- py prove / To turn [their] households’ rancor to pure love.” R.-II.iii.91-92. That plan ultimately failed 3 based on an unfortunate and unforeseeable sequence of events. But the real tragedy at this juncture is the families’ attempt to hold Friar Laurence liable for Romeo’s and Juliet’s deaths. This Court should reverse the jury’s verdict finding that Friar Laurence was negligent and bore 70% of the responsibility for the young lovers’ suicides. Friar Laurence cannot be found negligent because he had no duty of care, contrary to plaintiffs’ misguided theo- ry of spiritual malpractice. And even if this Court were to recognize a novel duty in this context, the Friar did not breach it. Each of his actions was rea- sonable, the resulting harm was unforeseeable, and intervening forces broke the chain of causation. Moreover, the jury erred in its analysis of compara- tive fault. If fingers are to be pointed (or thumbs bitten), it is the Montagues and Capulets who bear responsibility for the deaths of their children. Be- cause plaintiffs are at the very least equally at fault, they cannot recover in this civil suit. In the spiritual realm, Friar Laurence has already been “[him]self condemnéd and [him]self excused.” R.-V.iii.227. So too here, the jury’s verdict should be reversed. ARGUMENT I. “WE STILL HAVE KNOWN THEE FOR A HOLY MAN.” R.-V.III.270: THE FRIAR WAS NOT NEGLIGENT In Verona (as in Maryland, its successor province), “in order to establish a cause of action for negligence, a plaintiff must prove: a duty owed * * * ; a breach of that duty; [and] a causal relationship between the breach and the harm.” Walpert, Smullian & Blumen- thal, P.A. v. Katz, 762 A.2d 582, 655 (Md. 2000). The 4 Montagues and Capulets failed to carry their burden on each of those elements. A. “A greater power than we can contradict / Hath thwarted our intents.” R.-V.iii.153: Spiritual Counse- lors Are Not Subject To A Duty Of Care As A Matter Of Law “[T]here can be no negligence where there is no du- ty that is due; for negligence is the breach of some duty that one person owes to another.” West Virginia Cent. & P. Ry. Co. v. State, 54 A. 669, 671 (Md. 1903). That principle resolves this case. As Romeo and Juli- et’s spiritual counselor, Friar Laurence listened to the couple’s problems with open ears and, in accordance with the teachings of the Church, offered “priestly consolation and guidance in return.” Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980). Secular tort courts lack authority to craft standards of care to regulate that priest-congregant relationship. See, e.g., Constance Frisby Fain, Minimizing Liability for Church-Related Counseling Services: Clergy Mal- practice and First Amendment Religion Clauses, 44 Akron L. Rev. 221, 250 (2011) (“Clergy malpractice actions have been rejected uniformly by state courts”). “Such a duty would necessarily be inter- twined with the religious philosophy of the particular denomination or ecclesiastical teachings of the reli- gious entity.” Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley, 763 P.2d 948, 960 (Cal. 1988). Thus, any attempt to define Friar Laurence’s ministerial duties would necessarily entangle the Court in an investiga- tion and evaluation of religious tenets and doctrines, in contravention of principles of religious liberty that Verona may one day adopt committing it to “make no 5 law respecting an establishment of religion or prohib- iting the free exercise thereof.” U.S. Const. Amend. I. A contrary rule permitting a cause of action for spiritual malpractice would sanction “intrusive inquiry by the civil courts into religious matters.” Baumgart- ner v. First Church of Christ, Scientist, 490 N.E.2d 1319, 1324 (Ill. Ct. App. 1986). To establish a standard of care of an “ordinary” Franciscan friar engaged in religious counseling, the Court would have to probe whether Friar Laurence properly followed the teach- ings of the Church in advising Romeo and Juliet. This Court should resist plaintiffs’ request that it “judge [the] competence, training, methods and content of the pastoral function.” Hester v. Barnett, 723 S.W.2d 544, 553 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987). In short, and with all due respect, Friar Laurence should face the judgment of a higher authority—not the judgment of a tort court. B. “Hold, daughter. I do spy a kind of hope, / Which craves as desperate an execution / As that is desperate which we would prevent.” R.-IV.i.69-71: Friar Lau- rence Did Not Breach Any Duty Of Care Even if this Court could articulate a duty of care to govern ecclesiastical counseling relationships, Friar Laurence did not breach it. At trial, plaintiffs sought to premise liability on five separate acts, but none was negligent or wrongful. While plaintiffs contend that Friar Laurence should have delayed the wedding of Paris and Juliet, the record unequivocally establishes that the wedding was to occur “[o]n Thursday next” and “nothing may prorogue it.” R.-IV.1.49 (emphasis added). Indeed, Juliet pleaded with Lady Capulet to “[d]elay this marriage for a month, a week,” id. at III.v.200, and her mother sternly refused, echoing 6 Lord Capulet’s threat to disown Juliet if the wedding did not occur on an accelerated timeline, id. at III.v.203-204; III.v.188-196. Plaintiffs offer no reason to think that Friar Laurence could have successfully convinced Lord and Lady Capulet to alter the wed- ding date, given their desire to marry Juliet to a no- bleman whom they feared might be getting cold feet because the “times of woe afford[ed] no time to woo,” id. at R.-III.iv.8. Nor did Friar Laurence act negligently in provid- ing Juliet with the sleeping potion. Fake death is preferable to real death, and Juliet had just promised to kill herself if the Friar could not come up with a solution to her predicament. See R.-IV.i.51-68. Alt- hough plaintiffs contend the potion was a restricted substance, the Friar worked only with natural herbs and plants, see id. at II.iii.5-22, and had no reason to believe he was administering a controlled drug.